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Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to critically examine race and gender as
they intersect with tourism development in Cuba during the Special Period in a Time
of Peace (Special Period), a government imposed austerity program that followed the
loss of important Soviet subsidies in 1989.
I hypothesize that tourism development in Cuba during the Special Period
betrays the Revolution in that it reconstitutes discriminatory practices along lines of
race and gender and hence does not deliver benefits to average Cubans. Indeed, I
argue that tourism as presently constructed may subvert the well being of ordinary
Cubans.
I draw from Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and the wider body of theory
collectively referred to as the social construction of space to frame my analysis. I
posit that Cuba functions as a de facto hegemonic power and thereby challenges the
notion that hegemonies are necessarily associated with capitalist regimes. I
demonstrate how socially constructed discourses emerged during the Revolution that
support the Marxist notion that socialism eliminates discrimination and inequality.
Throughout the course of the Cuban Revolution, the Castro regime has
maintained that inequalities of race and gender have been eliminated because the
“conditions” for discrimination (i.e., the capitalist modes of production) have
disappeared. My data suggest that racism and sexism continue to exist in Cuba and

v

have become more prevalent during the Special Period in a Time of Peace (1989present).
I base the study on data derived from official and non-official sources along
with field data conducted over the course of three excursions from 1995-1997. I also
conduct a qualitative and quantitative analysis of Cuban tourism literature to examine
representations of women and darker-skinned Cubans to test my hypothesis.
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CHAPTER ONE
Statement of the Research Problem
“Tourism is both a constructed and constructing phenomenon, it is a communicator
and shaper of society’s ideology” (Hollingshead quoted in Morgan and Pritchard
1998, 17).
The main goal of this dissertation is to study how Cuba’s tourism-oriented
development strategy intersects with race and gender, and the extent to which tourism
benefits the average Cuban. I maintain that tourism development in Cuba during the
Special Period in a Time of Peace (1989-present: el Período Especial en el Tiempo de
Paz) betrays the Revolution in that it reconstitutes discriminatory practices along
lines of race and gender and hence does not deliver benefits to average Cubans.
Indeed tourism, as presently constructed may actually subvert the well being of
ordinary Cubans, despite government claims to the contrary. As the opening quote
suggests, tourism shapes and reflects a society, and consequently, the tourist
landscape reveals much about the societal streams of power (see Duncan 1991, 3).
With these points in mind, I have focused this analysis on the effectiveness of Cuba’s
tourism development strategy and the government’s role in implementing tourism.
First of all, given the Cuban decision to pursue a development strategy that combines
tourism with limited market capitalism, I explore how well Cuban tourism addresses
the “development for whom?” question. To do this I have posed the following
questions to guide the analysis: Who benefits from Cuba’s current economic
development strategy? Given that tourism is often a highly gendered and racialized
field (a point established in Chapters Four, Five and Six), how does the industry
affect the economic and social roles of Cuban women? How do the tourism
1

economy, and the resulting societal shifts of the Special Period, tangibly affect the
lives of Afro-Cubans and mulattos (blacks and mixed race Cubans) as opposed to
Hispanic-Cubans (whites)? Previous research in a wide range of countries has
revealed that women and darker-skinned participants in the tourism industry are
generally found in inferior and unskilled positions because those are often the only
jobs available to them (Sinclair 1997, 1-12; Chant 1995, 96-100; Harrison 1995, 2425; Shaw and Williams 1994, 150). This information serves as a point of departure
for this study.
The second key focal point is the ways the Cuban government “represents”
women and blacks in the Special Period and, more specifically, within the context of
the country’s tourism sector. The second indicator is related to the first in that as an
analysis of the power of representation, it should reveal how authentic has been the
effort to see that ordinary Cubans are the beneficiaries of the tourism development
strategy. I examine the representations of women and Afro-Cubans (which include
tourism promotional images) in the context of Cuba’s historical continuum, and I
investigate how representations have been addressed (or indeed manipulated) during
the revolutionary period. The insights revealed by tourism images in particular aid in
understanding the power relationships that underscore the current gender and racial
roles in Cuba. Indeed as Morgan and Pritchard write, “We need to acknowledge that
constructions reveal much about the dynamics of relationships between peoples,
cultures, genders and states—constructions which dominate the currency of culture
and ideology” (1998, 5). I will address this point further in Chapter Five.

2

In this study, I establish two main theoretical constructs to frame my analysis.
I will demonstrate that by understanding how space is socially constructed and
produced within the context of a Cuban economy dominated by the tourism industry,
one can uncover the hidden realities that are often glossed over by government
propaganda and official proclamations. As John Urry has observed, studying how
space is used and perceived can reveal “just what is happening in the ‘normal
society’” (Urry 2002, 2).
Secondly, I believe Cuba presents an interesting case study to test Gramsci’s
theory of hegemony. I posit that the Cuban model for development challenges the
notion that hegemonies are by nature the outgrowth of capitalist regimes. I
demonstrate that Castro fostered discourses during the Revolution in support of the
Marxist notion that socialism eliminates the “conditions” for discrimination and
inequality. However, in Castro’s self-proclaimed socialist paradise, the regime
functions as a de facto hegemonic power by controlling the means of production,
limiting access to space, stifling private enterprise, and cracking down severely on
dissent, all in the name of equality. As a result, the Cuban people resist government
policy in a number of ways including the relatively benign (procuring goods on the
black market in order to feed their families) to the increasingly dangerous (forming
anti-government dissident groups).

3

A Brief Introduction to the Geography and Colonial History of
Cuba1

Cuba, the largest island in the Greater Antilles, is home to 11.2 million
people. The island of Cuba is the largest in an archipelago comprising over 3,700
islands, islets and keys (cayos), the combined area of which totals 114,524 square
kilometers (Scarpaci, Segre and Coyula 2002, 3). Cuba is strategically located astride
three important narrows: the Yucatan Channel, the Straits of Florida and the
Windward Passage (West and Augelli 1989, 129). The island is only 150 kilometers
south of the Florida Keys and 210 kilometers east of Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula
(ICGC 1978, 22-23).
Researchers believe Cuba, along with the other islands that make up the
Greater Antilles (Old Antillia), was formed 100 million years ago during the
Cretaceous era. Topographically, plains dominate the landscape of Cuba, but three
main mountain chains punctuate the island: the Sierra Maestra in the southeast, the
Escambray Mountains in south central Cuba, and the Sierra de los Organos in the
west (ICGC 1978, 22-23). The Sierra Maestra are the most rugged of the mountain
chains and today are revered for the isolation they afforded Fidel Castro and his
compatriots when they returned from exile in December 1956. Castro used the Sierra
Maestra as a base to build support against the Batista regime. The highest point in

1

This section serves as a brief introduction to Cuba to set the context of the study. More detailed
analyses of Cuba’s geographic and historical patterns are included in relevant chapters.
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Cuba is Pico Turquino that rises to 1,972 meters in the Sierra Maestra (ICGC 1978,
22-23).
Historically, Cuba’s physical attributes allowed it to become both a key
agricultural producer, particularly in sugar and tobacco, and a major tourism hub,
particularly in the 1950s. West and Augelli noted that Cuba’s “favorable
combination” of climate, relief and soils provides one of the highest ratios of
cultivated land per person in the Middle American region (1978, 130). Cuba’s
average annual rainfall is between 65 inches in Pinar del Rio and 40 inches in
Guantanamo and is concentrated during the May to October rainy season. In the early
20th century, tourists began to flock to Cuba to take advantage of its tropical climate,
its wide array of beaches, and to enjoy its varied flora and fauna.
For much of the colonial period, Spain viewed Cuba as the “key to the New
World” (West and Augelli 1989,129-130). Spain’s initial colonial goal, from an
economic standpoint, was to extract New World mineral wealth, a pursuit they
accomplished using mainly indigenous labor sources. Unlike the northern European
colonies, extensive agricultural production, particularly the cultivation of sugar, was
not a key component of the early Spanish Main (Rudolph 1987, 10). Cuba’s first role
in the colonial network was to support the port city of Havana, the Caribbean hub,
where Spanish ships loaded with loot would rendezvous, take on provisions, and form
armadas in an attempt to protect themselves from pirates on their return trip to the
continent. Furthermore, Spain disallowed trade between its colonies and other
European countries, creating a disincentive for colonial cultivators who were
dependent on a Spanish market that exhibited little demand for imported sugar (Watts
5

1987, 301). The Spaniards initially pursued agriculture to supply the needs of Havana
in its role as the Spanish empire’s regional service colony, although the island
exported leather goods and tobacco products due to their demand in Spain (Thomas
1971, 27). I discuss the colonial period as it relates to race and gender in Chapter
Four. Two main events occurred in the past century or so that have been significant
to the evolution of modern Cuba. The first was the end result of the Second Cuban
War for Independence (1895-1898) when United States effectively de-railed Cuba’s
bid for independence. On the cusp of an apparent Cuban victory over the Spanish
colonial regime, the United States entered Cuba ostensibly to support the Cuban
revolutionaries. In the end, however, the U.S. gained control of Cuba as part of the
territorial gains realized when the U.S. defeated Spain in the Spanish-American War
(1898-1902). Therefore, rather than achieving outright independence, Cuba was
subsumed into an expanding U.S. empire through the maintenance of the Platt
Amendment2 (in place from 1902 to 1933), one component of which allowed the
United States to intervene militarily when deemed necessary (Thomas 1971, 453454). During this period, the United States dominated Cuba economically as its
leading trading partner and source of foreign investment (this point is discussed in
more detail in Chapter Three). The U.S. dominance was insured by Fulgencio
Batista, who was the official ruler of Cuba from 1940-1944 and again from 19521959, and who was supported by the U.S. Government as well as by revenue from
U.S. investors and tourists.

2

The Platt Amendment is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three.
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The second important event was Fidel Castro’s rise to power that culminated
in his January 1st, 1959 take-over of the country. Castro immediately instituted a
program to nationalize Cuban industries thereby alienating American investors and
the U.S. government in the process. Casto’s attempts to transform Cuban society led
to the emigration of an estimated 1 million people between 1959 and 1990, about
700,000 of whom settled in the United States (Gonzalez-Pando 1998, Appendix One).
In 1961, Castro officially allied Cuba with the Soviet bloc, thus beginning an
economic and political relationship that would last until 1989 when the Soviet Union
collapsed. Others have observed that Cuba traded one dependent relationship (with
the United States) for another. This point is discussed in more detail in Chapter
Three. In the remainder of the chapter, I discuss many of the contradictions that have
emerged as a result of Castro’s policies.

The Cuban Contradiction

In 1998, a three-level shopping mall opened in the heart of Havana in Vedado
near the famous Malecón waterfront. It was built near one of the city’s major tourism
zones between the imposing Spanish-operated five-star Hotel Sol Melía, symbol of
the post-1989 tourism era, and the re-furbished 1950s era Hotel Riviera. What is
significant about the mall is that the only currency accepted in its shops is the US
dollar. While most Cubans earn their salaries not in dollars but in Cuban pesos, the
majority of shoppers in the mall on opening day were not tourists, but the few
privileged dollar-toting Cubans who could afford the wares on display. As a symbol,
7

the mall speaks volumes on the changes Cuba has experienced since the fall of the
Soviet Union in 1989 left the country bereft of essential subsidies. Since that time,
the country has reluctantly embraced both tourism and capitalism (much like China
and Vietnam) in an effort to maintain a centrally planned political system supported
by a hybrid economy based on a combination of socialist and capitalist principles.
The re-introduction of large-scale tourism coupled with the advent of various
forms of capitalism has radically altered the Cuban landscape. The changes wrought
from tourism development span the virtual “Cancunization” of beach tourism
enclaves such as Varadero, to the presence of literally hundreds of small dollar-only
roadside snack bars that have sprouted in recent years throughout rural Cuba. To the
researcher, the evolving built environment serves as an important palimpsest that
allows one to study the re-ordering of Cuba’s priorities and to search for clues about
changing social patterns. This is made possible by the Castro regime’s extensive
renovation and re-use of 1950s era hotels, restaurants and even activities that were
once part of the pre-revolutionary period. For example, the government’s efforts to
enthusiastically market the Tropicana show3, that once served a clientele of
Americans during the Batista regime, is indicative of how far Cuba has strayed from
early revolutionary precepts when such shows were disdained and denounced as
symbolic of capitalist exploitation. In many ways, while the origins of the tourists and
aspects of the physical landscape have largely changed, many of the resulting social

3

The Tropicana is a still-functioning Havana nightclub famed for a Las Vegas-style caberet act that
features the ubiquitous “hot mulatta” dancers. Established in 1939, the club became a key attraction on
the tourism circuit in the 1950s and was known for its costly and flamboyant acts (Baker 2000, 394).
It is one of the few Batista-era attractions that has remained open over the entire course of the
Revolution.
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and geographic implications of the tourism industry are remarkably similar to those of
the pre-revolutionary period. Indeed, to use a term favored by Cubanologists, Cuba
has indeed gone “back to the future” by implementing tourism as a development
strategy (see Scarpaci 1996, Eckstein 1994, et al).
In 1960, R. Hart Philips published a book entitled, Cuba, Island of Paradox, a
work that detailed Castro’s rise to power in Cuba in 1959. For Philips, Cuba’s
paradox stemmed from the goals and aspirations of the newly victorious rebel forces
and their leader, Fidel Castro. She wrote, “Many people in Cuba believe that the
Castro reform program is in the tradition of the communist pattern, but others believe
that the parallel with communist procedure is coincidental. Ironically, Castro has
outflanked [communist] appeals by instituting his own reforms” (Philips 1960, 417).
She wondered aloud as to whether Cuba would move towards greater linkages with
the Soviet Union. She didn’t have to wait long for her answer.
While the issues surrounding Cuba today differ greatly in many ways from
those of the early revolutionary era, the title of her book remains apt. Cuba remains a
paradox at many different levels and as such exhibits several key contradictions. .
While Cuba is a country represented by pronounced racial and cultural diversity,
expressions of individuality (or even sectoral consciousness) are anathema to a
regime that demands unquestioned unity through state-directed expressions of
nationalism (la patria). This is reflected in Castro’s famous proclamation that
underlines the absolutist nature of Cuba’s political system: “everything within the
revolution, nothing against” (see Dalton 1993, 14-15). In this statement, the Castro
regime has alluded to the fact that there exist no avenues for dissent or legitimate
9

critique of the system and citizens are forced to either agree wholeheartedly with
policies or risk jail, exile, or worse. This has led to what Marifeli Pérez-Stable refers
to as la doble moral, or duplicity, whereby Cuban citizens espouse beliefs in the
public sphere that may completely contradict beliefs held and discussed in private
(1999, 208-209).
The tensions produced by la doble moral have arguably intensified over the
course of the “Special Period in a Time of Peace” (referred to hereafter as the Special
Period), which is Castro’s euphemism for a severe austerity program that
accompanied the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 (The Special Period will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three). As a result of Cuba’s loss of generous
Soviet subsidies, the Special Period has given rise to new social and economic
patterns that led to a curtailment of government spending on Cuba’s vaunted and once
generous social programs. The implementation of capitalist ventures such as tourism
and mining operations was accomplished in part by diverting resources from social
programs benefiting Cuban citizens to those that favored foreign investors and
tourists. The resultant diffusion of investment capital, ideas and people from the
capitalist world challenges the regime’s stranglehold on information and has at times
threatened Castro’s control of power. What follows is a brief summation of Cuba’s
most glaring contradictions as noted from the early 1990s to the present as a means of
both introducing the complex nature of Cuban life in the Special Period and of setting
the context for this study.
While Cuba remains ostensibly a socialist country, it is capitalism that is now
guiding the island out of its economic doldrums. Although the Castro regime has
10

made every effort to limit the role of capitalism in the lives of ordinary Cubans by
attempting to maintain social programs (continued free health care and education
provided by the state) and by controlling food distribution via an extensive rationing
program, there has been major slippage. During the Special Period residents have no
longer been able to depend solely on rations or the socialist economy for many basic
necessities and this has led to the creation of a booming black market and increasing
reliance on the dollar-based economy. In 1993, at the nadir of the Special Period, the
government reluctantly allowed average Cubans to possess and spend U.S. dollars.
This was done, in part, to address government concern about the lack of options
available in the peso economy. In order to provide legal outlets to Cuban shoppers,
dollar-only stores were opened to serve Cuban citizens and they quickly developed
into an essential source of goods during the Special Period (see Table 1). However,
the government was also concerned with the increasing number of dollars floating
around the black market that most Cubans were forced to utilize in order to satisfy
basic needs before access to dollar stores was legalized (see Jatar-Hausmann 1999,
61-68 and Pérez-López 1995, 161-162 for more discussion on the black market).

Table 1: Estimated Total Sales in Cuba’s “Dollar Stores”
Year
Total Sales
1992
$50 million
1999
$1 billion
Market Exchange Rate 1999: $1 US=26 Cuban pesos
Source: The Economist, Oct. 23, 1999: 37

11

Prior to the Special Period, dollar stores were synonymous with diplotiendas (diplos),
stores established for the exclusive use of foreign diplomats, tecnotiendas, stores for
foreign technicians, and tourist stores for international tourists (Pérez-López 1995,
48-49)4. While all dollar-denominated stores were officially off limits to most Cuban
citizens, many people were able to establish connections with diplomats and other
foreigners who would purchase goods on their behalf (Humberto, personal
communication 1997).
The black market continues to be driven largely by remittances sent to Cubans
from émigrés, the majority of whom live in the United States. According to one
estimate, Cuban-Americans send up to $1 billion annually to the island (Pérez-Sarduy
and Stubbs 2000, 34). The government, therefore, felt it necessary to legalize dollars
for Cubans and provide dollar-denominated stores to capture excess remittance
dollars that would have fed black market activities outside of Castro’s direct control.
The unequal distribution of remittances during the course of the Special Period has
resulted in Cuba becoming a nation starkly divided into those who have ample access
to dollars and livable incomes and those who depend mainly on their inadequate peso
salaries to survive5.
Another contradiction is that tourism, an industry that was reformed and deemphasized in the early Castro period, is currently Cuba’s leading economic sector.
This is especially significant when one considers the historical role of tourism in

4

While tourist arrivals have increased to nearly 2 million during the Special Period, Cuba welcomed
300,000 tourists on the eve of the Special Period in 1989. Canadians were, and continue to be the most
numerous although tourists from the Soviet bloc were also well represented during the 1970s and 80s.
5
The Cuban economy and the role of remittances during the Special Period will be discussed at greater
length in Chapter Three.
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Cuba as well as the lingering collective memories of the industry as it was
implemented in the 1950s. When Castro seized power of the country in 1959, he
overthrew a Batista regime famous for importing American mafioso to “clean up” the
corrupt gambling sector. A complex of tourism products that included prostitution,
sex shows and gambling shaped the country in the 1950s. Castro himself continued
to court tourists in the aftermath of his revolutionary victory despite nationalizing the
industry, and thereby alienating the former owners, many of whom were based in the
United States. But, he also closed the brothels and sex shows and began efforts to
“re-educate” Cuba’s prostitutes6. Castro erroneously believed that visitors would
continue to flock to his country despite the closure of gambling facilities and other
“sinful” dens of vice (Perrottet and Biondi 1996, 70). In October of 1959, Castro
attended the Havana convention of the American Society of Tourist Agents (ASTA)
and outlined his ambition to convert the island into the “best place for vacations, and
the best and most important tourist center in the world” (Castro quoted in Miller and
Henthorne 1997, 6-7).
The Eisenhower administration’s embargo against Cuba in late 1960 forced
Castro to de-emphasize the role of tourism in the Cuban economy as visitors from the
U.S. dwindled to a trickle. In the face of decreasing tourism revenue in the early
years of the Revolution, Castro declared that Cuba would never again depend on
tourism as a primary economic strategy (Perrottet and Biondi 1996, 70). Ironically,
Cuba’s mounting foreign debt forced Castro to negate this statement in the late 1970s.
By 1982 Castro engineered the passage of Law Decree 50 authorizing foreign
6

See Chapter Five for a discussion on sex work in Castro’s Cuba.
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investment through joint ventures (Simon 1995, 29). While not explicitly included in
the language of the law, the regime targeted tourism as a development strategy. In
support of the law, Castro declared in the early 1990s, “In the past we feared that
tourism would defile us, but tourism is gold” (Castro cited in Perrottet and Biondi
1996, 70-71). During the Special Period tourism once again dominates Cuba
economically; according to the World Tourism Organization, the island earned $1.7
billion in tourism revenue in 2000 (World Tourism 2001). On January 21, 2003, in a
speech delivered at the inauguration of the Playa Pesquero hotel in Holguin, Castro
stated that Cuba welcomed over 1.6 million visitors in 2002 and gross revenues
totaled $2 billion. He also noted that he expects over 1.9 million visitors to arrive in
2003 (Castro 2003).
Cuba’s tourism employment structure is also contradictory . While many
professionals in the developed world regard low-skilled jobs in the tourism industry
as undesirable, in Cuba doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other well-trained employees
of the state clamor for normally low-end tourism jobs and other opportunities
afforded by in-coming visitors in order to increase their chances of earning hard
currency meeting tourists. I once met an engineer who was overjoyed with his job as
a groundskeeper in a tourist compound in Varadero for it paid him more than his
former employment as an engineer for the state. One source documented the situation
of an ex-doctor who quit his job to rent rooms to tourists. He earned enough money
to buy a beach house for $18,000, a sum that would have taken him 165 years to
accumulate as a typical peso wage earner (Enterprise? Tax it! 1997, 32). The Central
Committee of the Communist Party noted this rush of professionals to find jobs in
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tourism. In March 1996 the Committee worried about the potential destabilizing
effects of Cubans leaving highly-skilled, but low paying jobs in the public sector and
accepting jobs in tourism (Schwartz 1997, 211). Indeed, while data detailing the
demographic backgrounds of Cuban tourism workers are lacking, workers in Cuba
generally are more highly educated (at least formally) than those in comparable
locations due to Cuba’s enviable high average education levels and the lucrative
status of tourism jobs in the country (see Human Development Report 2002, Table
10).
National income from tourism now follows closely income from remittances
sent from abroad, mainly from the United States, and indeed the country receives an
estimated $1 billion in remittances annually7 (Pérez-Sarduy and Stubbs 2000, 34).
Furthermore, investment from foreign partners fueled much of the growth in tourism
revenue, especially by companies based in Spain, Canada and Mexico, as well as by
tourist dollars spent by Canadians and western Europeans. In other words, many of
the former enemies of the Soviet bloc are now the island’s leading trading partners,
guests and remittance providers.
United States citizens also tour and spend money in Cuba, despite a continued
embargo by the U.S. government prohibiting unauthorized travel (Cuba Update
2002). According to Granma, the official organ of the Cuban government, an
estimated 180,000 Americans visit Cuba each year, while untold others traveled there
without the consent of the U.S. government (Guyallard 2003) Cubalinda, a tour
company based in Havana, maintains a website (cubalinda.com) that books travel
7

Espino (2000, 369) estimates that Cuba’s import component for tourism is 37 percent meaning that
only 63 percent of tourism earnings remain in Cuba (see also Scarpaci, Segre and Coyula 2002, 292).
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arrangements for U.S. citizens from “gateway” cities such as Toronto, Montreal and
Cancun. The company instructs travelers to book their own flight to the gateway city
while Cubalinda prepares the additional travel arrangements. The company includes a
link that supplies information instructing visitors how to avoid prosecution by the
U.S. Government.
Cuba’s improving economic situation in the late 1990s produced another
contradiction, namely the assertion by many Cubans that there is no longer an
effective embargo against their country. This is ironic because the Cuban government
vilifies the embargo maintained by the United States since the Kennedy
administration as the leading cause of Cuba’s current economic predicament. In the
public sphere, Cubans have often rallied to Castro’s call to denounce the embargo
(referred to by the Castro regime as the bloqueo or blockade) as a genocidal act on the
part of the United States government working in tandem with Cuban-American
exiles. When the controversial Helms-Burton Amendment tightened the embargo in
1996, Castro engineered a public relations campaign denouncing the act. The HelmsBurton addendum to the original language of the embargo allows for the prosecution
(in United States Courts) of any foreign company that invests in Cuba using property
(such as hotels, land, intellectual property, and trademarked material) claimed by US
citizens and companies who lost their property rights without reparations during the
Castro regime’s efforts to nationalize private industry in Cuba (Jatar-Hausmann 1999,
134-135). It must be noted that the Helms-Burton amendment is denounced not only
by Cuba but also by the island’s key trading partners such as Spain, Mexico and
Canada who object to its extraterritorial stance. Indeed, the Canadian government
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enacted counter-legislation in reaction to Helms-Burton to protect itsinterests on the
island (Baker 2000, 56-57). Further, the Helms-Burton Act remains controversial in
the United States as well, and the Clinton administration did not implement the act in
its entirety. A recent statement by Otto Reich, assistant Secretary of State for the
Bush administration, verified the government’s continued support for keeping the
embargo in place although, in fact, looser implementation of the Helms-Burton Act as
implemented by Clinton remains unchanged (Burns 2002).
While the Castro regime continues to blame its economic ills on the U.S.
embargo and Helms-Burton, evidence suggests that Cubans do not believe this to be
the case. Several Cubans who then worked directly in the private sector or in tourism
asserted to me in 1997 that the U.S. embargo was being effectively circumvented,
although many conceded that it remained a stumbling block in some areas such as in
the continued inability of the island to provide enough medicines to its citizens
(Fiona, Roberto, Jóse, personal communication, 1997). Additionally, U.S. produced
food ranging from grains to fruit are now traded directly with Cuba in the aftermath
of Hurricane Mitchell that devastated Cuba’s agricultural sector in November 2001.
In 2000, U.S. agricultural concerns obtained temporary exemptions to sell their goods
to Cuba. Castro at first declined to trade with U.S producers, but the havoc wrought
by Hurricane Mitchell forced him to deal with American sellers. Between December
2001 and July 2002, Cuba agreed to purchase 650,000 tons of U.S. agricultural
products worth $105 million (Alonso 2002). As of this writing, Cuba continues to
buy U.S. agricultural products.
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The assertion that the embargo has less of an impact on the Cuban economy
than is otherwise claimed by the Castro regime was underscored recently by a report
from the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) that examined the
impacts of the embargo on both sides of the Florida Straits. One the one hand, the
ITC estimates that 1 million U.S. tourists would visit Cuba each year if the sanctions
were lifted and the freedom to travel to the island was restored. On the other hand,
despite claims on both sides of the Florida Straits that the embargo is responsible for
suppressing a potentially lucrative trade relationship that would benefit both sides, the
ITC reports that U.S. companies stand to gain only $652 million to $990 million per
year in revenue from exports to Cuba, while Cuban exports to the United States
would be worth only $84 to $167 million per year. The report noted that the U.S.
exports about four times the amounts listed to the Dominican Republic alone. If the
report is correct, the embargo’s main force lies in its symbolic meaning. One
observer quoted in the article stated his belief that profits realized in the event of a
repealed embargo would be minimal because the Castro regime considers potential
political angles associated with proposed business ventures on the island. Therefore,
he believes, Castro, even if given the chance, would likely establish few meaningful
economic ties with American companies (Federal Trade 2001).
Observers report that Castro has been effective in rallying support at home
and abroad against the embargo (Baker 2000, 56; Jatar-Hausmann 1999, 136). Yet
according to a survey conducted by the Cooperative of Independent Journalists in
September 2002, three out of four Cubans disagreed with the government’s stance
that the embargo was the root cause of the economic crisis. According to the survey
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results, 49 percent cited the inefficiency of the socialist system, 10 percent said the
world crisis caused Cuba’s ills, and 18 percent declined to answer; only 23 percent
agreed with the government’s position (González 2002). Since 1993, the nadir of the
Special Period, and despite the continued embargo, Cuba has recorded sustained
economic growth based mainly on the strength of the tourist economy. This calls into
question the efficacy of the prohibition of trade. While sources vary as to Cuba’s true
economic growth rates, most believe growth to have averaged between 3.7 and four
percent yearly between 1993 and 2000 (Human Development Index 2002, Table 12:
Economic Performance; San Martin 2001, 1).
Indications are that the increasing role of tourism and the particular ways it is
organized are more responsible for perceived hardship in Cuban than the embargo. A
28-year-old Cuban I interviewed in 1997 said, “En Cuba, hay. Para nosotros, no,
pero hay!” (In Cuba, there is enough, but it is not for us [rather, it is for the tourists,
the party elite and those who have ample dollars]). This statement effectively
illustrates two main concerns voiced by many Cubans during the Special Period.
First, many decry the growth of “apartheid tourism,” which is the prohibition of
average Cubans from visiting tourist locales such as beaches, hotels and restaurants8.
Secondly, stung by a perception that they are effectively “second class citizens” in
their own country, Cubans further cite the lack of opportunities to earn dollars legally.
Ironically, Cuba’s increasing prosperity could signify that the key rallying cry used
by Castro, namely the need for the Cuban nation to resist the “genocidal” trade
embargo, may be losing its symbolic significance and its power to unify Cubans
8

See Chapter Five for a complete discussion of apartheid tourism.
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against a common enemy. While the regime continues to marshal large groups of
protesters for specific events such as the Elián González campaign, many Cubans
point to the compulsory nature of Cuban rallies in general. Several Cubans I
interviewed at a Havana rally in the summer of 1996 confirmed that they were
required to attend the event (although some were pleased to be released from work!).
The emergence of economic and social inequalities during the Special Period
is contradictory on two counts. First of all, many believe that the establishment of
economic parity was one of the greatest triumphs of the revolution, an assertion borne
out by economic data (see Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López 2000, Pérez-Stable 1995,
Zimbalist 1989, et al.). However, although the post-Soviet crisis has abated
somewhat, Cuba now has a permanent rift in incomes on a scale unknown since the
revolution began in 1959 before the legalization of the dollar in 1993. (The ratio
between the highest and lowest salary was said to be five to one). By 1995, some
Cubans earned (sometimes legally) incomes several hundred times higher than many
other islanders (Mala vista 1999, 37). Furthermore, this figure does not take into
account the difficult to calculate income differences generated by black market
dealings, nor income from remittances sent from abroad.
A brief market opening in the early 1980s produced, in Castro’s words, “too
many millionaires,” and he and his officials quickly implemented the far-reaching
Rectification Process (RP) to curtail income inequities associated mainly with the
farmers and artisans markets9. Ironically, this crackdown may have led to greater
inequalities in Cuban incomes in that some of the formerly legal transactions were
9

See Chapter Three for discussion of the RP.
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diverted to the black market, leaving them beyond direct state control. Although the
actual economic value of goods and services transacted in the black market are
impossible to calculate, Jorge Pérez-López, who has studied Cuba’s “second
economy” extensively, notes that it began to mushroom in the late 1980s and
throughout the 1990s while at the same time the centrally planned socialist (or first)
economy “faltered” (Pérez-López 1995, 1-2).
Many Cubans continue to subsist on official peso salaries that average ten to
fifteen dollars per month (200-250 pesos) but it is important to note that the living
standards of Cubans are not adequately reflected through the simple comparison of
the market value of the peso and the US dollar (which as of March 2003 stood at 27
pesos to one US dollar). The government provides basic needs free of charge (health
care, education, basic food rations) or heavily subsidizes them (housing rents, public
transportation and the cost of utilities). Jatar-Hausmann (1999, 114-115) notes that
most Cuban salaries, while often too low to fully satisfy the needs of the average
family, are worth considerably more than is indicated by the result of simply dividing
the pesos earned to the market rate for dollars. For example, she believes that the first
160 pesos earned each month are worth roughly the equivalent of $160 since this sum
is used to pay rent, utilities, transportation and basic food costs. Beyond the
procurement of the basics, however -- Jatar-Hausmann’s 160-peso cut-off -- the worth
of the peso dwindles to the market rate because Cubans must resort to the black
market, legal private markets, and dollar stores to procure any but the most basic
foodstuffs, as well as all clothing, personal products (soap, shampoo, toothpaste, etc.)
and maintenance for old and/or shoddy consumer goods such as appliances, bicycles,
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automobiles, etc. among other things. Several studies demonstrate that rationed food
meets nutritional requirements for only 10 days per month, a situation that has led to
the establishment of state-sponsored “family restaurants,” the equivalent of soup
kitchens (Mala vista 1999, 37).
Those who procure dollars legally generally earn them in one of several ways:
1) through tip-generating employment associated with the tourist sector that includes
such positions as taxi drivers, bartenders and waiters; 2) through remittances sent
from abroad (this point is discussed later in this chapter); and 3) through the often
legal and semi-legal forms of self-employment such as running a private restaurant
(referred to as a paladar) or renting rooms to tourists10. Item number one requires
explanation. Cubans working in tourism jobs for foreign-owned and operated
companies do not automatically earn their salaries in hard currency; the companies
pay the salaries of the workers to the state in dollars and the state remits the workers
the equivalent in pesos, but at the official one-to-one rate! This monetary sleight of
hand thus discourages Cuban tourism workers with no access to dollar tips. Indeed,
until 1993, even the tip-generating workers were required to remit all tips to the state
to be exchanged one to one for pesos (Avella and Mills 1996, 58). While this practice
was eventually ended, tip-generating workers currently must give 10 percent of their
tips to the state and 30 percent to contributing workers such as cooks and other
“behind the scenes” personnel (Avella and Mills 1996, 58) The Cuban government,
realizing that the quality of service might suffer from the presence of wide-spread
discontent among tourism workers, has since implemented a policy to partially
10
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reimburse tourism workers with “convertible” pesos, government scrip that is equal in
value to dollars on the island (Horizontes Hoteles Representative, personal
communication, 1997).
Cubans unable to earn dollars in the aforementioned manner resort to selling
on the black market, and to engaging in acts of jineterismo, a Cuban slang term for
the Spanish “jockey” or “horse rider,” which refers to activities designed to earn
dollars through illegal dealings with tourists (for an excellent discussion of
jineterismo, see Rundle 2001)11. This includes the gamut of activities ranging from
sex work, to driving illegal taxis, to renting out private rooms without authorization,
and selling often stolen and/or counterfeit goods (cigars, rum, family heirlooms,
drugs) to tourists. The Cuban government’s Marxist interpretation of “prostitution”
includes all activities that lead to illicit personal enrichment. For example, the
government’s condemnation of sex work focuses not only on selling access to one’s
body for money, but also engaging in illegal capitalist-driven gain. The moral
emphasis lies not with the Victorian-era view that engaging in sex work is an act of
moral turpitude (on the supply side, not necessarily on the demand side), but rather
with the act of making money outside the supervised realm of socialist society.
Diregarded is the ample evidence that the party elite benefits from the jinetera’s
dealings with foreign tourists in the form of increasing tourism revenues. It is
possible to engage in jineterismo outside the realms of tourism; as Fernández has
noted, even professors who tailor their work in order to gain invitations to

11

The practice of jineterismo is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three.
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conferences and workshops abroad are said to be jineteando (i.e., they benefit
materially from their association with foreigners) (1999, 85).
This last point leads to yet another in the long line of contradictions in Cuba’s
Special Period. The Castro regime soon recognized the potential of marketing the
country as a tropical paradise and destination for sex tourists, predicated upon the
availability of educated, “clean” Cuban women who could service the needs of dollartoting tourists. In a now-famous speech delivered in August of 1992, the Cuban
leader remarked that at the very least, Cuba’s prostitutes were “highly educated and
quite healthy,” a seemingly off-color and misplaced reference to Cuba’s achievement
of high levels of health care and education during the revolution (Bunck 1994, 119;
Rundle 2001). This apparent endorsement on the part of the government of the
ability of sex workers to attract tourists stood for awhile, but appeared to be
contradicted in 1996, the government instituted the first of several severe
crackdowns on activities deemed acts of jineterismo in the broadest sense of
rapacious capitalism. However, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, the clampdown
on illegal activity achieved uneven results: on the one hand, the success of the
measures in limiting jineterismo in the Varadero resort was almost total, whereas
Havana continued to boast spaces where illegal activities were either apparently
condoned, or were impossible to completely eradicate. Recent reports suggest that
sex work is widespread although less visible than early in the Special Period. I will
discuss this point further in Chapter Five.
The growing“dollar divide” frequently falls along gender and racial lines.
There are several reasons for this (see Chapters Three and Four for in-depth
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discussion). To begin, most of the lucrative jobs in tourism go to those who,
ostensibly, exhibit the highest “revolutionary” credentials, and therefore gain
employment based upon their socialist background. In reality, most workers gain
jobs through the system of “sociolismo” or the Cuban “buddy system,” a wellentrenched network of family, friends and acquaintances who are tapped to satisfy
particular needs and, in some cases, to secure employment.12 In practice, jobs go in
many cases to the friends and family of well-placed party officials. The fact remains
that even in a self-proclaimed racially integrated and “colorblind” society (a point that
will be examined in Chapter Four in more detail), most party officials are both male
and white, and therefore, not surprisingly, white males obtain the best tourism jobs.
The Castro regime prefers to place the blame for this occurrence on the preferences of
the foreign tourism companies who, it claims, prefer to hire light-skinned Cubans in
high-profile tourism jobs. Available evidence does suggest that racial discrimination
by foreign bosses exists, but regardless of the origin of the discrimination, my data
indicate that top tourism jobs are the domain of mainly white Cuban citizens, with the
very best jobs reserved for white Cuban males.13
The unequal distribution of overseas remittances sent by Cuban exiles
contributes to the growing economic and social division in Cuba. The majority of
Cubans who migrated since Castro’s victory are white, although this state of affairs
began to change during and after the Mariel boatlift in 1980. An estimated 125,000
Cubans emigrated during that year, equaling the numbers that left after the initial
12

This point is echoed by Foster (1960,4) who noted the importance of “personalismo,” an effective
working relationship with the right people to accomplish specific ends, in Latin American society.
13
See Perez-Sarduy and Stubbs (2000) and Howell (2001) for more discussion on racial discrimination
in the tourism sector.
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revolutionary victory in 1959 (González-Pando 1998, 165). Mariel remains
noteworthy in the post-revolutionary history of immigration mainly because AfroCubans and mulattos fled to the United States in greater numbers. Nonetheless, they
continue to be far less numerous than Hispanic-Cubans (whites). Indeed, PérezSarduy claims that 95 percent of the Cubans living abroad are Hispanic-Cubans,
suggesting that the Cubans who most benefit from remittances tend to be white
Cubans (Pérez-Sarduy 1995).14 This double blow of under-representation in the
tourism industry, and the lack of access to remittances helps explain the increasing
poverty among Afro-Cubans and mulattos (mixed race Cubans).
The new tourist economy aggravates gender divisions as well. While women
are well represented in the tourism sector, they often obtain the lower paying and less
prestigious jobs. For example, over the course of six months of intensive study in
Cuba in the summer months of 1995-1997, I failed to encounter a female taxi driver,
hotel manager or tourism administrator (all high-prestige jobs). These findings
compliment the more recent work of others who have noted the dearth of women in
administrative and managerial positions in tourism (see Howell 2001, Fernández
1999, et al). Further, as my data show, many positions among the general tourism
staff are also highly gendered. To cite one example, my sampling of the staff in
selected Varadero hotels indicated an overwhelming bias towards female maids
whereas males dominated as bartenders and waiters. One source notes that maids in
Cuba’s international hotels vie for tips, as well, by leaving personalized notes to

14
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guests and creating “towel sculptures” to endear themselves to visitors (Diacon,
personal communication, April 2003).
In order to underscore the importance of tourism employment to Cuban
citizens, I draw from Scarpaci who noted that access to tip generating jobs (such as
bartender and waiter) translates into a substantial increase in individual buying power.
According to his data, the average tourist taxi driver (who has access to tips) would
be required to spend about one percent of his wages to buy a pound of pork whereas
the average worker earning a salary in pesos would have to forgo nearly half a
month’s wage for the same item. He writes, “A taxi driver, or any other Cuban
formally or informally affiliated with the tourist trade, has access to a wide array of
basic foods and household products. A physician or college professor would have to
sacrifice much to buy those items” (Scarpaci 1995, 81).
For the reasons listed above, the segments of the population least represented
in the “legal” tourist economy are Afro-Cuban females and mulattas (mixed race
females). However, to identify another apparent contradiction, Afro-Cuban women
and mulattas are often highly sought after by European and North American sex
tourists who travel to Cuba in search of the exotic “Other” Indeed, Trumbell believes
Cuban women of color outnumber white sex workers (Trumbull 2001, 361). This has
proved a mixed blessing for mulattas and Afro-Cuban women. On the one hand, it
gives them the potential to capitalize on their status among tourists. On the other
hand, it makes them the frequent targets of police repression, and evidence shows that
they make up a disproportionate share of jailed jineteras (De la Fuente 1998, 4-5).
Despite the fact that many Cubans encourage young women and men to engage in sex
27

work, since it translates into a ready source of income for many families, in nearly all
societies people condemn sex workers (Hubbard 1999, 1-2). As Hubbard notes,
debates on sex work frequently divide observers into those who regard it as a form of
sexual slavery, and those who believe sex work to be the ultimate emancipatory
gesture by women in a patriarchal society (Hubbard 1999, 1-2).
Indeed, one must consider not only the social stigma, but also the very real
physical dangers sex workers encounter in Cuba (or in any other country). The
possibility of contracting STDs, and in particular HIV/AIDS, couples with the
potential of encountering violent clients. All of these factors must be weighed against
the opportunity to realize significant financial gains.15 While the number of people
diagnosed with HIV/AIDS is reportedly less than one percent of the adult population
in Cuba as of 2001, studies suggest that the acceptance of multiple sex partners
coupled with low rates of condom use may produce a rising incidence in the future
(Bauza and Collie 2001).
In the chapters that follow, I elaborate on the contradictions presented above
as based on fieldwork conducted in Cuba over the course of three consecutive
summers stretching from 1995-1997. This study is centered on a concentrated study
of spatial patterns and social constructions of space in the two most important tourism
zones in the country: Havana and Varadero. I collected data using multiple
techniques (the multi-method approach) including participant observation, directed
and open interviews, an extensive search of the primary and secondary literature, and
a quantitative and qualitative analysis of both Cuban and Canadian produced tourism
15
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literature. The following chapter explains the research methodology and then
discusses the theoretical bases of the study.

Research Outline16

Chapter One discussed the study problem and establishes the theoretical
constructs of the study. After a brief introduction to Cuba’s geographic setting and
colonial history, I set the context of the study by establishing important contradictions
related to Cuban tourism and the exigencies of the Special Period. Several
researchers have advanced the idea that Cuba is a paradox (beginning with Philips in
1960 and including Jatar-Hausmann during the Special Period). While I concur with
these scholars, I prefer to use the term “contradiction” because I believe it more
firmly establishes apparent disconnections between government pronouncements and
the policies they implement. As a point of departure from earlier studies, I focus more
extensively on Cuba’s spatial and representational contradictions in the remainer of
this study.
Chapter Two identifies the research methodology I employ in the study and
discusses the theoretical parameters in greater depth. I draw from a series of data that
range from observation (including participant observation), to directed and open
interviews. I also include a survey of the tourist literature to examine representations
of women and Afro-Cubans involving the tourism economy.
16

It must be noted that the nature of the study precludes the inclusion of a single chapter devoted to a
general literature review. Rather, literature relevant to the dominant theme of each chapter is reviewed
within the chapter itself (see Rankin 1998, A64). I will discuss this point in more detail in Chapter
Two.
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The theoretical basis for the study will also be explored in this chapter. I
define the ideas of social construction and social production of space and place them
in the context of previous studies. Social contructionism is a tool used to
contextualize the research findings through the lens of (sometimes hidden) power
relationships between the government, the tourist industry and the Cuban population
at large. I discuss the Gramscian concept of hegemony and explain how I have
applied it conceptually to the study.
Chapter Three begins with an in-depth discussion of the Rectification Process
(RP) that set the stage for many of the policies pursued in the Special Period. The
remainder of the chapter discusses the economic exigencies of the Special Period and
then highlights its impact on the lives of the Cuban people during the period of
austerity. This is followed by a discussion of the black market and a definition and
discussion of jineterismo, the illegal, yet sometimes sanctioned, act of entering into
financial relationships with tourists.
Chapter Four is divided into two distinct sections dealing with the issues of
race and gender in Cuba. The first section examines the rise of the “creolization”
concept (Cubanizarlo in the vernacular), an elaborate formation of multiculturalism
among the Cuban working classes, from the colonial period to the mid-20th century.
This section also discusses the changing status of Afro-Cubans and the issue of
racism. The second section presents changing representations of gender from the preRevolutionary period to Special Period-era Cuba. In this part of the study I argue that
both tourism and the shifting geographic realities of the Special Period produced
profound racial and gender differences, and in some cases, growing inequality. I
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hypothesize that the social relations re-ordered by the tourism industry unmask the
deep structural culture patterns that have remained unexamined during the Castro
regime due to the premise that the Cuban revolution has resulted in undisputed
equality.17
Chapter Five discusses the dominant discourses surrounding tourism during
the Special Period. I begin with a brief history of the Cuban tourism industry to
contextualize the structural changes noted resulted during the Special Period. Chapter
Five also explores the highly gendered realm of the prostitution economy. While
recent studies on prostitution in Cuba are mostly descriptive in their approach, this
chapter considers the spatial implications of sex work jineterismo in Cuba, both at the
local level and at the wider regional level. By examining shifts in the spatial
allocation of prostitution and jineterismo, a clearer understanding is gained of how
hegemony and resistance have been exercised during the Special Period.
Chapter Six covers representations of race and gender in Cuba through a
quantitative and qualitative analyses of Cuban, North American and Europeanproduced tourism literature. This chapter draws from recent studies on images and
representation in tourism by Morgan and Pritchard 1998, Bhattacharyya 1997, Dann
1996, and Selwyn 1996, et al and is included because the material provides yet
another set of insights on how race and gender are socially constructed in Cuba.
The study concludes with an analysis of possible future directions for Cuba
based on the experiences of the past forty-three years of the revolution. In particular,
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To question issues of equality within Cuba can lead to harsh punishment ranging from censure to
imprisonment and even death in extreme cases.
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I discuss the future role of tourism as a development strategy. I finish with a final
analysis of Castro’s hegemonic rule in Cuba.
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CHAPTER TWO
Methodology and Theoretical Focus of the Study

Methodology

Due to the scope of this project and the need to verify data gathered in the
field from both “official” and non-official Cuban sources, I have implemented what is
referred to as the “multi-method” approach to research and data interpretation. There
are several reasons why I utilize varying approaches in this study. First and
foremost, the complexity of the subject matter precludes the utilization of a single
specific theoretical or methodological approach. Secondly, I incorporate multimethod approaches because they are useful in gathering and assessing data that
address issues of power, ideology and subjective meaning (Bailey et al 1999, 170).
Qualitative data gathered from knowledgeable informants are useful in helping the
researcher understand the context and meaning of phenomenon being studied, a
practice referred to as “critical ethnography” (Wainwright 1997). One main goal of
qualitative research is to use evidence produced by the subjects of the study in order
to obtain a holistic portrayal of the situation (Walle 1997, 529-530). Inductive, rather
than deductive reasoning is often employed in qualitative research to order the
multiple realities as they are discovered and a flexible research design accommodates
emerging realities that cannot be predicted a priori (Riley and Love 2000, 168). Of
special importance to this research design is the role of the investigator, because only
a human “instrument” can fully grasp the interactions of context and multiple realities
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as they emerge from the fieldwork data and the application of theory (Riley and Love
2000, 168).
Susan Hanson notes that the effort to minimize power inequalities between the
researcher and the interview subject (or the “research associate”) enhances the
creation of knowledge through fieldwork ” (Hanson 1997, 126). Indeed, by
acknowledging and embracing the idea that interview subjects are active partners in
the creation of knowledge in the field, researchers can hopefully minimize perceptual
gaps and increase the depth of knowledge that “associates” are willing to share.
Hanson also advocates the multi-method approach to research because by involving
multiple viewpoints and voices, the possibility of “being surprised” by field-derived
data is maximized (Hanson 1997, 126). It is through the discovery of surprising data
that the researcher is able to formulate new practical and theoretical approaches to the
subject at hand.
My first step was an extensive reading of primary and secondary sources on
Cuba and on tourism. I then employed qualitative research mainly in an effort to gain
a deeper understanding of local context. In order to perform a complete rendering of
my subject matter, I used many “tools” to address my study questions. To begin, the
primary data for my study come from three main sources. First, the study draws from
my ethnographic research I conducted in Cuba over the course of three summers
spanning 1995 to 1997. I collected these data through structured and unstructured
interviews with Cuban tourism officials as well as with Cuban citizens engaged in
acts of jineterismo.
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Additional data were derived through active participant observation based on
the model of the “field tourist” as demonstrated by Boniface and Fowler (1993) who
note the desirability and efficacy of sustained personal contact with research subjects
in both formal and informal situations. In an effort to increase my understanding of
everyday life, I rented rooms in the homes of Cuban families, and participated in
typical events such as birthday parties and family gatherings as well as day-to-day
events such as shopping expeditions and excursions to local recreational.
A quantitative and qualitative content analysis of Cuban tourism literature also
informs this study by revealing how Cubans are depicted to tourists. Using
methodologies developed by Morgan and Pritchard (1998), Dann (1996), Laffey
(1995), Cooper (1995) and Britton (1974), I examined tourism literature for the ways
in which government officials and others represent Cuban gender and ethnicity (this
will be discussed at length in Chapter Six).
The multi-method approach lessens concerns about the validity of data
collected in the field, a concern voiced by researchers (Pope, personal
communication, 2002). Indeed, because of the “fear factor” in Cuban society, the
researcher must carefully consider the accuracy of ethnographically derived data. In
other words, many Cubans (including tourism officials and academics) dare not speak
openly with researchers for fear of censure by the government. While the validity of
this assertion cannot be proven, it is partially supported by a rumor that a tourism
worker was terminated from his employment because he cooperated with a German
research team. Finally, the data derived from an analysis of tourism literature adds a
level of confidence to my findings and subsequent discussion, and it does not expose
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Cubans to potential governmental retribution for their cooperation in dealing with
“sensitive” issues.
As stated in the introduction, I have included the relevant literature reviews in
the chapters where I discuss each topic in turn. I specifically designed the study to
focus more deeply on situational context and to reduce the tendency to
compartmentalize data. Because one of my goals in this study was to develop a means
to more logically order my discussion, I have taken to heart Rankin’s question, “What
can we do to make literature reviews more engaging and purposeful?” (Rankin 1998,
A64). She notes that the review of literature does “double duty,” both establishing
the theoretical framework, and indicating the perspective from which the study is
written.
I think it is both appropriate and more meaningful to include “positional”
statements that explain my role as the researcher and the roles and backgrounds of my
field research associates. This is important because it lends the work a more
immediate quality and helps the reader understand the process and context behind my
key assertions. I found that many of the connections I make in this study were not
self-evident from a simple analysis of the data, but rather emerged during the writing
process.

A Note on the Representational Narratives and Interview Data

Susan Hanson, while thinking about how to best incorporate the multiple
voices that inform the research enterprise, advocates the use of narrative (1997, 11936

127). Taking her lead, I include several narratives (referred to as vignettes or personal
profiles), drawn from discussions with Cubans, to represent more clearly the voices of
those involved in this project. Additionally, I believe that these narratives supplement
nicely the field data because they allow subjects to represent themselves by telling
their own stories. Many of the narratives are from Cubans active in the black market
and jineterismo. (Due to the nature of their activities, the identities of interview
sources have been altered to protect subjects).
The study of jineterismo and indeed associations with Cuban jineteros is a
sensitive issue in a country where a citizen can be harassed and jailed on the pretext
that he or she represents a “danger to society” (i.e., they engage in “social
dangerousness”), a euphemism that can include almost any act deemed
“counterrevolutionary” or found objectionable by the government. As Katz has noted,
“there is danger in making the practices of the oppressed visible to those who
dominate” (1994, 71). In practice, the examination of activities deemed acts of
jineterismo are not as problematic as I had assumed prior to gathering field data.
Given that these activities are illegal by nature (although the question of legality is
ambiguous in the case of sex work as well as other activities such as maintaining
“illegal” private restaurants, etc.), witnessing and discussing them might appear
difficult. In fact, most Cubans are quick to acknowledge that all citizens engage in
acts of jineterismo merely to survive during the Special Period. Because of this fact,
many Cubans seem willing to discuss more or less freely their black market dealings,
often accentuating the need to engage in such activities with the ubiquitous Special
Period statement: “no es fácíl” (translation: “it’s not easy” or “life is hard”). In spite
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of their willingness to discuss these issues, however, I have altered identities to
protect my sources.

Setting the Theoretical Context: Social Constructions of Space and
Gramsci’s Theory of Hegemony

Social constructionism, a widely adopted body of theory in the social
sciences, is predicated on the idea that knowledge is relative to particular historical
and cultural circumstances and is determined by its social context of inquiry. Under
this definition, knowledge is value-laden, and hence must be viewed in reference to
the conditions in which it developed (Bailey et al 1999, 173). This distinction goes to
the heart of on-going philosophical debates on ontology (the nature of reality and
being) and epistemologies (ways of knowing) that are adopted to define, as well as to
understand and make sense of, everyday life. Social constructionists follow the path
of the idealists who assert that knowledge is the certainty that phenomena are real and
that they possess specific characteristics. Phenomena, however, do not possess
universal meaning. For example, in the case of this study, tourism is a real and
omnipresent phenomenon in Cuba today. However, Cuban tourism and government
officials, foreign investors, average Cuban citizens and international tourists,
conceptualize, construct, represent and “live” tourism differently. . This section first
defines and situates the theory of social constructionism. Then, it demonstrates how
space and place are socially constructed and explains how the theories of social
construction and social production of space apply in this study.
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In the second section, I draw from traditional theories of hegemony to
establish the theoretical link between capitalism and cultural, economic and political
domination. I will challenge Gramsci’s assertion that hegemonic relationships are
exclusively associated with capitalist expansionism and imperialism by applying his
theory of hegemony to Castro’s Cuba.

The Social Contruction of Space

Theorists associated with the Chicago School of Sociology developed social
constructionism, a well-established sub-field in the social sciences, in the 1960s. .
Researchers such as Berger and Luckman (1966) and Schutz (1967) first applied the
idea that social objects are not found “in the world” but are rather understood by
virtue of the processes that created them. Berger and Luckman were unequivocal on
this matter, “Reality is socially constructed and the sociology of knowledge must
analyze the processes in which this occurs (1966, 1). They theorized humans as
agents who actively construct their world, rather than as passive organisms that
simply process information (Sarbin and Kitsuse 1994, 2). For this reason, social
constructions reflect the ability of humans to make sense of their world through
contextual clues.
Various actors and human agents construct space, as it is applied conceptually
to this project. Both space and place are the products of power and as such represent
the prevailing social order. According to one source, space is where issues of
“power, identity, meaning and behavior are constructed, negotiated and renegotiated
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according to socio-cultural dynamics” (Pritchard and Morgan 2000, 885). Space, as a
geographic construct, serves as the wider arena wherein social relations occur. Place,
by contrast, is a portion of geographic space and represents the tangible, bounded
result of spatial practices (Duncan 2000, 582-583). In other words, place is a product
of spatial construction. Significantly, place boundaries are porous and hence the
character of place is in flux continually as a result of local linkages with wider, even
global, forces (Massey 1993, 144).
In order to understand how space functions, the researcher must realize that
space is a process that is continually being altered, both cognitively and materially,
rather than being a value-neutral static stage on which social activities occur (see
Lefebvre 1991). This is because all who come into contact with a particular place
participate in spatializing the place. By spatialize, I follow Low who writes, “to
spatialize culture [means] to physically and conceptually locate social relations and
social practice in space” (2000, 126). In this study, place refers to the material and
symbolic landscape of tourism in Cuba, and space embodies the forces at work that
lend particular tourism places their unique characteristics.
Current practitioners of ethnographic methodologies recognize the need to
characterize social actors in terms of their experience of theorized phenomenon (Low
2000, 127). A growing number of social science scholars draw from and advance the
theory of social constructionism as it relates to spatial issues. Urban anthropologist
Setha Low conducted a long-term study of the social construction of urban plazas in
Costa Rica (Low 1996, 1997 and 2000). In her work she developes a refined
definition of social constructionism that points to its utility to researchers of spatial
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issues. She writes, “The social construction of space is the actual transformation of
space, through people’s social exchanges, memories, images and daily use of the
material setting, into scenes and actions that convey meaning” (2000, 128). Social
constructions of space, therefore, deal with the organization of the world into its
present spatial configurations, at all scales from personal to global. In this context
social change refers to the (re) allocation of space and the power that accompanies
access to space, in other words the power to “make space” (Perry 1995, 223). Social
constructions of space likewise depend, and indeed are based on, local conditions and
are for that reason inherently relativist, thereby underlining the impossibility of
separating the social from the spatial (Barnes 2000, 748).
Low distinguishes between social productions of space and social
constructions of space, and rightly points out that scholars often use the terms
interchangeably. The social production of space refers to all of those factors—social,
economic, ideological and technological—that create the physical or material setting.
As she writes, “the materialist emphasis of the term social production is useful in
defining the historical emergence and political and economic formation of …space”
(1997, 861). Social constructions of space, on the other hand, address the symbolic
meaning of the setting. Taken one step further, space actually can be defined in these
symbolic terms. She writes, “the ritual aspects of allocating space become the rituals
of society and the rules of property control” (Low 1997, 861).
At the heart of social productions of space is the reproduction of political and
economic power visible on the material landscape. Duncan (1991), a cultural
geographer who studies the historical landscape of Kandy, Sri Lanka, seeks to
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“illuminate the way in which a landscape, understood as a cultural production, may
be integral to both the reproduction and contestation of political power.” He
continues, “Questions (within cultural geography) of how landscapes are used to
advance or retard the attainment of social and political goals are virtually never
asked” (1991, 3). Indeed, he asserts that the designed environment works like a
communication system, or a text encoded with information by which symbols of
order and social relationships can be determined. He then notes that the underlying or
evident authority of the place can be deciphered through these texts. Duncan draws
from Foucault in noting that discursive fields evident in the landscape inscribe power
relations. He writes, “each discourse has attendant landscape models…that are
reflections of the culture within which they were built” (1991, 11).
As previously developed, social constructions of space are based on
relationships of power implying that space is under a continual process of
contestation. Peter Jackson, a cultural geographer, believes that patterns of cultural
dominance and subordination reflect the power relations of space. He writes that
dominant institutions that “exert a subtle and pervasive influence” on peoples lives
and “establish a preferred reading of local and national circumstances” shape the
nexus of power within cultures (Jackson 1989, 3). These dominant views are most
effective, Jackson argues, when they become “naturalized” to become part of the
“everyday common sense” of that particular culture (1989, 3). Lefebvre echoes
Jackson and notes that while a given power may control space, challenges exist that
lead to the impossibility of complete control of space. He writes that space, as a
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production by a central power or hegemony (discussed below), is a “means of control,
and hence domination, of power (Lefebvre 1991, 26).

The Gramscian Notion of Hegemony

Hegemony is the distinct expression of power that flows from dominance. The
term refers to the capacity of a dominant group to exercise control that leads members
of subordinate groups to accept social, cultural, economic and political institutions
that are inherently unequal (Ley 2000, 332). Hegemony incorporates more than the
ideology and beliefs that the dominant elite disseminates, it is rather “a lived system
of meanings and values” that makes up the “everyday common sense” described by
Jackson in the above paragraph (Ley 2000, 333).
Marxists see hegemony as a feature of the world-system whereby capitalist
societies exploit their own workers and those of other countries to maintain their hold
on global power (Pahre 1999, 3-4). Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist who was
imprisoned during the fascist rule of Mussolini, believed that hegemony, and its
attendant problems such as the domination of the working class by a wealthy elite, is
rooted in the ascendancy of European-style capitalist development (the Western
tradition)18 (Gramsci 1971, 416-418). Gramsci’s formulation of hegemony has been
applied to geopolitical studies to explain the succession of dominant global powers

18

Gramsci reformulated his theory on hegemony to better account for the rise in what he termed
“Americanism” (or Fordism) in the post World War I era (1971, 279-318). In Gramsci’s view, while
the American hegemon was rooted in the Western tradition of capitalism, America was free of the
“parasitic residues” (feudal roots) of older modes of production.
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(e.g., Britain in the 19th century and the United States in the 20th century) that “define
and enforce the rules of the game” (Ley 2000, 333).
Gramsci broke from orthodox Marxist thinking and proposed a less
mechanistic and materialistic view of socialism. He placed greater emphasis on
cultural capital than Marx did and he focused more on the roles of intellectuals
charged with establishing and articulating the moral constructs of society (Gramsci
1971, 5-7; 12). Gramsci argued that hegemonic powers could gain control only
through the “spontaneous consent” of the subordinate classes (Gramsci 1971, 12).
Marx, by contrast, believed that capitalist hegemons gained and maintained power
through force and coersion, but Gramsci demonstrated that consent to the ruling party
can be “voluntary” and thus seemingly moral and ethical in character (1971, 80).
Indeed, in Gramsci’s view, class struggle can only be successful if fought and won on
the cultural front.
One observer believes the maintenance of hegemony is facilitated by, and
concentrated in, civil society (Cammett 1967, 204-205). In his view, civil society
refers to the institutions that diffuse “one concept of reality” to all strata of society
thereby maintaining the hegemony and allowing the elites to remain in power19. The
development of hegemony, therefore, depends on the “level of homogeneity, selfconsciousness, and organization” reached by a ruling class. As Cammett notes, mere
awareness of economic interests is not sufficient to establish hegemony, rather the
ruling class must convince repressed groups that the interests of the dominant group
coincide with their interests, as well (Cammett 1967, 204). From this perspective, the
19

Civil society, in this context, should not be confused with the capitalist notion of private entities that
operate outside the purview of the sphere of production and the state (see Johnston 2000, 84).
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concept of Gramscian hegemony serves as a useful construct to ground political,
economic and cultural development during Cuba’s revolutionary period. Indeed,
Cammett expanded on the Gramscian notion that problems of hegemony “become
particularly important in periods that follow a phase of revolutionary activity” and
therefore class struggle becomes a “war of position” on the cultural front (Cammett
1967, 206). In this study, I will demonstrate that Castro fights a continual “war of
position” on the cultural front in an effort to claim the moral high ground in his
attempts to maintain hegemonic rule in the country.
Jackson believes that the real innovation of Gramsci’s work was the
realization that in capitalist societies, hegemony is never fully acheived due to the
continual plurality of cultures in any given society. This is due to an imbalance of
power between a ruling elite and subordinate classes who continually challenge or
contest the dominance of those in power. “Resistance may not always be active and
open; often it will be latent and largely symbolic” (Jackson 1989, 53). Jackson’s
point is echoed by Lefebvre who notes that states seek, but fail, to wield their power
completely (Lefebvre 1991, 26). In this sense, those who wield unequal power in a
specific society and culture continually contest the utilization, symbolism, and
production of space. This contested space becomes visible through signs and other
symbolic imagery constructed by the subordinate people of the given society.
Jackson draws from Parkin’s theory of social closure to explain how power is wielded
at the societal level. Parkin notes that the ability to control the downward flow of
power enables dominant groups to maintain exclusionary practices. By contrast,
subordinate groups attempt to gain power in an upward direction by such actions as
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strikes and riots (Jackson 1989, 54-55). Where the dominant social groups can
marshal the full resources of the state, as in Cuba, resistance in the form of organized
dissent is often severely repressed and often takes on symbolic form. I concur with
Jackson and Parkin, although I hold that the plurality of cultures exists, though
perhaps less obviously, in authoritarian regimes such as Castro’s Cuba. By plurality
of cultures, I mean the growth of better defined social classes during the Special
Period that fall along lines of race, gender and wider socio-economic privilege
conferred to those who have access to dollars.
In many ways, the questions raised in feminist theory deal explicitly with
manifestations of power and many researchers center their studies on social
constructionist models as evidenced by the work of Pritchard and Morgan (2000),
Kitzinger (1994) and Massey (1994) among others. Indeed, gender analysis as
proposed by feminist scholars can be an appropriate tool for uncovering the results of
power differentials, since gender itself is a social construction. According to Swain,
gender is a “system of culturally constructed identities, expressed in ideologies of
masculinity and femininity, interacting with socially structured relationships in
divisions of labor and leisure, sexuality and power between men and women” (1995,
258). Daphne Spain notes that our understanding of gender inequalities, for example,
can be improved by considering both the architectural and geographic contexts within
which they occur (1992, 3). Massey describes how local constructions of space in the
modern world are not based solely on indigenous conditions, but rather are influenced
by global patterns. In this context the spatial can be seen as constructed out of the
wide range of social relations across all scales, from the global, which implies the
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reach of multi-national corporations and hegemonic systems, to local relations at the
city-wide, household and even personal levels (Massey 1994, 2-3). The local space is
often where the power of globalizing institutions comes into contact with local
particularisms, a collision that often leads to re-formulations of local space. The
study of social constructions at the personal level—in everyday life—can also reveal
the actual utilization of space as lived space by local inhabitants. In short, by
expanding the scale of analysis, local particularisms become more pronounced
allowing researchers an enhanced ability to better conduct cross-cultural and crossspatial analyses.
In sum, I explore the gendered and racialized construction of Cuba’s tourism
space in this study. Since women and darker-skinned Cubans have historically been
granted little power to produce space, understanding how they socially construct their
space will aid in understanding how the spaces created for tourism are lived and
perceived by all involved. The built environment expresses spatial divisions within
Cuban society, and verifies anecdotal evidence of emerging social divisions within
Cuban society resulting from the implementation of tourism as a development
strategy. This point will be explored in greater detail in Chapters Four, Five and Six.

47

CHAPTER THREE
Setting the Stage: The Rectification Process and the Special Period in
a Time of Peace

The program of austerity known as the “Special Period in an Time of Peace”
(referred to hereafter as the Special Period) best defines Cuba over the course of the
past decade. Announced in 1990 after the demise of the Soviet Union effectively
severed the economic lifeline that Cuba depended upon for almost thirty years, the
subsequent loss of subsidies led to a precipitous contraction of the Cuban economy
that shrank an estimated 35 to 40 percent between 1990 and 1993 (Roque and
Sánchez 1998, 9, Pérez-López 1995, 1). It was not until 1994 that the economy finally
began to post gains when the GDP grew by a reported 0.7 percent (Roque and
Sánchez 1998, 10). Despite an average growth rate of 3.8 percent per year since
1995, Cuba’s economy is still functioning at 84.5 percent of pre-1989 levels (San
Martin 2001). According to a recent report, Cuba’s GDP increased 1.1 percent in
2002 (Gómez Balado 2003).
The Soviet demise so devastated Cuba’s economy because of Cuba’s almost
complete reliance on Soviet subsidies further extended a long pattern of dependency
on foreign “benefactors.” Under the Soviet plan, Cuba supplied sugar, other tropical
produce such as citrus, and nickel ore to the USSR and the rest of the Soviet bloc at
prices as high as three times the world market rate. The Eastern bloc countries
(Committee for Mutual Economic Assistance: CMEA members) absorbed 90 percent
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of Cuba’s sugar, citrus and nickel exports at those highly subsidized rates (Binns
1996, 45). Cuba, on the other hand, depended on the CMEA for close to 100 percent
of its imported food needs, including condensed milk, butter, cheese and flour as well
as the precious oil allotments that fueled the island’s agricultural sector and attempts
at industrialization (Binns 1996, 45). Cuba further benefited from the trade
arrangement insofar as the Soviets allowed Cuba to sell unused oil on the global
market in order to raise hard currency.
This chapter examines the social and economic ramifications of the Special
Period austerity program. In order to understand the political and economic bases of
the Special Period, I consider policies established during the Rectification Process
announced in 1986. The chapter begins with a discussion of reasons for the
Rectification Process, and how Rectification policies reverberate on the economic
landscape in Cuba today. In an effort to contextualize the island’s current
dependence on international tourism and foreign investment, I also discuss Cuba’s
historical dependence on outside regimes. In order to complete a full assessment of
Cuba during the Special Period, it is useful to compare Cuba’s development data with
those of comparable countries. The chapter concludes with a discussion of ways
Cubans adapted to Special Period policies by participating in the burgeoning black
market (which includes engaging in acts of jineterismo) and through legal forms of
self-employment.
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The Rectification Process

In the mid-1980s, it became clear to Castro that Cuba’s beneficial relationship
with the Soviet Union was not sustainable in the long run. In response to market
openings in the Soviet bloc, Castro announced the Rectification Process (hereafter the
RP) in 1986 in part to distance Cuba from Soviet policy deemed unacceptable by the
Cuban political leadership, but also to foster a national economic model better suited
to the needs of Cuba (see Everleny 1998, Eckstein 1994, and Mesa-Lago 1994).
Castro effectively shunned Soviet Premier Gorbachev’s reform-minded policies by
restricting economic privatization while concurrently reviving the nationalistic and
anti-American rhetoric of the early revolutionary period. During the RP, Cuba’s
involvement with Soviet-supported military and civilian internationalism waned as
Castro focused on the promotion of Cuban nationalism.20 Rabkin sums up Castro’s
retrenchment in the mid 1980s thusly:
“The regime’s preoccupation with questions of political unity and loyalty,
long a feature of Cuban communism, grew more intense, just as the reverse
process of political pluralization and liberalization developed in Eastern
Europe” (Rabkin 1991, 179).
Officially, Castro implemented the RP to “correct mistakes” in policy that had given
rise to myriad problems considered anathema to the regime, such as growing
inequalities in earnings, increased dependence on material rewards, multi-level
corruption and inefficient use of labor, particularly labor associated with the
20

See Eckstein (1994, 171-203) for more discussion on Cuba’s role in the Soviet plan of
internationalism.
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construction and agricultural sectors. In the 1980s, Castro believed (or at least
preached) that a general corrosion of “conciencia” or decline in revolutionary zeal
that affected the whole of the country caused these problems (Eckstein 1994, 61-62).
Yet, Cuba was also in the midst of growing economic difficulties, a point that was
often lost in the ideological focus of public pronouncements during the RP.
Marifeli Pérez-Stable believes the RP represented an important crossroads in
the revolutionary period: the country could have either embraced broader and more
meaningful market openings, or pursued a policy of retrenchment, a return to the
“tenets of revolution” (1999, 154-155). The Castro regime decided to pursue the
latter course, a move that in retrospect allowed Castro himself to remain in power
long after his contemporaries, such as Gorbachev, were swept from office when their
countries embraced further reform. Many RP policies shaped the subsequent Special
Period actions, and Castro invoked this ideological retrenchment over the course of
several economic crackdowns in the 1990s. I argue that a series of government
crackdowns on private initiative and jineterismo dating from 1996 to the present
constitute a latter day RP.
At one level, the RP reined in and in some cases reversed economic reforms
introduced in 1977 under the System of Economic Management and Planning
(Sistema de Dirección y Planificación de la Economia: SDPE). As part of an overall
effort to decentralize the Cuban economy, the SDPE was designed to 1) make
enterprises accountable; 2) introduce a system of material incentives designed to
reward enterprise profitability; 3) promote economic efficiency; and 4) widen selfemployment (Zimbalist 1994, 221). In the main, the engineers of the SDPE hoped to
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improve economic sector efficiency by empowering managerial personnel to perform
a wider array of micro level decisions. Decentralized decision-making allowed
managers more leeway in the use of material incentives to encourage workers, as well
as a freer hand in the procurement and management of supplies. Managers were also
instructed to abide by greater measures of accountability in an effort to stem
corruption (del Aguila 1994, 99).
The SDPE aped reforms originally implemented in the Soviet Union in 1965
and it signaled a Cuban attempt to follow more closely the state socialist model
instituted by the Soviet bloc countries (Zimbalist 1994, 221). In fact, Cuba adopted
the SDPE reforms largely to appease the Soviet Union, which was reportedly not
happy with the use of their financial assistance in Cuba (del Aguila 1994, 99-100).
Del Aguila estimates that Soviet assistance to Cuba during the 1970s totaled nearly
$12.5 billion, including both balance-of-payments assistance and the aforementioned
agricultural and trade subsidies (del Aguila 1994, 99-100). Despite Cuba’s adoption
of Soviet-approved reforms, Castro never really warmed to the new policies, and in
fact initially suppressed his hostility towards what he saw as capitalist tenets of
management (del Aguila 1994, 99-100). For this reason, Castro’s swift re-alignment
of policy to conform to early revolutionary reforms and his back tracking on SDPE
initiatives during the RP came as no surprise to observers.
The regime’s commitment to decentralization and market reform had
deepened in 1980 when it established free farmers markets in a bid to supplement the
rationed and non-rationed food supply and additionally to improve the quality and
variety of the foods available to average Cubans (Benjamin et al 1986, 58). The
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Cuban government also felt the need to reinforce its connection with the Cuban
people in the aftermath of the Mariel boatlift when 125,000 Cubans left the island in
1980 (Pérez-Stable 1999, 150). The government gave private farmers the right to sell
their excess produce (after providing the state with 50 percent of their harvest) in
special markets where prices floated with demand. Despite the fact that the
availability of food, and more importantly, fresh produce and meats, improved as a
result of the markets, both residents and the government complained of growing
abuses by farmers and distributors. Castro complained that the markets produced
“too many millionaires,” a reference to reports of some farmers and distributors who
listed annual incomes in excess of 50,000 pesos (the average Cuban legally earned
around 190 pesos per month) (Zimbalist 1994, 224). These systemic abuses led to
reforms in 1982 to deal specifically with problems of exorbitant prices, excessive
profits by middlemen and resource diversion from the state sector.21 However,
despite incorporating a tax system for private farmers and distributors and expanding
the state-controlled parallel market to compete with the farmer’s markets, the
government blamed continuing abuses as the reason for the eventual closing of the
markets with the advent of the RP (Zimbalist 1994, 224). The experience of the
farmer’s markets led to the amendment of the penal code in 1988 to include hoarding,
speculation, deception of consumers and damage to economic plans as crimes against
the state (Dalton 1993, 49).22

21

Castro believed that truckers and sellers were withholding the best produce to sell for their private
gain (Eckstein 1994, 74).
22
This amendment has been cited frequently during the Special Period in instances when the regime
has attempted to control self-employed workers and the farmer’s markets that were re-introduced in
1992.
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Castro began a campaign to address what he believed were SDPE-inspired
lapses in proper revolutionary ideology. As part of its appeal to the Cuban populace,
the government “resurrected” for their promotional use the writings of Ernesto Che
Guevara, the Argentine communist and doctor who played a large role in the
revolutionary victory and wrote extensively on the moral bases of communism.
Guevara, following the teachings of Marx, insisted on replacing the money-based
economy with a system of equitable exchange (Pérez-Stable 1999, 69). In Guevara’s
view, the government should play the role of the benevolent distributor of necessary
goods and services, and citizens, should work for non-material rewards, i.e., the
greater good of the revolution (Pérez-Stable 1999,72). For these reasons, Castro
quickly trotted out Guevara’s revolutionary credentials in an effort to stir up latent
Cuban nationalism. This was easy to do, for Che was a Castro confidante in the early
years of the revolution and he participated in the initial training of exiled Castro
supporters in Mexico in the mid 1950s. He was present on the leaky yacht “Granma”
that carried the rebels back to Cuba in 1957 to begin the revolution in earnest.
Guevara served both as a physician to the rebel elite as well as a column leader during
the so-called westward push that led to the eventual rebel victory in 1958 (PérezStable 1999, 69). In a speech delivered in October 1987, Castro paraphrased Che by
stating:
“The new man [sic], driven by conciencia and guided by education, was to
build socialism and communism with the appropriate tools (output plan,
voluntary work, moral rewards), while rejecting the pernicious mechanisms of
capitalist economics (markets, prices, monetary incentives) (Roca 1993, 95).
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He continues to cite Guevara’s writings in the Special Period in an effort to combat
perceptions of lingering materialism on the part of many Cubans (see Castro 2002).
As mentioned earlier, Castro’s move to “rectify” the perceived problems of
the revolution went beyond a simple statement of the ideological shortcomings of the
part of the Cuban population. The RP also emerged to control a profound fiscal crisis
brought on by falling sugar prices that led to a rapid rise in the national debt. Indeed,
while the RP was influenced by perceived internal rot and lack of ideological
discipline on the part of the Cuban people, the program was more importantly
addressed external economic exigencies (Eckstein 1994, 71-72). By 1986, Cuba
confronted a growing fiscal crisis due, in part, to forces beyond its immediate control.
A fall in world sugar and oil prices exposed the island’s monocultural dependence on
sugar. Indeed, by the mid-1980s, Cuba rapidly accumulated foreign debt, especially
to its Western trading partners, as imports surpassed export revenue (Roque and
Sanchez 1998, 12). Despite a heavy dependence on the Soviet bloc for trade, Cuba
relied on the capitalist world for 10-15 percent of its imports, mainly technology and
other inputs not available from the socialist bloc countries (del Aguila 1994, 103).
Between 1985 and 1986, Cuba’s debt to Western lenders jumped from 3.6
billion pesos to 5 billion pesos, and Castro’s inability to secure new funding for
interest payments led to Cuba’s default on Western loans. This led to a significant
contraction in hard currency earnings from trade with the West (Eckstein 1994, 72).
Eckstein sums up this point thusly, “the real spur for the rectification drive probably
lay less in any sudden realization that the ‘profit-spirit’ had invaded the Cuban
working class than in Cuba’s position vis-à-vis the international economy” (1994,
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74). Paradoxically, Cuba’s high degree of economic dependency on the Soviet bloc
thus became more entrenched at the same time the two sides began to differ on issues
of reform policies. Cuba’s declining economic relationship with the Western world
in the late 1980s thus exacerbated the severity of economic contractions experienced
during the Special Period. .
The reforms of the RP effectively spelled the end of what Ana JatarHausmann referred to as Cuba’s “golden 80s,” a period marked by the highest
average spending power experienced since the revolution began (1999, 27). Lee
Lockwood affirms the “golden 80s” moniker and writes:
“The parallel market was at its zenith and the prevailing mood in Havana was
euphoric. Many people now owned stereo sets and even videotape recorders.
For the first time in years, people could invite a friend to dinner in their homes
knowing that there would be enough food. Once again you heard lively
chatter and people smiled at you as they passed you in the street” (1990, 364).
Indeed, an interview with a Cuban who has lived through the entire course of the
revolution confirmed the widely held belief that the early 1980s represented an era
when “there was ample food on the shelves and in the private markets. We didn’t
worry about food then as we do now” (Marlo, personal communication, 1997).
Today, many Cubans, especially those without access to dollars, frequently reminisce
about the early 1980s as the period when market reforms greatly improved life for
Cubans (Jatar-Hausmann 1999, 29).
The dramatic political and economic shifts that Cubans witnessed during the
RP contextualize the severe economic and social problems associated with the
Special Period. Furthermore, as mentioned, the government struggled to maintain the
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ideological precepts of the RP during the Special Period including continued
exhortations that trumpet the superiority of moral over material rewards. Despite the
re-opening of private farmer’s markets and the expansion of self-employment, the
regime continues to insist that the private sector is to be closely regulated and will
play only a “complementary” role to that of the state-managed economy (Peters and
Scarpaci 1998, 2). In short, the regime maintained as closely as possible the Cuban
economic model pursued during the RP: “centralist, personalist [i.e., related to the
dominate role of Fidel Castro], anti-market, and anti-incentive, with heavy emphasis
on ideological and political values” (Roca 1993, 91).

The Rectification Process and the Changing Status of Women

Many observers overlook the impact of the RP on women in the labor force.
The RP addressed a problem of excess employment that had become progressively
worse throughout the course of the 1980s and indeed remained a problem at the outset
of the Special Period. Castro denounced “overemployment” in the administrative and
managerial sectors where the number of personnel had risen from 90,000 in 1973 to
over 250,000 by 1984 (Bengelsdorf 1994, 151). However, he also advocated deep
employment cuts in such sectors as public health and textiles that historically
employed greater numbers of women than men (Bunck 1994, 114). The
“reorganization” of employment structures, therefore, often targeted women at a
greater rate than men, due in part to lingering attitudes regarding sex roles in the labor
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force (Bunck 1994, 114).23 For example, the government reduced support for a
program designed to accommodate working mothers, known as “buffer hiring,”
whereby employers hired extra women to cover maternity and child-care-related
absences of others (Smith and Padula 1996, 118). The subsequent reduction in job
slots as well as loss of aid to working mothers represented major setbacks, since
despite an increase in the number of day-care centers (known as círculos) built
nationwide over the course of the revolutionary period, child-care options were often
extremely limited for working mothers. In fact, by 1980, the círculos only
accommodated a reported eight percent of Cuba’s children under the age of six
(Bunck 1994, 113). Smith and Padula underscore this point with the following
example:
“In December 1987, (it was found that) women workers (in an industrial parts
factory) could not arrange for child care during two of their three hour shifts.
The solution, according to the union representative, was to replace female
workers with men” (1996, 119).
The issue of women’s work and childcare also emerged when the government shifted
surplus labor into voluntary micro-brigades that focused on housing construction (by
1989 33,000 Cubans worked as volunteers). However, only six percent of the
volunteers in that year were women, a state of affairs that Smith and Padula attribute
to continuing problems with day-care and the belief by many Cuban men that women
were not suited to that type of work (Smith and Padula 1996, 119). Women would
become the victims of disproportionate job loss in the Special Period, as well. This

23

See Chapter Four for discussion.
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point will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four along with a deeper analysis
of women and the labor force.

A History of Dependency

Castro’s regime consistently expressed concern over Soviet reform efforts
while it pushed, via the RP, a policy of political and economic retrenchment.
Nevertheless,the quite sudden demise of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the insistence
by the new Russian state that Cuba settle its reported 15.5 billion-ruble debt in hard
currency took Castro by surprise (Pérez-Stable 1999, 89). The dismantling of the
USSR led immediately to the suspension of most Soviet subsidies to Cuba, including
a majority of the oil that the island had scheduled to power sugar planting and
harvesting equipment pending debt re-payments. Trade between Russia and Cuba
would no longer consist of the preferential arrangements offered by the previous
regime. The end of the Cuba-Soviet relationship, however, did not signify the end of
dependency for the Cuban economy. Instead, it forced Cuba to seek out trade with,
and investment by, the “enemies” of the revolution, namely the Western capitalist
nations. The Special Period, therefore, signaled a new form of dependency.
In one respect, the fall of the Soviet bloc meant that for the first time in its
history as a state, Cuba was freed of domination by a single foreign power. After the
defeat of Spain in 1898 in the so-called “Spanish-American War,” a conflict known
on the island as the Second Cuban War for Independence, the United States
dominated the former Spanish colony economically and politically. This de-facto
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American colonialism was initially instituted by the controversial Platt Amendment
which allowed the United States to intervene militarily whenever deemed necessary,
and indeed the U.S. government invoked the Platt Amendment in 1905 and again in
1912 when US Marines occupied Cuba during periods of political unrest (Thomas
1971, 478-479). The United States also established a base on Cuban soil at
Guantanamo Bay, a sliver of Cuba that remains in US possession. Although the Platt
Amendment was abrogated in 1934, U.S. business interests were by then well
entrenched in Cuba and the island depended greatly upon US investment capital and
the American market, particularly for production and sale of agricultural products.
Cuba also depended on American tourists to support the growing tourism industry.
By the end of the 1950s, tourism revenue in Cuba topped 60 million dollars annually
(Villalba 1993, 107).24
Table 2 demonstrates that when the Castro regime overthrew Fulgencio
Batista’s government in 1959 and adopted Soviet-style socialism in 1961, Cuba
effectively traded its dependent relationship with the U.S. for one with the Soviet
Union. In 1959, the agricultural sector dominated the island’s export economy, with
sugar accounting for the lion’s share of revenue. At that time, the United States
purchased the majority of Cuba’s sugar (accounting for almost 55% of total sugar
exports) and American companies controlled many internal industries such as sugar
refining, mining, transportation links, power companies, and tourist hotels and
restaurants, to name a few of the most important (Pérez-Stable 1999, 24-26 & 88-89).

24

See Chapter Five for more discussion on the history of tourism in Cuba.
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Table 2: A History of Dependence and Monoculture

Decade
Sugar exports as a percent of total exports
Percent total trade with the United States
Percent total trade with the USSR
United States: Percent share of total sugar
exports
USSR: Percent share of total sugar exports
Decade trade surplus/deficit per capita in pesos
Source: Pérez-Stable 1999, 88

1950s 1980s
83.0
76.6
68.2
66.2
54.8
56.3
+61.2 -1300

In 1961, the Castro regime tied the island to the Soviet economic and political bloc
and despite efforts to the contrary, Cuba remained as dependent on Soviet aid and
markets as it had been on the US under the “American” period of 1902-1959.
Furthermore, Soviet demand for sugar actually increased Cuba’s dependence on that
single commodity due to the preferential conditions of trade granted by the USSR.
It is ironic, therefore, in light of the severe economic contractions of the
Special Period that the post-Soviet era ushered in a measure of political independence
from external domination that the island never before experienced, despite
revolutionary rhetoric to the contrary. Nonetheless, the economic realities of the
Special Period limit Cuba’s ability to function independently of the global capitalist
system, forcing the country into a new dependent relationship. This time, the
dependency results from foreign joint-venture capitalists and dollar-toting tourists
who receive preferential treatment in Cuba’s dollar-driven economy. So many
Spaniards have visited and invested in Cuba in the last ten years that Cubans
sometimes refer to this era as the “reconquista,” or the “reconquering” of Cuba by
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Spanish “colonists” (Elizade and Pulido 1996). Indeed, in 1998, Cuba confirmed that
Spain had become the island’s biggest trading partner in that bilateral trade equaled
over $700 million, although the balance of trade was heavily in Spain’s favor
(Fletcher 1999). By the end of 2001, Spanish companies accounted for over almost
25 percent of the joint venture and investment deals signed with the Cuban
government (Spadoni 2002, 163).

The Economic and Social Side Effects of the Special Period

Economic shocks administered during the Special Period continue to
reverberate in Cuba today. Beginning in the early 1990s, conditions considered
anathema to the Castro regime have become commonplace, and many fear that gains
realized over the course of Castro’s rule have been jeopardized. For example, the
regime has justifiably prided itself in the ability to provide basic necessities to Cuban
citizens including free or highly subsidized education, health care and housing.
Indeed, Cuba now ranks among the best of the developed countries on indicators
relating to human well-being and the country compares favorably to the United States
and the developed world countries based on important development statistics (see
Table 3). While its Maternity Death Rate is higher than many developed countries
including the United States, it is still considerably lower than comparable countries
such as Costa Rica (29/100,000) and Venezuela (60/100,000) (Human Development
2002). The data from Costa Rica and Venezuela are presented here because Cuba
scored roughly equidistant between the two in the overall UNHDI rankings. Out of
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Table 3: Comparative Statistics: 2002

Country/Region Infant mortality Life
Adult
Maternity Death
UN
rate
Ex.
Lit.
Rate
HDI
Cuba
6
76
97
33
55
United States
6
77
99
12
6
Costa Rica
10
76
96
29
43
Venezuela
20
72
93
60
69
Infant Mortality Rate is expressed as number per 1,000 of live births; Life Expectancy
is the average life span of a cohort born in a certain year; Adult Literacy Rate is
expressed as a percent of the population over the age of 15; Maternity Death Rate is
expressed as number per 100,000 live births; UNHDI (United Nations Human
Development Index) is based on ranking system of countries developed by the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP).
Source: Human Development Report: United Nations Development Program 2002.
173 total countries, Costa Rica ranked 43rd, Cuba ranked 55th and Venezuela ranked
69th (Human Development 2002). The UNHDI takes economic and political indices
into account, as well as social indicators (such as health, education and gender).
The “Human Poverty Index” (HPI), compiled and published by the UNDP,
ranks Cuba fourth out of 88 developing-world countries based on their effort to
eliminate poverty in the population (Human Development 2002). The HPI rankings
take several variables into account including average lifespan, basic educational
opportunities, access to public and private resources and employment opportunities.
Once again, Cuba scored favorably compared to comparable nations. Costa Rica was
second out of 88 and Venezuela was ninth.
While Cuba ranks at the top of the HPI list at the regional level (alongside
such countries as Chile and Costa Rica), compilers admit to shortcomings in the study
that would have had an adverse effect on Cuba’s ranking should they have been
included. For example, the study claims that “constraints in data” meant the
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exclusion of some dimensions of human poverty, such as political freedom. It is
difficult to quantify degrees of political freedom: the ability to participate in decisionmaking, personal security, the ability to participate in the life of a community, and the
absence of threats to the overall sustainability of the system are all considered
(Human Development 2002). These are all areas that Cuba has been roundly
criticized for by members of the international community. In fact, UN general
assemblies repeatedly condemn Cuba for continued human rights violations. In a
motion filed by Uruguay in April of 2002, the U.N. Human Rights Commission
voted to censure Cuba for its refusal to grant its citizens individual liberties or to
allow a human rights monitor to visit the island (San Martin 2002). Critics complain
that Castro’s famous proclamation: “Everything within the Revolution, nothing
against,” leads to the maintenance of strong instruments of social control such as the
harassment, imprisonment and even the death of outspoken political opponents
(Dalton 1993, 14-15). In short, Cuba exhibits a low tolerance for any behavior
deemed “counter-revolutionary” by the regime, including criticism of Castro and his
policies, and this has led ultimately to a captive press and a weak and disorganized
civil society in Cuba.
The Special Period severely tested Cuba’s ability to provide the welladvertised basic provisions for the welfare of the population as a whole. Recent
reports from Cuba document the decreasing quality of health care in the country.
Shortcomings, such as the lack of suitable medicines and health care equipment, limit
Cuba’s ability to keep dangerous diseases at bay. Recent reports note that poor
sanitation and lack of medical supplies have worsened hepatitis outbreaks in central
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and western Cuba (Arroyo 2001). Furthermore, Lastres (2001) believes that the true
extent of health problems in Cuba is vastly underreported since many Cuban doctors
are punished for publicly reporting outbreaks of hepatitis and dysentery, diseases that
Lastres believes will increase in severity due to Cuba’s declining health care system.
One recent article states that problems in the health care system increasingly
stem from health services being increasingly diverted to foreign patients as Cuba
expands its health tourism offerings (Cosano-Alén 2001). This state of affairs means
marked differences in the provision of health care for Cubans and the care received
by foreigners paying in dollars. The following excerpt from the above article
underlines this assertion:
“The x-ray department [in a polyclinic for use by Cubans] has been out of
service for almost a year and the technician was transferred to another clinic.
The ekg equipment is now working, but was out of commission for six
months. Nurses, technicians and specialists are often in short supply.
[However], in Santa Maria del Mar [in Havana, a nearby health tourism
facility for the exclusive use of foreigners], all the necessary equipment exists
to provide excellent care. The facility even has an ambulance [a “luxury” that
many Cuban facilities currently lack]” (Cosano-Alén 2001).
In addition to health care difficulties, the inability to provide adequate food
rations became a key problem during the Special Period. The government reintroduced basic foodstuff rationing at the onset of the Special Period in an effort to
ensure a level of equality among the population. Although rationing has played an
important role in Cuban life since the beginning of the revolution, the practice
intensified during the Special Period. Cubans consistently complain that rations do
not meet the needs of their families (see especially McGeary and Booth 1993, and
Jatar-Hausmann 1999, 19-23). The availability of rationed goods has reportedly
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deteriorated during the Special Period to the point where many assert that stateprovided food and other supplies are frequently sufficient for only ten days per month
(Mala vista 1999, 37). In order to feed themselves, Cubans must either pay the
relatively high prices at dollar stores or depend on the black market to meet their
needs. A newspaper account (Fornaris 2001) dated 3/31/2001, reported that the
following products were available for residents under the monthly quota:
1. rice (6 pounds per person),
2. sugar (3 pounds white and 3 pounds brown per person),
3. red beans (20 ounces per person),
4. the first installment of 10 containers (of 24 for the month) of evaporated
milk for children with medically-prescribed diets.
The report also stipulated that in the Havana municipality of Regla, one pound of
chicken would be available (per ration book for the month of April) and in the El
Cerro municipality one half pound of beef would be available for each family in the
neighborhood. The report stated that these particular products were available two or
three times a year. Clearly, the amount rationed does not meet the dietary needs of
the citizens (Fornaris 2001. Also see Scarpaci, Segre and Coyula 2002, 251-253).
However, a report published in the Houston Chronicle in 2001 argues that the
caloric intake of the average Cuban stabilized over the course of the Special Period
and improved since 1993, the oft-considered low point of the post-Soviet era.
According to the source, the average Cuban today consumes a reported 2,585 calories
and 68 grams of protein daily, compared with 1,940 calories and 48 grams of protein
in 1993 (Snow 2001). For comparison, the World Health Organization recommends a
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minimum daily intake of 2,700 calories and 20-30 grams of protein depending on the
body weight of the consumer (Snow 2001).
Two factors produced the improvement in the average Cuban diet: on the one
hand, the legalization of dollars in 1993 allowed Cubans to hold legally and spend
U.S. currency, which meant that Cubans could shop in the dollar stores for the first
time, giving those with ample greenbacks access to a wider variety of non-rationed
food. Perhaps more importantly, the government re-introduced private markets (oft
demonized during the early 1980s and the RP) known as “agropecuarios” in which
Cuban farmers legally sell a portion of their produce. This return to market
capitalism, which the government still monitors with a wary eye and at times
criticizes, is perhaps the greatest contributor in helping to stabilize Cuban food
availability. Of course, the black market continues to function as an important source
of food and is also a key factor that enables Cubans to feed themselves during the
Special Period.
Despite these gains, most Cubans struggle to provide basic necessities for
themselves and their families on a daily basis, and have responded to the privations of
the Special Period in myriad ways. At the extreme end of the spectrum, some have
left the country using any means necessary, from meeting and marrying foreign
tourists, to lashing together rafts of questionable seaworthiness in order to attempt the
90-mile journey to Florida through shark-infested waters. Reports of human
trafficking also increased, and one source claims that Cubans pay up to $8,000 US per
person for the illegal passage by speed boat to the United States (Fineman 2001).
Recently, two Cuban youths perished after positioning themselves in the
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undercarriage of a London-bound aircraft, succumbing to a lack of oxygen and
extreme temperatures en route. Interviews with a third youth who was unable to
climb under the plane in time revealed that the doomed pair believed the jet was
bound for Miami (Cuba identifies 2001).

Self employment and Jineterismo during the Special Period

While some Cubans left the country, others risked fines and even
imprisonment by turning to the black market (what Pérez-López refers to as the
“second economy”) for sustenance. A viable and relatively large black market has
been a reality in Cuba since Castro took control in 1959. Indeed, the government has
often turned a blind eye to the petty offenses of minor dabblers, reasoning that the
black market serves as a vital safety valve for an economy ill-equipped to provide
certain difficult-to-obtain consumer items. One observer noted the importance of the
second economy to Cuba’s present and possibly its future, as well:
“The second economy is, after all, the segment of the Cuban economy that
most directly responds to market signals and operates most efficiently. It is a
logical reservoir for entrepreneurial talent that could be constructively used in
a market-economy setting. Under a free market system, second economy
activities could form the backbone of a private sector composed of small
businesses engaged in the production and sale of goods and services” (PérezLópez 1995, 2).
Cuba’s changing employment structure also influenced the growing role of the
black market during the Special Period. Belt-tightening at the onset of the Special
Period resulted in a rapidly rising rate of unemployment in the state sector mainly due
to the loss of Soviet subsidies and the need to increase productivity. According to
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one source, employment in the state sector dropped from 95 percent of the population
in 1989, to around 75 percent in 1995 (Pérez-López 1995, 56-60). The increasing
jobs in tourism, the private sector and self-employment only partially mitigated the
sweeping loss of public sector jobs and forced Cubans to operate in the black market.
While job creation in the tourism sector alleviated some of the employment
pressures, the Castro regime has been slow to legalize employment opportunities in
the private sector, most importantly in the realm of self-employment. According to
Peters and Scarpaci, self-employment has had little impact on Cuba’s total economic
production. It encompasses only three percent of the labor force, and “does not rank
with ‘strategic’ economic initiatives such as foreign investment or agricultural
reform” (1998, 2). The government legalized self-employment for over 100
occupations in September 1993 (there are currently over 150 legal occupations) with
the passage of Decree Law 141. The sector peaked in 1996 with 209,000 licensed
workers and since then declined (to a reported 165,000 in 1998) mainly due to the
passage of a strict tax law in 1996 and the vigorous enforcement of stringent
regulations (Peters and Scarpaci 1998, 4). Indeed, most of the legalized jobs were in
niches not easily filled by the Cuban government, including various positions that
specialized in the repair of scarce and/or expensive goods such as shoes, bicycle tires
and umbrellas. The growth of popular private restaurants known as paladares is one
notable exception to this rule (Peters and Scarpaci 1998, 4). Additionally, many who
toil legally in the private sector report near constant harassment by the authorities
quick to charge fines and revoke licenses at the discovery of seemingly trivial
infractions (Goering 2001; Bauza 2001b). Therefore, many Cubans resorted to the
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black market in order to earn an income when confronted by the slow pace of job
creation in legal private sectors coupled with shrinking public sector employment and
an actual decrease in the number of the legally self-employed.
The influx of foreign tourists into Cuba fueled a large and growing black
market. Most visitors to the island encounter hustlers willing to sell them anything
from cut-rate cigars (most cigars purchased on the street are counterfeit) to family
heirlooms (I was once offered a family’s prized stamp collection). In short, many
commit acts of jineterismo to make ends meet in today’s Cuba. The government’s
stance on jineterismo reached back to the revolutionary shift in 1961, when Castro
closed Cuba’s brothels by condemning sex work as a by-product of Spanish and
“Yankee” imperialism. The government sent an estimated 40,000 Cuban sex workers
to special schools to receive “re-education” and training and then gave them
employment opportunities (Padula and Smith 1985, 80-81). The regime then sent
those who continued to ply their trade to jail or into exile and labeled them counterrevolutionaries. While some researchers have primarily focused on the term in
reference to acts of prostitution or hustling (see especially Rundle 2001, Fernández
1999 and Fusco 1998), most Cubans, if pressed, will admit to resorting to jineterismo
as part of la lucha (the struggle) to make ends meet during the Special Period. As
Rundle notes, the term jinete has existed throughout the revolutionary period to
indicate a person who used his or her connections to obtain goods or services in short
supply (Rundle 2001). However, the term shifted focus over the course of the
revolutionary period to include a larger range of activities than before the Special
Period and the advent of tourism (see Table I below).
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In sum, understanding the growth of jineterismo requires understanding the
context of Special Period austerity measures and their roots in RP policies of
retrenchment. While Cuba continues to rank high among developing countries
education and access to health care, the Special Period placed a strain on many
previously taken-for-granted institutions such as the food ration program. The lack of
options in legal fields of self-employment coupled with the inadequacy of salaries
paid in pesos pushed many to perform activities deemed acts of jineterismo by the
government (see Figure 1 for a list selected illegal acts). Chapter Four will continue
discussion on the effects of Special Period policies through a deeper examination of
issues related to race and gender.
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1. Sex Work (includes all involved in sex work provision, i.e., sex workers,
procurers, etc.)
2. Unauthorized Private Room Rentals to Tourists for Dollars or other
Compensation
3. Unauthorized Operation of Private Taxis
4. Unauthorized Operation of Paladares (includes practice of “steering”
visitors)25
5. Other Unauthorized Dealings with Tourists:
Selling Black Market Cigars, Rum, Drugs, etc.
Selling Family Heirlooms or Items Stolen from the State
Selling Services as a Guide

Figure 1: Selected Acts Deemed as “Jineterismo”

25

Some paladar owners employ people (touts) to actively seek out tourists and direct them to their
particular restaurant. Others have formed alliances with taxi drivers and others with access to tourists
to recommend their establishment. Generally, those who engage in steering are offered free meals and
beverages by paladar operators (Rosa, personal communication, 1996).
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Construction of Race, Racism and Gender in Revolutionary
Cuba
During the Special Period, representations of race and gender were
transformed. Changes in the national policy, connected primarily to efforts to earn
more national income from tourism, altered the lives and livelihoods of women, AfroCubans and mulattos. In this chapter, I argue that the severe economic strain of the
Special Period coupled with the polarization of economic power on the island,
produced this transformation. This first contextualizes the issue of racism in Cuba by
tracing its historical origins from the colonial period to the present. Then, I examine
the issue of race in the Special Period. Racism is an old and entrenched problem in
Cuba that, contrary to popular revolutionary rhetoric, did not disappear from the
island during the “war” on class-based inequalities, but rather remained a neglected
issue that resurfaced during the tension-filled Special Period. Although Cuban
scholars do examine the race issue, they often overlook the many instances of overt
and subtle forms of racism. As will be shown, discriminatory behaviors and reduced
opportunities appear increasingly in the important tourism sector. These factors result
in shrinking economic power for darker skinned Cubans during the progression of the
Special Period.The second part of the chapter addresses issues of gender during the
Special Period and the role of women in the changing Cuban economy. As with the
issue of race, I examine Cuba’s gendered society in historical context -- in particular
the context of the revolutionary period. Fidel Castro promised to fight the “revolution
within the revolution,” by which he meant the struggle for gender equality (Eckstein
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1994, 48). While Cuban women gained much during the Castro era, little changed in
the traditional setting for women, the house (la casa), and women remain underrepresented in key political positions and in high prestige jobs. Furthermore, the
advent of the Special Period forced many women to work even longer double days as
material shortages require more time spent on acquiring provisions for the family.26
In this section, I will show how Castro’s changing discourse on race and gender
corresponds with the need periodically to institutionalize the moral and ethical
precepts of the Revolution. I suggest that, in so doing, the aims of government do not
serve the best interests of women and darker skinned Cubans.

Racial Constructions from the Colonial Period to the Revolution
“[In Cuba], there is a denial of racism, often embedded in the current of thinking that
there is no such thing as race…on the grounds that focusing in on race is divisive and
everyone is simply Cuban” (Pérez-Sarduy and Stubbs 2000, xii).
The complex issue of race in Cuba must be viewed in its complete historical
context in order to understand the modern manifestations of racism on the island. In
typical Marxist fashion, the Castro regime maintains that racism is simply a byproduct of classism that is embedded in colonial attitudes and more importantly
within the structure of capitalism, a point disputed by many observers (see Fernández
1999, Moore 1995, Taylor 1988, et al). In fact, notions of race have developed and
shifted since the arrival of the Spanish over four hundred years ago. Taylor (1988)
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Double day is a term used to highlight the pattern of women who work two full-time jobs: one at the
workplace and the other in the home where they are responsible for running the household with little
assistance from male partners and family members.
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traces the roots of racism in Cuba to Spanish notions of racial purity present long
before the original conquistadors set foot in the New World. He writes, “Iberians had
long subscribed to Western Christian color symbolism wherein white is associated
with purity, virtue and beauty, … and black with malignance, repugnance, corruption,
sin and death” (Taylor 1988, 20). They carried these notions with them to the New
World and transposed this symbolism into attitudes of race that served to justify first
the exploitation of the indigenous populations, and later the trade and use of African
slaves in the Spanish colonies. As such, racist beliefs in many ways served as an
important impetus for the explosive growth in sugar production that would propel the
Cuban economy for two and a half centuries.
Indeed, from the mid eighteenth century onward, the issues of race and sugar
dominate Cuban history. Cuba (along with Puerto Rico), ironically, was actually one
of the last islands in the Caribbean to embark on the large-scale cultivation of sugar,
and this meant that the widespread importation of slaves occurred later than it had on
comparable islands such as Jamaica and Hispaniola (Rudolph 1987, 10). Sugar
development in Havana’s hinterland and particularly the eastern sections of Cuba was
limited until the British occupation of the island in 1762-63, when sugar production
was jump-started. The invaders were quick to recognize Cuba’s agricultural potential
and the British rapidly introduced 10,000 slaves and sugar technicians from Jamaica
in an effort to take advantage of virgin sugar-growing areas (Watts 1987, 303). In the
process, they greatly extended the acreage under cane, although they focused
development on the immediate region surrounding Havana, leaving the east largely
devoid of large-scale sugar landholdings (Ibid.). The Spanish regained control of the
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island in February 1763, as a result of the Treaty of Paris27. Once in control, they
eased some of their restrictions on trade and the sugar sector quickly responded with
spectacular growth. Indeed, sugar exports, that had totaled a mere 490 tons when the
British invaded in 1762, rose to 5,200 tons in 1765 and 8,200 tons in 1771 (Ibid.)28
Sugar production and exports jumped again around the end of the 18th century when
an estimated 300,000 French sugar planters and their entourage fled the Haitian slave
revolts that began in 1791 and ended in 1804 (Rudolph 1987, 10-11).
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Cuba became the leading foreign
sugar provider to the United States (Watts 1987, 304). Cuba’s comparitive advantage
of expansive areas with relatively under-exploited soils, at least compared to other
Caribbean locations, trumped many of these locations, including Haiti, which
suffered declines in sugar production as a result of worn-out soils and decreasing
capital investment. Cuban sugar plantations expanded from the traditional core in
the west located in the Havana hinterland, to more central and eastern locations in an
effort to take advantage of declining output elsewhere in the region (Watts 1987,
305). Sugar production in the East rose in the late 18th and early 19th centuries due to
the collapse of the French colony of St. Domingue (Haiti) in 1791 and the Lousiana
Purchase of 1803 that sent French planters and their slaves to Cuba. The colonial
government actively encouraged the land ownership by foreigners in an effort to
bolster the island’s population (Scarpaci, Segre & Coyula 2002, 25). An explosion in
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The Treaty of Paris granted Britain the Spanish holdings southeast of the Mississippi River in North
America (Treaty of Paris 1997, articles XIX, XX).
28
As a point of reference, Cuba eventually produced over 8 million tons of sugar during the course of
their 10 million ton drive leading up to 1970. Despite massive investment, the goal of 10 million was
never accomplished.
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the demand for slave labor paralleled production increases, so that over one half of all
slave imports took place in the 19th century (Pérez 1995, 86).
This dramatic increase in dependence on imported slave labor occurred at the
same time white fears of a potential Haitian-style slave revolt were running high.
According to one source, the white Cuban planter society was “at its most racist” in
the first half of the nineteenth century precisely because the sugar boom resulted in a
rapidly expanding black population (Pérez-Sarduy and Stubbs 1993, 8-9). According
to Thomas, Cuba imported over 100,000 slaves between the years 1816-20, more than
were imported in the whole period before 1790 (1971, 95). By the middle part of the
nineteenth century, blacks and mulattos comprised nearly 50 percent of Cuba’s
population. According to a comprehensive census conducted in 1862 the island was
then home to over 600,000 “blacks” (i.e., slaves and “free coloreds”) out of a total
population of 1.3 million people (Pérez 1995, 86-89).
In1886, Cuba became the last country in Middle America to outlaw slavery.29
The perceived need for slave labor during a period of expansion in the sugar industry
explains the late date of abolition. Advocates for slavery wavered, however, when
profits by Cuban sugar growers and processors waned in the 1880s due to
competition from rapidly expanding European beet sugar production.30 Additionally,
many Cuban planters suffered extensive damage to their fields and equipment as a
result of the Ten Year’s War (a.k.a., the First Cuban War of Independence, 18681878). A reduction in the amount of credit made available to planters in the aftermath
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In 1888, Brazil became the last country in the western hemisphere to formally outlaw slavery.
In 1848, less than one-fifth of the world’s sugar came from sugar beets; in 1884 sugar from beets
accounted for just over one-half of world production (Thomas 1971, 272).
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of the war exacerbates this state of affairs (Ibid.). Therefore, the decline in sugar
output in the 1880s served as the major impetus for the eventual abolition of slavery
in Cuba, although ideological arguments espoused by abolitionists played a role, as
well.
While the abolition of slavery came late to Cuba, racial attitudes in the
country, as in many other Latin America countries, underwent a transformation
beginning in the early years of the nineteenth century. At one level, societal shifts in
Latin America evolved as a result of increasing racial mixing (alternately referred to
as mestizaje or miscegenation) among people of European, African and Native
American descent (Fernández 1996, 101).31 In Cuba, the low post-Colombian
survival rate of Native Americans led to a greater mulatto population (those with
European and African blood) rather than the European-Native American mestizos
common in much of Central and South America.32 Despite this distinction, Cuban
mulattos are at times referred to as mestizos to indicate their mixed race status.
Despite growing numbers of mixed race people, mulattos, black slaves and
later Afro-Cubans were (and continue to be) relegated to the lower classes of society
by “whites,” a racial category that included native-born Spaniards (peninsulares) and
Creoles (criollos). In the case of Cuba, the term Creole (criollo) is generally used in
two main contexts. First, it refers to the children of European-born parents who were
born in the Spanish colonies (usually only those in the Americas). However, it is also
31

The term mestizaje is utilized in Cuba as it is elsewhere in Latin America regardless of the fact that
what actually occurred in Cuba would more accurately be referred to as mulattoization.
32
By the 1770s, Native Americans in Cuba had dwindled to a few thousand isolated peasants or had
been absorbed into Spanish families. While the actual population of Native Americans in Cuba is
uncertain, they likely numbered no greater than 60,000 people at the time of the Spanish conquest
(Thomas 1971,21).
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used to describe those descended from the original European settlers or those who
appear phenotypically “white” or Hispanic. The term Creole, then, has both
biological and cultural overtones. In the colonial period, race was correlated with
social and economic standing in society and lighter skin tones were generally
associated with higher status (Martínez-Alier 1989, 4-5). In the aftermath of the
Haitian revolt and the subsequent fear of an uprising in other countries of the
Caribbean, the colonial government essentially recognized two ethnic categories,
Spanish (White) and African, although this dichotomy became less pronounced in
official circles over the course of the nineteenth century (Martínez-Alier 1989, 4-5).
According to Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz, mestizaje has always
been more accepted by those in the lower classes, despite the fact that mixing was
often the result of sugar planters engaging in sexual relations (often through force)
with their black slaves33 (Ortiz as cited in Fernández 1996, 107). Fernández, in her
study of race in modern Special Period-era Cuba, notes that the working class
contains the highest percentage of interracial couples thereby supporting Ortiz’
observation (Fernández 1996, 107). Meanwhile, among the upper classes attitudes
remained strong that the “races” should not mix because those of African or Native
American derivation were inferior. Thomas attributes some of the blame for
continued racial tensions in the early twentieth century to the rapid increase in
immigrants from Spain who maintained the traditional Iberian (read European)
attitudes towards darker skinned peoples. The resident white or Creole population, in
contrast to the incoming Spaniards, was reportedly much more tolerant of both
33

Illegitimate mulattos born of these unions were almost never acknowledged by their fathers and most
were not granted higher social status among the elites in spite of their lighter skin tones.
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mulattos and Afro-Cubans meaning that class (and color) was not the only key
determinant of racial views (Thomas 1971, 280).
Despite the historical truism that skin tone determines one’s position in
society, racism in Cuba was (and remains) difficult to assess because the island, like
many Caribbean and Latin American countries, exhibits much more fluid and
ambiguous racial categories, unlike the commonly clear-cut black/white divisions
espoused in North America. Cubans, like many Caribbean people, employ
descriptive (and sometimes derogatory) vocabulary to classify individuals along a
scale of phenotypes to include skin color, hair type and lip thickness, demonstrating
the acceptance of a fluid racial spectrum rather than a strict black/white dichotomy
(Benoit 1999, 34-35).
Afro-Cubans, and particularly mulattos, often attempt to blanquear (whiten)
themselves through their choices of employment, their social associations and even
their marriage partners. General Fulgencio Batista, Cuba’s mulatto “strongman”
leader for two distinct periods during the 1930s and early 1940s and again from 1952
to 1959, was a fair skinned mulatto who at times claimed to be white although his
mother was Afro-Cuban. By virtue of his position in Cuban society, people referred
to him as a mulatto avanzado (advanced mulatto) or one who was able to pass for
white in most situations34 (Moore 1988, 5). Likewise, certain activities can “darken”
one, as well. For example, sex workers during the Special Period are often assumed
to be mulatto or Afro-Cuban as Fusco has demonstrated: “To engage in sex work [in

34

The “white” Cuban elite never fully accepted Batista and chided him for his “inferior” racial
background (Moore 1988, 5).
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Cuba] practically means to assume mulatta identity by association” (1998, 155).35
However, the apparent fluidity of race in Cuba does not mask the entrenched racial
divide that exists in the country as Fernández has noted, “While the plasticity of the
categories and the range of terminology used to describe phenotypical variation attest
to the tradition of mestizaje, they do not eliminate the basic structural hierarchy of
race” (1996, 101).
A significant aspect of Iberian culture that was transplanted into the new
colonies was the Catholic Church whose mission was to convert natives to
Christianity. The great influence of the Catholic Church led to a strong class system
in which each social group was assigned a particular social and economic function to
fulfill (Foster 1960, 3). While the rigid caste-like system of the colonial period has
given way to greater social and racial interaction and cross-pollination in the modern
era, racist beliefs have tended to remain stronger among the elites in society. It is also
important to note that Cubans in the post-colonial period viewed the Church with
suspicion since Church leaders largely sided with the Spanish loyalists during the
independent movements. Afro-Cubans have also been leery of the Catholic Church
since it maintained a general policy of repressing Afro-Cuban religions (Eckstein
1994, 4). Therefore, the Catholic Church and its policies have played a less
significant role in Cuba during the twentieth century than is true in other Latin
American countries.
Vera Kutzinski, in her book Sugar’s Secrets, elaborates on a particular
discourse that developed out of the growth in “mestizaje” whereby Latin Americans
35

The constructions of race and gender in the realm of sex work will be discussed at greater length in
Chapter Five.
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came to focus on the unique forms of multiculturalism and diversity that developed in
their countries (1993, 5). For Kutzinski, mestizaje (as a multicultural discourse)
celebrates racial diversity and effectively downplays divisive social realities (1993,5).
She holds that multiculturalism wrought from racial mixing is a key signifier of
Cuba’s national identity since leaders drew extensively from it in an effort to fan
Cuban nationalism as frustrations with colonial policies began to grow in the late 19th
century (1993, 5). Martínez-Alier concurs with Kutzinski and believes that in
nineteenth century Cuba, the racial question and the national question were one in the
same. The prevailing attitude among Cubans of all races and backgrounds was that
Cuba’s national identity, and independence, could only be achieved through full
racial integration (Martínez-Alier 1989, 5). Cuban leaders from General Antonio
Maceo (an Afro-Cuban born into slavery) to Jóse Martí36, the Cuban political essayist
and nationalist hero, seized on this point and preached that only a united Cuba devoid
of internal division could successfully overthrow the Spanish colonial rulers. Martí
referred to “blacks’ generosity, their virtues, their love for sensible freedom, their
gratefulness, and their prudence” while crafting his pro-independence tracts (de la
Fuente 1998, 44). The patronizing tone of Martí’s phrase illustrates the point that the
Cuban elite, while making an effort to develop more generous attitudes toward AfroCubans, continued to subscribe to racist notions and to use the racial issue as a means
to achieve their own ends which in the late nineteenth century included the formation
of an independent state.

36

Martí wrote extensively in favor of Cuban independence and he played a significant role leading up
to Cuba’s Second Revolution in 1895-98. The Castro regime considers Martí to be among Cuba’s
pantheon of national heroes.
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Robin Moore’s study of the connection between Afro-Cuban culture and the
rise of nationalist sentiment in the 1920s and 30s reveals that little had changed from
a racial perspective in the early post-colonial years. While racial mixing continued
apace, Cuba (like most Latin American countries) exhibited what Moore refers to as
the “double dynamic” whereby the African components of Latin culture are
celebrated while persistent racial bias and discrimination occurred (Moore 1997, 15).
Moore’s study reveals the acceptance of Afro-Cuban musical traditions into the
Cuban mainstream during the 1920s and 30s and posits that this corresponded to
growing nationalist sentiment in the face of the economic and political turmoil
associated with the Great Depression. It should also be noted that tourists from the
United States arrived in greater numbers in Cuba throughout the course of the 1920s,
and the rapid social changes that accompanied international tourism development
may have spurred nationalist sentiment, as well.37 The growth in Afro-Cuban music
represented another instance in which nationalist aspirations aligned with Afro-Cuban
culture. Unfortunately for Cubans of color, this did not translate directly into tangible
benefits for the population segment as a whole.
De la Fuente, in his study of race in Cuban society, underscores this point:
“The ‘myth of racial equality’ was an ideological construction of the elite that masked
the objective structural subordination of Afro-Cubans in society” (1998, 45). In the
end, the multicultural discourse (and myth of racial equality) as seized on by
intellectuals and other elites such as Martí, achieved much the same ends as Castro
aimed for when he stifled debate on race by declaring such activity “counter37

The development of tourism in Cuba during the 1920s will be discussed at greater length in Chapter
Five.
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revolutionary” or illegal (see Kutzinski 1993, 6). Indeed, both Martí and Castro
define Cubanness (meaning in this case a distinct Cuban national character) in part as
an absence of racial strife, and each in turn made every effort to downplay strong
racial identities. The tendency to de-emphasize racial exceptionalism in Cuba was
underscored by mulatto leader Gualberto Gomez who said, “We are Cuban, nothing
more” (Gomez quoted in de la Fuente 1998, 45). Of course, the reality was that race
continued to be a source of strife and social discord in the post-colonial period as was
witnessed by the race riots of 1912, an event that reportedly led to the deaths of over
3,000 Afro-Cubans (Thomas 1971, 523). Racist beliefs among the wealthy during
the 1950s led them to deny General Fulgencio Batista membership into the exclusive
Havana Yacht Club (- Scarpaci, Segre and Coyula 2002, 111). While Batista’s
successor, Fidel Castro, made significant progress on many race-related issues
including the official abolition of color bars, as the following discussion shows,
racism in other forms remains a problem in Cuba to this day.

Race and Revolution
“The issue of race in Cuba has not been resolved under the revolution; and it is hinted
that blackness correlates with lower status, and that cultural attitudes about race
remain obdurate” (Baloyra and Morris 1993, 10).
When Castro took power in 1959 he inherited a Cuba in which racism
remained institutionalized and in many cases overt. Castro moved quickly to level
standards of living and to provide economic benefits to all members of society, efforts
that earned him the respect and loyalty of many of Cuba’s traditionally
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disadvantaged. On March 23, 1959, Castro issued what became known as the
Declaration against Discrimination during a Havana Labor Rally by stating: “We
should not have to pass a law to establish a right that should belong to every human
being and member of society. Virtue, personal merit, heroism, generosity, should be
the measure of men, not skin color” (Castro1959). In the same forum in which Castro
denounced racial discrimination, he also linked discrimination and prejudice as being
“anti-nation” (Castro 1959). Thus, he equated racial harmony with larger national and
revolutionary goals emphasizing the hegemony of government policy.
Castro’s revolution fed on Cuban nationalism, and not solely socialism, and
he folded race into his wider nationalist goal.38 Bengelsdorf demonstrates the
importance of nationalism to the Cuban revolutionary leadership when she notes, “In
Castro’s mind, unity was the indispensable element in forging a new Cuba able to
withstand the enormous internal and external threats” facing the country (1994, 73).
The push for a unified Cuban populace who would stand together against “yanqui”
(yankee) aggression effectively stifled a national discussion of race as a major issue.
As a result, race remains to this day an issue clouded in revolutionary rhetoric. After
declaring the socialist nature of the revolution, the government “targeted” class-based
rather than race-based disparities in the belief that correcting the former would
address the latter concern (Pérez-Sarduy and Stubbs 2000, 5).
Scholars often refer to Afro-Cubans and mulattos as Castro’s “secret weapon”
in that they are believed to form a body of staunch supporters of the revolution
38

As has been well documented, the move towards communism and the eventual linkages with the
Soviet bloc were concretized in 1961 fully two years after Castro rose to power, indicating that Cuba’s
revolution was born of nationalist goals rather than out of an urge to promote of a socialist revolution
per se (see Bengelsdorf 1994, 73-74 and Pérez-Stable 1999, et al for more discussion on this point).
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because of past government efforts to improve their overall situation (see de la Fuente
1998). More so than any other group, observers regard them as perhaps the greatest
recipients of the Cuban revolution due to a great improvement in their access to
education, health care, and employment opportunities. From the outset of the
revolution, Castro reportedly commanded the support of over 80 percent of Cuban
blacks, while only 67 percent of whites favored his regime (Caute 1974, 36).
Despite their apparent gains, many Afro-Cubans and mulattos are frustrated
with their position in Cuban society today. Many feel that the revolution, while
initially improving their social and economic position in Cuba, ultimately left them
without the possibility of earning a living or even complaining about their lack of
economic and political options. Fernández touches on reasons why the issue of race
commands marginal attention in Cuba today:
“The total picture of race in Cuba has been left half-painted by neglecting the
crucial realm of lived, subjective, quotidian experience that in the literature on
race relations in Cuba, has been pushed into the margins” (1996, 101).
Interestingly, the lack of a meaningful discourse on issues of race during the
revolutionary period mirrors in many ways a similar situation blacks encountered
during the first years of Cuban “independence” from Spain in the early years of the
twentieth century. Due to the late date of abolition in Cuba, many Cubans had
experienced the institution of slavery first-hand when the island first won its
independence from Spain in 1902. Unfortunately, the experience of Cuba’s former
slaves was similar to that of others throughout the region and the deeply seated
experiences of racism that accompanied the slave era were not easily overcome by
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Afro-Cubans, even after years of independence. In these early post-colonial years, as
later, in the aftermath of the Castro-led revolutionary period, patriotism and
nationalism ran at a fever pitch leading blacks to expect that the end of colonialism
would mean an improvement in their lives. They would become full-fledged Cubans,
thereby leaving behind their status as second-class citizens of the Spanish empire.
However, the actual circumstances of racial segregation and inequality remained so
severe that it sparked a major race riot in 1912, as noted above. Further, as de la
Fuente has noted about the early 20th century,
“No opportunity seemed to be open for blacks to be Afro and Cuban at the
same time. Any possibility for blacks to voice their specific grievances and
discontent was explicitly rejected as un-Cuban and un-patriotic” (1998, 4445).
This opportunity is still lacking today as blacks are taught that voicing their
grievances and discontent is not merely un-Cuban and un-patriotic, it is “counterrevolutionary” and therefore against the law of the state.
The issue of racism in Cuba is as thorny as in most countries, although for
arguably different reasons. To begin, as mentioned above, race remains a “hidden”
issue in Cuba. As one source notes, “[During the revolutionary period] race itself
disappeared from public political discourse, mentioned only in regard to
developments in other countries” (de la Fuente 1998, 2). Widespread claims of
racism in Cuba would call into question the moral underpinnings of the revolution
(which, after all, stands for equality) and the regime does not tolerate criticism at that
level. In the summer of 1965 in an interview with American journalist Lee
Lockwood, Castro noted, “Discrimination (in Cuba) disappeared when class
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privileges disappeared, and it has not cost the revolution much effort to resolve that
problem” (Lockwood 1990, 114). Castro further asserts that the capitalist class
system creates racial discrimination, thus: “in Cuba, the exploitation of man by man
has disappeared, and racial discrimination has disappeared, too” (1990, 216). Taylor
underscores this sentiment by noting that in the Second Declaration of Havana
(February 4, 1962) Cuba was “solemnly recorded as having suppressed
discrimination due to race” (1988, 20).
The choice of wording in the sentence just quoted merits emphasis. I argue
here that while revolutionary leaders duly acknowledged racial discrimination as a
serious historical problem in Cuba, and addressed it as such, in reality it was the issue
of race that the government suppressed, as opposed to racism itself. After all, the
official party line reinforces the idea that race is ultimately of little significance in a
proper socialist system: all Cubans are “100 percent Cubano” or, in effect, all the
same39. To support this assertion, the Castro regime often invokes the writings of
Jóse Martí, the thinker who effectively dismissed race as a major issue by declaring
that Cuba “was more than white, more than brown, and more than black.” (Taylor
1988, 20-21). After the Revolution, former Foreign Minister Raul Roa, crowed that
“The Cuban Revolution has complied fully with Jóse Martí’s legacy” (Ibid.)
While the government denounced racism as counter-revolutionary, and denied
its existence, Carlos Moore, an Afro-Cuban currently living in the United States,
believes that Castro made every effort to conceal from Cubans the actual racial makeup of the island (1988, 359). Cuba’s racial profile is said to have changed greatly
39

“100 percent Cubano” is a reference to a campaign in the late 1990s designed to express and bolster
solidarity among Cubans (Fernandez 1999, 83-84).
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during the Castro era due mainly to the widespread emigration of white Cubans.
Following Castro’s 1959 victory, the government placed a total ban on gathering and
reporting demographic data on race due to its supposedly “subversive” nature (Ibid.).
While officials reversed this stance for the 1981 census,40 the actual number of nonwhites in Cuba (including Afro-Cubans, mulattos and others such as people of
Chinese descent) has been widely disputed. Estimates of the actual number of AfroCubans and mulattos vary greatly: according to the 1981 census, 33.9 of the
population is “non-white,” but most agree that over 50 percent of the population falls
under this category (see Moore 1988, 15 and del Aguila 1994, 6), while some believe
the figure could be as high as 70 percent (Pérez-Sarduy and Stubbs 2000, 7).
According to the World Factbook, 2002, Cuba’s ethnic composition is as follows:
Mulatto: 51 percent, White: 37 percent, Black: 11 percent, Chinese: 1 percent,
meaning that 63 percent of the population is non-white (Cuba “People” table).
Moore (1988, 359) asserts that Castro continues a pro-white policy that has
been followed historically in Cuba. Castro does so to conceal the fact that AfroCubans and mulattos make up the majority in the country for fear of white
disaffection, particularly among the working class and peasantry that Moore regards
as traditionally prejudiced. In 1934, an Afro-Cuban observer wrote, “In Cuba a prowhite policy is enacted in every field of national life and one of the methods of such a
policy is to classify mulattoes as white in the census” (Urrutia as quoted in Moore
1988, 357). In 1966, Fidel Castro reportedly told foreign journalists that “African
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The 1981 census is the latest one to be released by the government (Howell 2001). A more recent
census was taken in September 2002 and the results have not been released as of this writing.
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blood flows through the veins of half of Cuba’s population,” a point that was not
reported in the Cuban press (Urrutia as quoted in Moore 1988, 357).
Despite his efforts to downplay the role of race in revolutionary Cuban
society, it would be wrong to assume that Castro attempted to entirely squelch AfroCuban identity with his rhetoric on racism in the revolution. On the contrary, while
the regime consistently denies people of color the opportunity to voice their racial
concerns openly, the government has allowed for various expressions of Afro-Cuban
cultural traditions, including, eventually, the right to openly practice santería (after
initially suppressing it). Also, the government established an African Study Center
that focuses on African contributions to Cuban society (Eckstein 1994, 25).
Santería (meaning saint worship) draws from Roman Catholicism and
traditional African religions, primarily the Lucumí religion of the African Yoruba
tribes (Baker 2000, 111). The popular conception is that all Cubans are superstitious
and as such are true believers in santería. The Castro regime views the promotion of
Afro-Cuban culture as a mark of nationality, and thus as entirely consistent with
efforts to promote Cuban nationalism.41 However, as Eckstein has noted, santería
worship often functioned as a form of cultural resistance in Cuban history, dating
back to the period of slavery (1994, 16). In the early years of the revolution, Castro,
aware of the wider implications of its symbolism, actively drew from santería to
attract supporters. Indeed, rebel leaders asked santeros (priests) who supported the
rebellion to place protections on the rebel army. Eckstein parallels the rise in santería
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The Castro regime is also keen to tap into the “heritage tourism” market segment and therefore
santería and Afro-Cuban art and music are promoted to tourists seeking an “authentic” experience with
an exotic Cuban “other.”
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in the Special Period with a growing resistance movement; in this case, however, the
target of resistance is the Castro regime, itself (Ibid.). The increasing prevalence of
santería coincides with rising attendance at both Catholic and Protestant services,
supporting the notion that people seek solace in engrained belief systems during
periods of stress (see Scarpaci, Segre and Coyula 2002, 308 for more discussion on
the rise of religion during the Special Period).
Race has returned as a focal point of popular culture, particularly in the arena
of arts and music. In recent years, Cuban hip-hop, rap and traditional music such as
son, trova and danzon has replaced the socialist folk music (Nueva Trova) of
luminaries such as Silvio Rodríguez and Pablo Milanes, artists whose music dates to
the 1960s. The success of the movie and soundtrack Buena Vista Social Club,
conceptualized and produced by American musician Ry Cooder, led to a revival of
traditional Afro-Cuban music at home and abroad. According to Joseph Scarpaci,
music from the soundtrack is supplanting the ubiquitous Cuban folk song
“Guantanamera” as the standard tourist fare performed by Cuban musicians
(Scarpaci, personal communication, April 2003). According to Granma, the official
organ of the Revolution, the success of Buena Vista Social Club may lead to the
survival of Cuban son (Castañeda 2001). Indeed, Cooder was responsible for
reviving the careers of Cuban musicians such as 90-year-old vocalist Compay
Segundo and 76-year-old Ibriham Ferrer (Buena Vista 2003). The irony of the
elderly musicians’ popularity is noteworthy since it is precisely the global mass media
that brought them to the world stage. This is significant in a country whose political
leadership has railed against market-driven global change.
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On the other end of the age spectrum, Cuban young people reportedly favor
African-American-style hip-hop and rap over more traditional Cuban music. Young
Afro-Cuban artists draw from pirated hip-hop and rap recordings from the U.S. to
create a distinctively Cuban form of the music that incorporates Latin rythyms.
According to Krinsky (2001), hip-hop is strongest in the more marginalized sectors of
Cuban society, and rappers are predominantly of African descent. In common with
hip-hop movements all over the world, Cuban rap is devoted to exposing the
difficulties the rappers encounter in their daily lives, particularly economic hardships
and racial prejudice, thus illustrating that racial issues have found a forum among
young Afro-Cubans. It is noteworthy that while the music is by nature political and is
not always in line with official government policies, hip-hop and rap artists perform
regularly at government sponsored concerts, a clear indication that the government
has resorted to cooptation to maintain hegemomic control (Krinsky 2001).
To date, only one Cuban rap group, the Orishas, have signed with a major
record label (EMI) and, although the group visits Cuba regularly, they live and record
in Paris (Orishas online, 2003). The few Cuban rappers that do get a chance to record
are forced to put their music onto cassettes in home studios and, because it costs more
to create original instrumentals, usually record their lyrics on top of pre-recorded hip
hop beats from the U.S. The sampler, the principal instrument of hip-hop musicians,
is not used by the vast majority of Cuban rappers because so few are available in
Cuba (Krinsky 2001).42 While race is discussed in some venues during the Special
Period as demonstrated above, many issues surrounding day-to-day race relations in
42
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Cuba often remains below ground. However, the Castro regime sometimes plays the
race card to its advantage. For example, Raul Castro (Fidel’s brother and the leader
of the Armed Forces, FAR), in justification for Cuba’s military involvement in
Africa, and particularly in Angola, stated that “As Latin Africans we Cubans had an
historical debt to Africa, one of the vital roots of our nationality” (Eckstein 1994,
187). In regard to the intervention in Africa, Castro quickly grabbed the moral high
ground by ascribing Cuban forays into internationalism as racial solidarity: “At Girón
(the Bay of Pigs), African blood was shed, that of the selfless descendants of people
who were slaves before they became workers. Angola (where Cuban blood was shed)
represents an African Girón” (Castro quoted in Eckstein 1994, 186-187)43.
Furthermore, Castro’s embrace of Cuba’s African component may signal his
awareness of growing discontent on the part of Cuba’s Afro-Cuban and mulatto
population and his effort to indirectly address perceived racial discord on the island.

Race and the Special Period
“Something strange is happening during the Special Period. There is a revival of
racism” (Anonymous Afro-Cuban woman quoted in de la Fuente 1998, 9).

Despite early efforts on the part of the revolutionary government to eradicate
it, racism has never really disappeared in the hearts and minds of the people or in the
workplace. In fact, policies of the Special Period along with the stress of the austerity
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program have led arguably to increasing incidences of racial discrimination (see
Howell 2001). In her study of interracial couples in Cuba, Fernández finds that
racism still reigns in intimate contexts. Her studies present a Cuban population
comfortable with the maintenance of friendships and business dealings with members
of different races, but but uncomfortable with interracial marriages and affective
relationships. Significantly, she notes that white parents often react negatively to
such relationships at a greater rate than black parents, but, black parents, as well,
sometimes view interracial relationships as a form of “denying one’s roots”
(Fernández 1996, 106).
Several occasions demonstrated to me that racism remains an issue in Cuba.
On numerous occasions I have heard variations of the following:
“We Cubans are not racist, but you have to watch out for the blacks (often,
another more divisive term was used.) They are dishonest, thieving hustlers”.
Many were quick to note that they had black friends, thereby proving that they
themselves are not racist. Many whites characterize Afro-Cubans as lazy and
shiftless and those who practice santería are looked on with suspicion by whites,
many of whom continue to regard the syncretic African-based religion as
“uncivilized” despite its apparent acceptance by the Castro regime and, indeed, its
promotion as a significant tourism draw. Indeed, many whites seemingly conflate
santería with Afro-Cuban culture in general. During a tour of the Varadero
Community Museum in 1997, the tour guide (a mulatta woman in her early 20s)
confided in me that she greatly disliked santería and would have preferred that the
museum remove all of its santería displays. Some white Cuban acquaintances
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expressed surprise and revulsion when an American colleague studying santería
explained her research to them. On the other hand, some whites have accepted
santería as a valuable part of Cuban culture and have actively discussed aspects of the
religion with me.
Interestingly, non-black Cubans employ a form of sign language to refer to
Afro-Cubans in a discreet manner. The sign, composed of rubbing two forefingers
over the opposite arm, indicates “los prietos” or those with darker skin color, a sign
I have witnessed numerous times in many different contexts. Indeed, according to
Scarpaci, the sign is also a signal Cubans use to request soap from tourists (Scarpaci,
personal communication, April 2003). While sign language is commonly used in
Cuba in quite mundane circumstances, I believe the use of sign language in Cuba is
borne out of the need to communicate potentially divisive (and oft-times illegal)
information in a society that tolerates very little political dissent. For example,
Cubans refer silently to Fidel Castro, the so-called maximum leader, by stroking an
imaginary goatee44. The leadership class of the country is often indicated by the
touching of the shoulder with two forefingers, a sign for military stripes. Sign
language, therefore, has become a powerful symbol of self-expression on the part of
the Cuban people and illustrates one application of the Cuban doble moral, the idea
that people, due to fears of oppression by government agents, express views in public
that they then completely disavow in private (i.e., it serves as a form of passive
resistance to control). In other words, while in pubic, Cubans must resort to sign
language and other devices in order to express their true feelings. Sign language is
44

Castro is also referred to in conversation as El Caballo, (the Horse), a former term of endearment
that I heard Cubans now use in a negative way.
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also evidently an effective tool used by many whites to keep alive racist attitudes
during a period when outright racist behavior is not tolerated by the regime.
Perhaps due to the repressive nature of the Castro regime, Cuba is home to
citizens gifted in subversive discourse. In addition to sign language, Cubans employ
double entendres and turns of phrase to communicate potentially dangerous criticisms
of government policy and officials as well as to describe activities outside the legal
parameters of the revolution. This language includes racist rhetoric. On a side note, a
part-time jinetero in Varadero named Carlos explained that he and his friends used
hand signals and a specialized vocabulary to communicate with one another when
they feared the police might be monitoring their activities.
Many a well-meaning white Cuban acquaintance has issued a warning to
beware the “hustlers” in the streets, almost invariably using the above-mentioned sign
to indicate danger associated with darker skinned Cubans. In one instance, I was
taken aback when Elena, a woman I would describe as a darker skinned mulatta,
warned me to avoid prietos on the street by employing the same sign used by whites.
It is worth noting that her husband is a white artist who owns a studio in Havana
Vieja and who frequently deals with tourists. This incident may signal that Elena
considers herself “whiter” (i.e., a mulatta avanzada) through her association with her
husband (in other words she “advanced” herself via marriage to a white partner.)
Another interpretation could be that the sign has become part of the national
discourse and is used synonymously with delinquent behavior that many whites, but
also non-whites, believe is more prevalent among Afro-Cubans and mulattos. Indeed,
the association of the sign with darker skin means that many Cubans view hustling as
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an activity pursued by los prietos thereby conveniently forgetting (or failing to admit)
that most Cubans regard themselves as jineteros in some fashion due to the demands
of daily survival in the Special Period. Additionally, white Cubans frequently use
dark skinned Cubans as scapegoats for many of the country’s myriad problems,
including a rising crime rate. This attitude has carried over into police dealings with
Afro-Cubans and mulattos vis-à-vis the tourism industry. As Howell has noted,
“Race and tourism also intersect uncomfortably on the streets of Havana these
days where police often question dark-complexioned young Cubans on the
assumption that they are hustlers looking to make a dollar from tourists”
(2001).
In direct contrast to interviews conducted with white Cubans where racism
was often revealed through attitude and sign language, the several interviews I
conducted with Afro-Cubans and mulattos failed to expose perceptions of
problematic race relations in Cuba. In fact, a series of discussions carried out with a
group of young blacks in their early 20s who lived in the Vedado neighborhood of
Havana revealed a belief that racism was a greater problem in the United States than
in Cuba. When pressed on this point, participants admitted that the state-run media
had greatly influenced their opinions on the matter. Overall, however, the group of
young Afro-Cubans believed racism to be a largely benign problem in Cuba today. It
should be noted here that the interview data may have been affected by the racial
position of the interviewer. In other words, since the interviewer (me) was a white
American and older than the others in the group, it is possible that the interviewees
were not comfortable discussing intimate issues of racism in an uninhibited manner.
While I met with this particular group on several occasions including attending a
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“rap” concert with them, the age and ethnic distance between us may have been a
factor.
In order to explain these findings, it is useful to consider that the acceptance
or denial of racism by Afro-Cubans and mulattos is often linked with their political
beliefs. According to one source, those with a favorable impression of the socialist
regime tend to underemphasize their encounters with racism while those critical of
the regime will be more forthcoming or will exaggerate the existence of racism on the
island (Díaz Alaya cited in Moore 1997, xi). Interestingly, the fact that the youth I
interviewed live in Vedado may explain why they downplayed or denied the
existence of widespread racism in their country and in their own experience. For
instance, despite attempts to level living standards and promote integration, AfroCubans and mulattos continue to suffer the greatest from the increasing housing
shortage on the island and they continue to be over-represented in poorer
neighborhoods (de la Fuente 1998, 4). By contrast, the youth I interviewed lived
among the financially better off white population of Vedado in Havana, a historically
white suburb. Although they represented a minority in the neighborhood, it appeared
from their interactions with white neighbors that they were generally accepted in
Vedado. At least one member of the group was dating a white person who was well
acquainted with the group members and who lived nearby. From my perspective, this
dating arrangement seemed to meet with acceptance by the larger group of friends,
although I did not conduct further study to discover the attitudes of the families of the
two young people involved or to test Fernández’ findings that interracial couples are
not easily accepted in Cuban society (1996, 99-117).
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Castro and others have argued that in a future Castro-less Cuba, returning
Cuban-Americans would attempt to re-implement racist policies. De la Fuente
disputes this notion by stating that most Afro-Cubans and mulattos must deal with
racism on a daily basis and therefore are not concerned with potential future
eventualities. Further, he notes that a CID-Gallup survey conducted in Havana in
1994 revealed that only 18 percent of young Afro-Cubans believed that the white
exiles would “bring racism back to the island” (de la Fuente 1998, 11). The
following vignette is based on a series of semi-structured discussions with Mani, a
young mulatto male in Vedado, Havana.

Personal Profile: Race and the Revolution

Mani was a long-term interview subject who identified himself as mulatto (he
was lighter skinned than most in this category) and he proved to be very forthcoming
in relating his lived experience in Cuba prior to and during the Special Period. In
many ways, he was exceptional in that he was an ardent supporter of the revolution
and a self-proclaimed active member in the local Committee for the Defense of the
Revolution (CDR), an organization that functions as both facilitator of revolutionary
principles and watchdog at the neighborhood level. Interestingly, unlike most Cubans
who are apt to vent their frustrations in private, Mani never uttered a word critical of
the revolution. Mani is a male in his mid-20s (in 1996) and was born in the western
province of Pinar del Rio but grew up in the Vedado (Havana) neighborhood where
he still lives with his parents. Mani’s parents are also great supporters of the
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revolution mainly, he believes, because it alleviated the poverty they experienced
growing up in rural Cuba and it offered them new opportunities. His father is a
retired member of the Communist Party and served in several key local positions.
Mani offered two explanations for his support of the revolution. First of all, he
suffered from many health problems throughout his life and was thankful for the free
health care and medicines that allowed him respite from his afflictions (he was not
specific about his illnesses.) Secondly, he had the chance to study electronics and to
travel in the Soviet Union, an opportunity he feels would not have been available to
him in the “old” Cuba. Mani felt that racism was a “minor” problem in Cuba and he
was quick to note that his sister had recently been hired as a flight attendant with
Cubana airlines, a highly sought-after job in the Special Period. In all, he credited the
Castro regime with improving race relations in Cuba.
(Based on my conversations with Mani, June 1996).

Mani’s endorsement of Castro’s Cuba apparently stems from the direct
benefits he and his family have realized as a result of opportunities made available to
them by the triumph of the revolution. He regards his sister’s job with Cubana
Airlines as proof that his mulatto family enjoys access to employment opportunities
that might not have been available to them otherwise. Although he did not state it
explicitly, Mani, like many Cubans, undoubtedly understands the potential monetary
rewards he and his family might reap as a result of his sister’s job. He fails to
recognize, or chooses to ignore, the deeper meaning behind his sister’s direct
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involvement in the tourism industry. By all accounts, she is representative of the
attractive mulatta that the Castro regime is said to be marketing to attract international
tourists, many of whom are traveling to Cuba in search of sexual opportunities with
women of color (see Chapter Six for more discussion on this point.)
There exist, however, much evidence that runs counter to my interview
findings with people like Mani. Taylor and others have argued that, despite official
rhetoric proclaiming absolute desegregation along the lines of race, Cuba’s “menial”
jobs continue to be the domain of black and brown Cubans. He writes, “a
disproportionately large number of blacks still (perform) menial jobs as domestics,
street cleaners and ditch-diggers” while “there (exists) a visible absence of blacks in
supervisory positions” (Taylor 1988, 24). Indeed, in 1965 there were only 9 black or
brown appointees to the 100-member Central Committee of the Communist Party, a
figure that compares to the 9.3 percent of people of color voted into the Cuban Senate
twenty years earlier (Taylor 1988, 24). The situation has not changed appreciably in
recent years and indeed Castro himself recognized the overall lack of women and
blacks in leadership positions in the country at the onset of the rectification campaign
during the Third Party Congress in 1986, one of the few times he has acknowledged a
problem with race or gender during the revolutionary period (Fernández 1996, 108).
In a recent speech, Castro acknowledged that racial discrimination persists in Cuba,
despite the island’s “radical social revolution in which people were able to attain full
and complete legal equality and a revolutionary level of education that cast out the
subjective component of discrimination” (Castro 2003b).
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There are several important economic and social indices on access to
education and health care that indicate the revolution has been successful in achieving
racial equality, a fact also cited by Mani. Indeed, Castro eliminated prohibitive color
bars in restaurants and beaches, and discrimination based on race and gender in the
workplace and theoretically allowed for comprehensive desegregation and social
mobility for Cuba’s Afro-Cubans and mulattos. According to many different criteria,
the Castro regime has realized great strides in eliminating racial inequality in many
sectors of society including education and health care. However, the counterpoint to
this is that racial inequalities persist in other areas (including employment in tourism
and in upper level administration jobs) and that a “racist mentality” continues to
permeate Cuban society (see de la Fuente 1998, and Fernández 1996 for more
discussion on this point). Racist practices and unequal social constructions of race
remain institutionalized, a fact evident in the use of language (including the sign
language mentioned above) and labels. One observer noted the case of two white
psychologists who declared that Cuba was devoid of racism, but then employed the
use of what Afro-Cubans regard as insensitive terms in describing Afro-Cuban
features (pasas, meaning nappy hair, and bemba, meaning thick lips) (Herrera 2000,
122).
Observers have also noted an overall lack of black representation in the Cuban
media that has remained consistent throughout the revolutionary period. Taylor
commented that a 1967 issue of Mujeres (a Cuban women’s magazine) sported fortyeight pages of fashion photographs and not a single one portrayed a black woman
(1988, 26). This lack of representation was echoed by Clytus, an African-American
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who visited the island in the late 1960s and who wrote “In the streets, I looked at
magazine covers and saw whites; I looked at newspapers and books and saw whites”
(1970, 24). Fernández notes that Cuban television, long recognized by Castro as an
important medium for interfacing with (some would say controlling) the population
remains largely un-integrated:
“TV images don’t correspond with the achievements of the revolution. Blacks
are not represented on TV. This doesn’t reflect the level of education
achieved by blacks, their acting talent, etc. Recently, the Cuban comic Alexis
Valdes made a joke saying that when TV was first developed it was in black
and white. Then technology kept advancing and produced TV in color, but
now here in Cuba we have TV in white only because we don’t see blacks
anywhere” (1996, 110).
Knight, an Afro-Cuban actor, echoes this sentiment: “There are no black TV
directors, no black presenters, there’s no collective of black actors in current
programming, and so Cuban TV is white” (2000, 111).
Contrary to my interview findings, there is evidence of a growing desire to
acknowledge race-based problems on the part of many mulattos and Afro-Cubans.
Pérez-Sarduy and Stubbs have attempted to establish a debate on racial issues by
publishing interviews with prominent Afro-Cubans that deal explicitly with the theme
of race. Pedro Pérez-Sarduy is an Afro-Cuban writer and journalist currently living
London and Jean Stubbs is a white British social historian who lives in the United
States. Both maintain strong ties with the island and they have published two books
on race (1993, 2000) that have been widely read in Cuba and abroad. Their goal for
each book has been to provide a forum for Afro-Cubans living on the island. In their
book, Afro-Cuban Voices (2000), they identified three broad contemporary race103

based points of contention that they believe should be acknowledged and corrected by
the Castro regime.
First, they note a growing tendency of white Cubans to “blame the victim” as
more and more blacks are out-of-work and are forced into illegal activities (such as
jineterismo). Afro-Cuban and mulatta sex workers are in high demand by Canadian
and European travelers who seek the “exotic other,” a state of affairs that upsets many
white Cubans45. Taylor believes that some whites project their racism through the
lens of revolutionary mores when they criticize blacks who they believe fail to live up
to revolutionary expectations. He writes,
“White Cubans can get very excited—really wild—about black counterrevolutionary (activity). Where black individuals in Cuba become immersed
in antisocial activity, it appears to merely (give) white racists an opportunity
to massage their sentiments” (1988, 27).
The tendency by whites to severely criticize blacks when they voice dissent is
partially rooted in the idea that Afro-Cubans and mulattos have no right to criticize
the regime since they are thought to have benefited most from Castro’s policies. The
growing significance of the black market during the Special Period has also fueled the
disparaging perceptions of darker-skinned Cubans in that they are increasingly
identified as delinquents and black market operators (Fernández 1996, 113). This
trend is reflected in reports that people of color make up proportionally higher
numbers of Cuba’s citizens jailed for petty offenses (Pérez-Sarduy and Stubbs 2000,
7). Furthermore, non-whites are reported to represent over 78 percent of all
individuals who are labeled “counter-revolutionary” and hence socially dangerous; de
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This point will be discussed in Chapter Five.
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la Fuente calculated that blacks were declared to be socially dangerous 7.6 times
more than whites and 3.4 times more than mulattos (de la Fuente 1998, 5).
The second point of contention according to Pérez-Sarduy and Stubbs is the
appropriation of Afro-Cuban culture by the Castro regime. While Afro-Cubans are
increasingly stigmatized as criminals, the predominantly white leadership draws
extensively from Afro-Cuban culture and legitimizes its actions in the name of
mestizaje (2000, 7). Indeed, the appropriation of Afro-Cuban symbols and culture
ranges from producing and selling artwork with Afro-Cuban themes to the marketing
of santería in an effort to promote “cultural” or heritage tourism. Cuba has also been
quick to market Afro-Cuban music, such as Salsa, to international audiences. The
authors believe that the marketing of Afro-Cuban culture is exploitive of Cuban
people of color since they tend not to share in the proceeds of profits realized from
the appropriation of their culture (Ibid.). The government’s appropriation of AfroCuban culture for profit further supports the Gramscian assertion that hegemony is
maintained by recruiting the support through manipulation, rather than by forceful
action.
The third, though contentious, point noted by Pérez-Sarduy and Stubbs is the
lack of an outlet for Afro-Cubans to “articulate a black perspective,” one that would
allow for increasing discussion and analysis of particular race-based themes (2000,
8). In other words, they support removing the veil of silence imposed by the Castro
regime on those desiring to openly discuss racial matters. They believe this issue is
all the more important because Cuba’s racial problems during the Special Period are
directly linked to historical and demographic patterns. On the one hand, despite a
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reported 63 percent non-white population, the top leadership positions in Cuba
continue to be held by white Cuban males as was discussed earlier. Furthermore,
non-white Cubans complain that they lack the ability to earn dollars legally since they
have limited access to the remittances from relatives abroad that many white Cubans
enjoy and they are under-represented in the legal tourism sector.
Remittances entering the island from Cuban émigrés fall mostly into the hands
of white Cubans since only 10 percent of the total Cuban diaspora is reported to be
black or mulatto (Page 2002). Since 1995, when United States President Clinton
permitted Cubans living in the United States to send remittances, Cubans have
received up to $1 billion. The value of remittances to the island, therefore, is one
reason why Cuba has become polarized along the lines of people who have relations
abroad, and those who do not. In accordance with the demographic profile of the
Cubans living abroad, the beneficiaries are overwhelmingly white.
Another indication of discrimination is that Afro-Cubans lack representation
in the tourist industry. The Cuban government is quick to blame foreign managers
for the dearth of Afro-Cubans in tourism-related jobs (Howell 2001). However, my
analysis of government-produced tourism-related literature points to a marked
absence of Afro-Cubans in jobs of importance in the tourism industry. In fact, the
two most frequent characterizations of Afro-Cubans in the tourist literature are as
entertainers or tobacco rollers. Chapter Six examines this point through a quantitative
and qualitative analysis of Cuban tourism literature that will substantiate these
assertions and further contextualize representations of race during the Special Period.
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In sum, there is as yet no substantial public discourse on race and race-related
issues in Cuba and it is likely to remain so for the fore-seeable future. Yet, race is, in
fact, a complex issue in Cuba and while one can point to many ways that AfroCubans and mulattos have benefited under Castro’s Revolution, nonetheless, the
strains of the Special Period have given rise to growing racial faultlines. As will be
discussed below, both gender and race are issues that have not been fully addressed
under Castro’s rule. When they have been addressed, gender equity policies, as well
as policies aimed at racial equity, have garnered mixed results.

Gendered Spaces: Women in Revolutionary Cuba

“The Revolution has brought women out of the home and into the ‘streets’ of the
political and economic life of the nation. It has offered new and abundant goals,
values and rewards for Cuban women and has given them a new sense of dignity and
worth” (Padula and Smith 1985, 79).
“Women can be free only to the extent that they commit themselves first and
foremost to the revolution” (Fidel Castro, 1977)46
Following Castro’s victory in 1959, Cuba, in an effort to gain support for the
revolution, embarked on a multi-faceted program that purported to support the
advancement of women as part of a greater effort to institutionalize the revolution.
Referred to by Castro as the “revolution within the revolution,” the regime pursued
policies that actively encouraged women to participate fully in revolutionary
institutions. To achieve this end, the regime preached that in order to achieve
46

Quoted in Bunck 1994, 89.
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equality at the home and workplace, it was necessary for women to become active in
institutional bodies such as the Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de Mujeres
Cubanas or FMC) and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR).47 In
fact, the FMC was given the key task of coordinating the institutionalization of
socialist ideals among Cuban women (I discuss the FMC in greater detail below).
However, the economic strains of the Special Period have led to shifts in the roles of
women, a state of affairs made evident in changing employment patterns and also in
the representations of women in the tourism literature (discussed in Chapters Five and
Six).
The conflicting construction of gender in Cuba can be said to reside in Fidel
Castro, himself. Castro symbolizes the state of gender relationships in the country in
that he is concurrently the country’s leading self-proclaimed “socialist feminist”48
who claims to advocate gender equality at all levels, but he is also the bearded
patriarch or caudillo who represents and encourages the “macho” attitudes of Cuban
revolutionary culture (Smith and Padula 1988, 150). The caudillo, or strongman, is a
key feature of leadership across Latin American societies. In this sense, Castro is
simply the latest in a long line of military dictators in the region who have assumed
the position at the forefront of a macho society.
Castro’s desire to fight the “revolution within the revolution,” a euphemism
for a supposed quest for gender equality in socialist Cuba, might seem at odds with

47

The CDR was established as a neighborhood level organization that primarily focused on
surveillance but was also a means to disperse government directives in a quick and efficient manner.
Local CDRs also organized neighborhood social activities.
48
The term “socialist feminist” as used here is not to be confused with self-proclaimed socialists
seeking to develop a political theory based on gender (see Dominguez 1987, 12-13).
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his role as caudillo. While some would argue (as I will below) that true gender
equality has evaded Cuban women, Castro realized that he required their support if he
intended to remain in power. With that point in mind, the Castro government has
crafted laws requiring men to aid gainfully employed women with housework
through the Family Code of 1975 (Código de Familia, 1975). Additionally, the
Constitution of 1976 was amended to officially guarantee women equal rights in
terms of marriage, employment, earnings, education, and sex discrimination became
punishable by imprisonment (Constitución de la Republica de Cuba 1976, artículos
42 & 43; Eckstein 1994, 43). The Castro government has undoubtedly improved the
status of women in many regards: greater access to higher education, greater
employment opportunities, and improved health and childcare options, just to list a
few. At the same time, however, the government has been accused of thwarting the
advancement of women in the workplace through limiting access into high status
fields of employment. More recently, the Castro regime has been charged with
cynically exploiting Cuba’s young women as sex workers to draw tourism to the
embattled country. As I will argue in the remainder of this chapter, the evidence
points to a decidedly mixed record for gender relations in revolutionary Cuba.
Some have been critical of the regime’s top-down approach to dealing with
gender issues: “There [have been] many disappointments in Cuban women’s struggle
for equality. A central dilemma was the failure [of policy makers] to consider
adequately the implications of women’s domestic responsibilities” (Smith and Padula
1996, 185). Despite key female revolutionary figures such as Vilma Espín, Raul
Castro’s former wife and appointed leader of the FMC and Celia Sánchez, Castro’s
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key aide and confidant, the architects of Castroism were, and continue to be,
overwhelmingly male. Women in top positions, like Espín who was admitted into the
Pulitburo in the 1970s, generally have strong personal connections to Fidel Castro
either as family members or trusted revolutionary compatriots. Most have found it
difficult to gain entry into highly visible and lucrative jobs. Indeed, as Smith and
Padula assert, “women were expected to be loyal implementers or grateful recipients
of the male-determined revolutionary program. Women’s concerns were viewed as
peripheral” despite governmental claims to the contrary (1996, 23). As with their
male and Afro-Cuban counterparts, women who disagreed too strongly with the
government-prescribed role for women were labeled counter-revolutionary and faced
prison and exile for their beliefs.
In Cuba, ideas about gender, much like those surrounding race, are steeped in
the Marxist tradition that capitalism and colonialism create the conditions for gender
inequality. Once socialism is in place, Cuban officials have argued, gender equality
will follow automatically. This idea follows the thinking of Marx and Gramsci who
also asserted that hegemony was linked with capitalism. However, as was
demonstrated with the issue of race in the discussion above, a simple pronouncement
on the part of the government is insufficient to effect real change. Despite
equalization efforts and strong government support to the contrary, gender equality
continues to elude Cuban women, as it does in most every country around the world.
Lingering gender-biased attitudes held by the Cuban leadership and the general
populace, coupled with the economic realities of the Special Period, are among the
chief causes. It is also important to understand, however, that unlike the issue of
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racism, which the government treats at times as a non-issue because it was seen as
already eliminated by socialism, the role of women has been subject to continual reexamination by the Castro regime. Alvarez, a student of Cuban film, believes the
government’s stance on race and gender finds expression in the Cuban film industry.
He writes,
“If it is true that the Cuban cinema of the Revolution has neglected to
represent the participation of black figures in the process of social change, one
cannot say the same about the representations of women and their
contribution, integration, and dialogue with the Cuban Revolution” (Alvarez
2000, 115-116).
In fact, the passage of the Family Code in 1975 (discussed in more detail below) was
a result of a major shift in policy by the regime and represented, in part, a belief that
men needed legal “encouragement” to accept the government’s view that the status of
women had changed during the course of the revolution. Its passage also pointed to
lingering problems surrounding the perception of revolutionary gender roles because
some Cuban women as well as government officials worried about lagging female
employment rates, climbing divorce rates and the side-effects, such as increasing
rates of juvenile delinquency, associated with a supposed weakened family structure.
While the societal effects of the Family Code remain debatable, its passage
into law speaks to a keen awareness of the importance of women’s roles in Castro’s
revolution. In a more recent example, debate has swirled around the issue of young
women engaging in sex work with tourists. However, as will be discussed in Chapter
Five, much of the debate has been focused on sex work as a form of illegal
capitalism, rather than as a phenomenon that exploits women, or as an immoral act,
per se.
111

In this section, I examine Cuba’s gender constructions as a part of the
evolution of Castro’s unique form of socialism. I focus particularly on women’s
shifting roles as well as the government’s shifting perceptions of gender roles during
the revolution. I argue that women in many ways have borne the brunt of austerity in
the Special Period in that they have suffered greater job losses and exploitation, even
as their duties to provide for families during a period of increasingly undependable
state support increased. Indeed, the Special Period has signaled yet another shift in
gender constructions and in the role of the family unit, as Cubans adjust to the
diminishing ability of the state to meet basic demands.

Gender Relations in Pre-Revolutionary Cuba and the Rise of the Federation of
Cuban Women (FMC)

To set the context for this section, one must consider first the gender
constructions associated with the pre-revolutionary period. Many have argued that
women in pre-revolutionary Cuba, as a group, were among the more advanced of
Latin America (see Smith and Padula 1996 and Pérez-Stable 1987). By the 1930s,
Cuban women had been enfranchised, were guaranteed employment in certain sectors
of the economy, and despite the opposition of the Catholic Church, were protected by
advanced maternity and divorce laws49 (Pérez-Stable 1987, 53). Some Cuban women
also benefited from health care provisions that allowed Cuba to boast some of the best
49

Between Cuban independence from Spain and the advent of Castro’s revolution, the Catholic Church
was considered weaker in Cuba than in other Latin American countries in part because of continuing
animosity regarding it’s support of Spain during the drive for independence an also because of the
moderating influence of Cuba’s close neighbor, the United States.
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health statistics in the Latin American region. This was true despite uneven
distribution of services between urban and rural locales and between Hispanic and
Afro-Cubans (Smith 1989, 170). Furthermore, according to the 1953 census, women
were well represented in Cuban schools and prior to the revolution female literacy
rates were higher than those for males (78.4 percent and 74.1 percent respectively)
(Pérez-Stable 1987, 53).
Nonetheless, gender disparities remained, especially among rural (and
particularly Afro-Cuban and mulatto) people, in that there was uneven distribution of
resources and services leading to lower education rates and reduced or non-existent
access to proper health care for women. Additionally, despite government job
guarantees, women were over-represented in low status jobs (fully 25 percent of
economically active women were employed as domestic servants) while few achieved
positions in higher status business and government jobs (Pérez-Stable 1987, 53). As
mentioned above, this continues to present a problem to the current administration
where there are few women in positions of power in the country.
In traditional Iberian fashion, Cuba was divided along strict lines of gender
whereby la casa, the home, was the domain of the women and la calle, or street was
considered male-dominated space. Women who worked outside of the home were
often stigmatized as lower class, since freedom from the economic need to work
outside the home was viewed by society as proof of middle or upper class status.
While Cuban women (and even men such as Jóse Martí, the Cuban poet and
revolutionary) had challenged this colonial mindset, it was not until independence
was achieved from Spain that women’s roles began to change substantially and more
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women sought employment outside of the house. Smith and Padula believe that the
impetus came from greater contact and exchange with the United States. Under U.S.
governmental coaxing, education (for both genders) was guaranteed in the
constitution of 1901 and Cuban teachers began to receive training in the United
States. This investment in education paid off by increasing female literacy from 42
percent in 1899 to 61 percent in 1919 to 78.4 percent in 1953 (Smith and Padula
1996, 14-15). United States involvement in Cuba also led to the importation of
typewriters and sewing machines and U.S.-owned companies were among the first to
hire Cuban women as typists and sewing experts. Additionally, Cuban women found
employment in Cuba’s U.S.-controlled telephone and telegraph companies; by 1953,
over nine thousand women had jobs in this sector alone (Smith and Padula 1996, 1415).
Despite revolutionary rhetoric that spoke of the need to free women from the
oppression of Cuba’s pre-revolutionary capitalism system, Cuban women were
generally more advanced than their Latin American colleagues. Further, the country
was home to several women’s organizations, such as the Club Feminino formed in
1917 that helped provide the political clout to eventually bring Cuban women the
vote and to push for other improvements for women (Stoner 1991, 57-60). However,
when Castro took control in 1959, he could point to some glaring problems that
women continued to face. On the eve of the revolution in 1959, women constituted
only seventeen percent of the labor force while over 60 percent of the small number
of women in professional jobs were employed as nurses and teachers (Bunck 1994,
91-92). Additionally, Afro-Cuban women faced strong discrimination and most were
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not allowed to obtain front-office jobs such as bank tellers and sales counter
representatives (Smith and Padula 1996, 20).
In an effort to bring women “into the revolutionary fold,” and ostensibly
address many of the above concerns, Castro established the Federation of Cuban
Women (FMC) in 1960 to institutionalize the gender revolution. The key reason for
the establishment of the FMC was to mobilize female support for the revolution and
recruiters were sent house-to-house to convince or otherwise “cajol” women into
joining the FMC and other revolutionary organizations. While membership has
waxed and waned throughout the revolution (reportedly peaking in 1977 with a
membership of over 80 percent of Cuban women over the age of thirteen), more than
half of Cuban women are purported to belong to the organization today (Pérez-Sarduy
and Stubbs 2000, 11). One observer notes that in the early 1990s the FMC
publications, Muchachas and Mujeres, had been suspended and there was talk of
disbanding the organization (Padula 1996, 228). Nevertheless, the FMC continues to
maintain a headquarters and to remain a functioning revolutionary organization.
Nonetheless, it must be explicitly noted that issues of discrimination were
clearly a secondary concern to the leadership. In fact, FMC Director Vilma Espín
openly asked, “Why do we have to have a women’s organization? I had never been
discriminated against [under the Castro regime]. I had my career as a chemical
engineer. I never suffered. I never had difficulty” (Espín as quoted in Smith and
Padula 1996, 36). The FMC under Espín focused not on discrimination per se but on
literacy campaigns and the drive to develop a national day care system in 1961.
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The literacy campaigns of the early 1960s were an effective means to bring
previously uneducated women into the fold of the revolution. In remote parts of the
country, girls were admitted to schools (many for the first time) along with their
brothers and were often taught by young female teachers recruited from Havana.50
By 1974, an estimated 73 percent of all Cuban women had reached the sixth grade
level while only 55 percent of males reached that milestone (Padula and Smith 1985,
82-83). The campaigns were successful insofar as they were able to reach women
and men who had been neglected under previous regimes. Indeed, in an effort to
raise and equalize living standards across the island and to garner national support for
the revolution, the Castro regime sent an army of teachers and technicians into rural
areas, particularly in the east. The accomplishments of Castro’s revolution as viewed
from a perspective of spatial equality is summed up well by Eckstein:
Castro created a cradle-to-grave welfare state for all Cubans, including the
rural and urban poor previously excluded form social programs. Life
expectancy rose, infant mortality declined, medical and educational facilities
and services expanded, … and rural/urban inequities diminished considerably
(1994:204-205).
In an effort to equalize living standards across Cuban space, the FMC was
also instrumental in the creation of the Ana Betancourt School for Peasant Women.
The school was given the use of the Havana Hilton to house peasant girls who were
schooled in the academic basics as well as trained in such fields as sewing, basic
health care and personal hygiene (Bunck 1994, 94-96). These efforts at educating the
youth of the country were thinly disguised means of inculcating the first generation of

50

Smith and Padula report that over 70,000 literacy workers, most of them from western Cuba, were
involved in the campaign (1996, 37)
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revolutionaries with the basics of socialism. Part of this process was to decrease the
amount of time young people spent at home with their parents, as Castro sought to
dominate the development process of Cuban children. Overall, the revolutionary
government made every effort to reach out to women who comprised a previously
neglected segment of society. This gendered focus was part of a larger effort to bring
up living standards in the rural provinces that Castro counted as the core of his
support.
The FMC was also instrumental in helping to establish a national day care
system (known as the círculos infantiles) to aid working mothers, since, despite
advances in gender equality, child care was and continues to be considered the job of
the women in the household (the mothers, grandmothers and older sisters of the
children). Indeed, according to an FMC spokeswoman, the day care centers were
created “to allow women to enter the work force liberated from their traditional roles”
(Serra quoted in Bunck 1994, 97). According to one source, the government moved
quickly to build day care centers and that by the mid 1980s, the country boasted six
times as many centers as in the early 1960s (Eckstein 1994, 43). However, as
discussed in the Chapter Two, the lack of dependable day care centers continues to be
a problem for working Cuban women and the nation was never able to build enough
to satisfy demand.
It is important to realize that day care centers were viewed by the Castro
regime as a means to separate children from the home values that were incompatible
with those of the leadership (Bunck 1994, 97). As Dalton notes, because day care
centers and boarding schools were available, “parents were expected to devote more
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time to voluntary activities that contributed to socialist development rather than to
individualistic endeavors rooted in the nuclear family” (1993, 64). Therefore, day
care centers were part of the larger plan to deliberately weaken the family structure
while strengthening the role of the state in people’s lives: “The political education of
children had joined sexual equality as a chief rationale for the child-care centers”
(Bunck 1994, 37).
The view of the Castro regime that it was the government’s role to replace the
family as the “primary agent of socialization” was at odds with traditional Cuban
society where the family was considered a strong institution whose autonomy was
protected by governmental and Church policy (Dalton 1993, 64). Castro believed that
in order to be successful his revolution needed not only the support of women (and
Afro-Cubans, for that matter), but control of their “reproductive” capabilities, as well.
Reproduction in this context has to be understood not simply as the biological
reproduction of infants, but in the wider context of perpetual renewal of society. This
includes not only the raising of children, but the maintenance of social systems, in
this case the provision of cradle to grave care for all Cuban citizens (Pearson 1997,
678-679). In paternalistic fashion, Castro sought to become the “father of the
people,” so to speak, and in the process sought to transfer most of the functions (and
the associated loyalties) of the family into the fold of the state. This is one reason that
from the early years of the revolution children and young adults were separated from
their parents and were sent to be educated at boarding schools and agricultural camps.
By the early 1970s, the Castro regime began to question the efficacy of its
goal to control many of the functions associated with the traditional Cuban family.
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As a result of policies focused on separating youth from the potentially “counterrevolutionary” influence of their parents and grandparents, the family came to be
viewed as an institution in crisis. This crisis arose, in part, because the state
accomplished its goal too well: the family had been supplanted by the state in its role
as the primary reproductive agent of society. Castro pointed to various data to verify
the charges that the state was failing in its role to better socialize the nation’s youth.
By 1969, only 46 percent of students who had enrolled in first grade were able to
finish sixth grade despite extensive educational reforms (Bunck 1994, 41).
Delinquency rates also increased and minors were said to have committed over 40
percent of all crimes in Cuba, a figure above pre-revolutionary numbers. Castro
summed up his feelings on the matter thusly, “Many young people are neither
working nor studying. No parent has the right to permit his son (sic) to be an idler, a
vagabond, a future delinquent (Castro 1967; Bunck 1994, 41-42).
The Family Code (Law 1289: Código de Familia) of 1975 was passed to
address the problems just listed and the regime attempted to re-focus energy on the
family unit. The following passage from the Code highlights the key parental
responsibilities according to the Castro regime:
Keeping the children under their guardianship and care; making every
possible effort to provide them with a stable home and adequate nourishment;
caring for their health and personal hygiene; providing them with the means of
recreation fitting their age which are within their possibilities; giving them
proper protection; seeing to their good behavior; and cooperating with
authorities in trying to overcome any situation or environmental factor that
may have unfavorable effect on their training and development (Código de
Familia 1975; Dalton 1993, 65).
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While the new law mandated that men participate equally in household
chores, it remained clear that men were not expected to actually change their
traditional gender roles (Safa 1995, 37-38). For example, Cuban women are
persuaded to enter traditionally male-oriented fields such as engineering, but men
were not encouraged to staff day care facilities or become nurses (Smith and Padula
1988, 157). Nor have men followed the letter of the Family Code Law that behooves
them to assist with household chores. According to most sources, overwhelmingly,
household labor continues to be performed by women (see Smith and Padula 1996
and Safa 1995, et al). Padula and Smith illustrate this point with the following
comment: “No member of the revolutionary elite has ever been photographed doing
the laundry. One party official agreed to do the laundry but not to hang it outside.
Suppose the neighbors saw him” (Padula and Smith 1985, 87).
Just as Afro-Cubans have enjoyed some benefits of the revolution, Cuban
women as a whole, though undoubtedly witnessed improvements in their status as a
result of revolutionary projects. Nonetheless, much evidence suggests little has
changed in the traditional female space, la casa. While the Family Code was designed
to correct problems such as rising divorce rates, increasing rates of delinquency
among the Cuban youth, and the lack of domestic support to very Cuban women, in
reality, the increasing demands frequently fell on the shoulders of the women it was
designed to help, many of whom were already working double days. The following
passage illustrates the pressure foisted on Cuban women by the leaders of the
revolution:
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“The revolution has put great pressure on Cuban women, who are now called
upon to excel at work, to volunteer, to study, to participate in sports and
politics, and to raise families- to be super women” (Padula and Smith 1985,
79-80).
The status of Cuban women in many ways mirrors that of their compatriots in
the former Soviet bloc countries and China where communist regimes, despite
rhetoric that embellished gender equality, actually increased women’s workloads
through their policies (Attwood 2001, 158; Curtin 1975, 53-54). Ilič notes that the
Bolsheviks originally passed labor laws to protect women from the worst excesses of
industrial employment in the early 1920s. However, the “economic imperatives” of
the drive to industrialize Russia led to the eventual retraction of those laws by the
early 1930s and as a result, women began logging longer hours at the workplace (Ilič
2001, 139 & 154). The Soviets, like the Cubans, officially advocated the
emancipation of women, but the result was that the “new Soviet woman” had a more
complex set of tasks than her counterpart, the “new Soviet man.” She was expected
to perform at a high level at the workplace and then again at home and she was to
“embody the different and often contradictory qualities and traits which were
supposedly appropriate to each of these spheres” (Attwood 2001, 158). The end goal
of the communist regimes was not the promotion of gender equality but rather the
rapid push for women’s assimilation into the world of men (the public sphere)
through the application of “ancillary” changes (such as the provision of day care) to
accommodate the demand for female labor (Attwood 2001, 158). While often veiled
in revolutionary rhetoric (i.e., the “revolution within the revolution”), the end result
was that the public sphere remained under the control of men while women were
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expected to administer the private sphere (la casa) while participating at lesser status
in the wider economic and political domain.
Overall, policy in Cuba, as in the Soviet Union, indicates that neither regime
took seriously efforts to realize true gender equality. In fact, passage of the Family
Code in 1975, for all of its fanfare, did little to change gender constructions since men
were never widely encouraged to pursue traditional “women’s work” either at home
or in the workplace despite occasional exhortations to the contrary. At the same time,
women were discouraged from pursuing higher status employment, such as
managerial positions, due to both official policy and the refusal of their male coworkers to support such actions. The basic assumptions that legitimized a continuing
sexual division of labor were left unchallenged by the regime, “above all the notions
surrounding the female as mother and the absolute primacy of biological functions”
(Bengelsdorf cited in Smith and Padula 1996, 140).
The problems associated with fulfilling the role of Cuban “superwoman” of
the revolution are well portrayed in many Cuban films of the Castro era including
Lucía (1968), Portrait of Teresa (Retrato de Teresa) (1978), and Up to a Certain Point
(Hasta cierto punto) (1983) (Alvarez 2000, 117). In the film, Portrait of Teresa, by
Cuban director Pastor Vega, the protagonist, an intelligent and educated mother of
three children, is a factory worker who is pressured to “volunteer” her services to a
local theater group in the evenings after work. Her husband adamantly opposes her
added responsibilities and demands his dinner on time while refusing to assist with
household tasks. The film highlights many of the problems facing couples in this
situation. For example, Teresa is forced to lobby for increased day care facilities and
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against proposed plan to charge for day care. In order to cope, she begins taking
tranquilizers to help her through her busy schedule and her husband’s verbal abuse.
In the end, the couple drifts towards divorce despite the pleas of Teresa’s mother who
urges her to quit her job and spend more time at home. Teresa’s refusal to follow this
advice underlines the major theme of the film, namely that women’s fulfillment lies
in activities outside the traditional female space in Latin American society, the home.
Her mother represents the old-fashioned housewife who seeks to maintain the prerevolutionary status quo while Teresa’s husband is an unbending macho figure who is
portrayed as out of touch with Cuba’s revolutionary changes and pursuits. While
clearly conflicted, Teresa in the end seems to find satisfaction in her newly found
independence from her tradition-bound relatives (see discussion in Padula and Smith
1985). The conflict between the public and private sphere that Teresa encounters in
the film is aptly summed up by Smith and Padula, “Parents were chided for a merely
‘pro forma’ participation in public activities at the same time that they were being
denounced as ‘neglectful’ for putting their public life ahead of their families” (1996,
164).
The increased personal stress associated with the revolution is noted in
climbing divorce rates that rose from 8.5 percent in 1959 to over 30 percent by 1974
(Padula and Smith 1985, 84). Birth rates also dropped to “below replacement level”
due to the increased availability of birth control and improved health care coupled
with the nationwide housing shortage and the new roles for women (Padula and
Smith 1985, 84). The added stress of the Special Period has also contributed to low
birth rates. Several women I spoke to stated that they are waiting longer to have
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children due to the uncertainty of Cuba’s present economic situation. Nena, a woman
in her early 20s who lived in Havana stated, “I am delaying having children because I
live with my husband’s family and there is no room for a child” (Nena, personal
communication, June 1997).
It is worth noting that while issues surrounding race and racism have been
largely ignored by the Castro regime, gender issues have at least been subject to
frequent, although often limited, debate as the Family Code illustrates. For example,
the FMC has held five congresses over the course of the revolutionary period
beginning with the first national conference in 1962. But some have charged that
while the congresses provided a forum to discuss topics relevant to Cuban women, in
the end they merely served as a means to effectively “rubber stamp” Federation and
government initiatives. As one source notes,
“The FMC congresses dealt only with practical issues. No federada (congress
participant) would raise a question that challenged national policy on nuclear
power plants, African adventures, or economic initiatives. Doing so would
invade the realm of male elites. Each congress closed with a unanimously
approved statement of support for the revolution and its leadership” (Smith
and Padula 1996, 51).
These examples raise the question as to whether an honest debate on gender issues is
possible in Castro’s revolution or if policy changes were merely a means to disguise
and support an unbending revolution founded on “macho” precepts. These points
serve to frame the discussion of the next section.
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Gender Roles in the Special Period

The Special Period has led to some important shifts in women’s roles,
particularly in the economic arena. The emerging class system (that divides those
who have access to dollars from those who do not), has given rise to the re-emergence
of jobs once considered anathema to the regime. Sex work among young women has
emerged as a popular means to earn hard currency. Ironically, as will be discussed in
the next chapter, this form of employment has also led to new gender and racial
constructions that many women find liberating. The number of domestic servants has
also increased, particularly during the last several years. Lloyd (2002) believes that
thousands of Cuban women have accepted work as domestic servants even though the
work is technically illegal under current administrative laws.
One of Lloyd’s interview subjects, an 88 year-old retiree who has re-entered
the job market as a maid to supplement her inadequate state pension, believes that
officials “look the other way” precisely because they are the key employers of maid
services (Lloyd 2002). Furthermore, Armenteros (2001) concurs with Lloyd, adding
that supply currently far outstrips demand for domestic servants in Cuba’s capital.
She suggests that the reason for this glut may be that many women wish to retire from
government service and then find employment in domestic service where the pay can
be four times the amount of a typical state pension. If, indeed, party officials are
employing maids this represents a major breakdown in revolutionary ideology.
To place this development in context, the revolutionary regime went to great
lengths to eradicate jobs in domestic service, viewing them as degrading and
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exploitative. Through the auspices of the FMC, the government organized a school
for former domestic servants to “get those maids away from the bourgeoisie” and
“capture them for the revolution” (FMC official quoted in Smith and Padula 1996,
39). Former maids who graduated from the FMC programs were given the jobs of the
bank and telephone workers who had fled the country. By 1968, these schools had
out-lived their usefulness and were closed down (Smith and Padula 1996, 39). While
maid service never entirely disappeared during the early revolutionary period, its
resurgence raises new questions about the era of the Special Period in Cuba. This
example highlights the assertion by some observers of Cuban gender issues that the
Castro government, despite enacting measures to the benefit of women, continues to
follow a murky path regarding gender equality.
FMC policies have come under recent scrutiny by Cuban scholars. While
exact membership data are lacking, the FMC reportedly suffered a large decline in
membership dating from the mid 1980s (Padula 1996, 228). One reason given for
this drop in interest is that in recent years the organization may have lost its
relevance. As one critic notes, “the FMC has a completely bourgeois concept of
moral values” that excludes not only differing points of view, but also ignores
segments of the population formerly deemed the core constituents (Herrera 2000,
123). Indeed, it has been charged that the FMC, while preaching inclusion, actually
promotes “middle class white values” and fails to fully incorporate values held by
many Afro-Cuban women (Herrera 2000, 123). Furthermore, some have maintained
that both the overall focus and power of the FMC has diminished considerably with
the advent of economic difficulties. This is illustrated by the following quotation by
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Georgiana Herrera, an Afro-Cuban poet, who belongs to a non-official women’s
organization in Cuba known as MAGIN (taken from imaginación or imagination):
“It has to be recognized that [Cuban women today] were given every
possibility for their emancipation-study, maternity care, day care centers,
work. [However], it’s gone backwards. The time came when the FMC
stopped short and was only offering cleaning, cooking and embroidering,
when other things were happening in the world. Now, women know they are
not emancipated, that men [continue to be] predominant in many things”
(Herrera 2000, 121).
It is also useful to consider that many of the women who managed to attain high
positions in government were the same women who called on their compatriots to
become “superwomen” without considering the social consequences. FMC leader
Vilma Espín denied that she had suffered from discrimination during the Castro era
and suggested that perhaps a women’s organization was not necessary. In the end,
she was largely correct but for the wrong reasons: the FMC, in the later years, has not
functioned as an organization that truly benefits the women it is supposed to serve.
A woman I interviewed for this study spoke at length about her
disappointment that Cuban women, unlike American women, were not able to fully
develop at an individual level. While she offered an overall positive assessment of
women’s advancements under the Castro regime, she recognized that neither she, nor
her daughter had been able to realize goals independent of revolutionary
prescriptions. She worried that Cuban women had been taught to identify appropriate
goals as those that are consistent with revolutionary ideals. This conformity to the
revolution has made the Special Period austerity program all the more difficult to
negotiate (Marlo, personal communication, 1997).
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With the shifting employment landscape of the Special Period, the
government’s role as the provider (patriarch) of the Cuban “family” has come into
question. As Pearson has noted, a reduction in state assistance in terms of the
provision of basic necessities including food, medicine and even day care, has led to a
need for mothers of families to assume greater roles in basic family support (1997,
671). For example, the lack of basic foodstuffs available from the ration book has
meant that women must find alternatives in order to feed their families. Many have
turned to the black market to procure basics such as cooking oil, soap, toothpaste, and
many other necessities. Furthermore, with a decline in the health care options,
women have a greater responsibility to care for sick children (and even elderly
parents) at home rather than rely on poorly staffed and under-stocked hospitals and
health care facilities. This has translated into a longer “double day” as more time is
required to care for loved ones.
Cuba’s women’s movement during the Castro years was distinct from
Western models in that it occurred with the full support and guidance of the
government, whereas movements in countries like the United States have emanated
from civil society (i.e., private) institutions. North American women, for example,
have been encouraged to pursue individual achievement and personal development,
while Cuban women have been taught to become functioning (and yet oddly
subservient) members of government institutions. Although Cuban women work
side-by-side with their male counterparts in sugar cane harvests and military
maneuvers (despite the objections of some men), women are still forbidden from
accepting employment that involves stringent physical labor. This proviso, while
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appearing to protect women, actually opens the door for discrimination in other ways.
Significantly the women’s movement in Cuba has been characterized by Castro as
“feminine” rather than “feminist” and women’s loyalty and service to the state are
encouraged above all else (Bunck 1994, 88). Castro’s unfortunate choice of words
serves to indirectly illustrate the underlying goals of the “revolution within the
revolution.” Indeed, as Smith and Padula note, “Cuban women were isolated by the
very ideology that purported to liberate them” (1996, 183). This was because the
policies came directly from Castro and were implemented by his sister-in-law, Vilma
Espín. It appears that Castro called Cuba’s equality movement “feminine” precisely
because he wished to maintain the traditional gender hierarchy whereby women
perform subservient roles.
Unfortunately for Cuban women, policy adjustments dating from the mid
1970s coupled with decreasing state support during the Special Period have meant
that women have had to shoulder a greater burden in the raising of their families (and
concurrently, with assisting in social reproduction.) With this point in mind, many
have questioned the extent to which Cuban women have been “liberated” by the
Castro regime. As previously noted, tourism has provided an opportunity for some
Cuban women to negotiate the new Cuban economy and to call into question
women’s roles within the revolution. This point will be discussed at greater length in
the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Cuba’s Tourism Industry: An In-depth Analysis

In spite of the difficulties experienced by the average Cuban during the
Special Period, the country has witnessed substantial economic gains as a result of the
strength of tourism during the 1990s. Indeed, tourism’s comeback as an important
economic engine is likely the most important factor to consider in assessing the
Special Period, as the industry has re-ordered Cuban society in many ways:
geographically, socially, economically, politically, ecologically and so on. What
follows is a brief assessment of the tourism industry through its beginnings on the
island to its current role in the Cuban economy and society.
The second part of the chapter includes an examination of the social
constructions and productions of tourism space during the Special Period. The
discussion is focused on two distinct discourses advanced by the Castro regime. The
government has attempted to maintain socialist principles while at the same time
actively engaging in capitalism by seeking foreign investment and international
tourists. The socialist discourse is evident in the government’s maintenance of the
national tourism infrastructure, the campismo popular, designed for the exclusive use
of the Cuban population. By contrast, the spatial policies of exclusionary capitalism
are most evident in Varadero, Cuba’s most extensive tourism enclave.
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A Brief History of Cuban Tourism

In the Cuban collective memory, tourism was an industry linked to 1950s era
decadence and exploitation at the hands of the old Cuban elite, North American tour
operators and visitors from the north. Indeed, much that has been written about Cuba
in the 1950s centers around the role of tourism during that decade (see Graham
Greene’s Our Man in Havana [1958] as an example). Swashbuckling tales of
American gangsters and Mafioso (Meyer Lansky was said to have been invited to
operate Cuba’s gambling casinos in an effort to “clean up” the industry!) and famous
expatriates (including Ernest Hemingway, who maintained a residence near Havana
and was often found imbibing at Havana’s most famous establishments) remind
Americans and Cubans alike of a time when Cuba dominated the Caribbean tourist
trade (Perrottet and Biondi 1996, 35-37). Indeed, between 1952 and 1958, tourism in
Cuba increased by over 30 percent, and in the year 1957, Cuba controlled over 21
percent of the Caribbean tourism market (Villalba cited in Miller and Henthorne
1997, 4-5).

The Period of Initial Tourism Development: 1919-1931

While the 1950s period was considered the heyday of tourism in the country,
Cuba’s reputation as the Caribbean’s premier tourism location had been established
much earlier. While Cuba has been welcoming guests since its early days as a
Spanish colony, as a result of several factors, the island first came into its own as a
131

recognized tourist destination in the post World War One period. Well-heeled North
American tourists had begun to visit the island during the First World War through
regular service offered by several shipping lines. One of the most popular was the
Cunard Line from New York that charged passengers $40 for a one-way, all-inclusive
first class ticket to Havana (Villalba 1993, 49). Tourists were drawn to Cuba by its
warm wintertime weather and exotic beaches, and increasing arrivals during the war
period set in motion a series of investments in Cuba’s tourism infrastructure. A law to
jointly legalize gambling and more greatly promote tourism on the island was passed
in 1919, although as Schwartz notes, articles written into the bill clearly benefited the
political and economic elite who had vested interests in the fledgling tourism
industry. For example, the family of President Menocal, who signed the bill into law,
gained the exclusive concession to operate jai alai games in the country (Schwartz
1997, 33-34).
During Prohibition in the United States that lasted from 1919 to 1933, Cuba
cemented its reputation as a tourist destination by providing an outlet for Americans
seeking to drink legally. The legality of alcohol, however, was not the sole reason that
Americans visited the island. Basil Woon, the author of the 1928 travel guide “When
It’s Cocktail Time in Cuba,” stated the following reasons why self-respecting
“gentlemen” should visit the island:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

You may drink as much as you want.
You may buy as many drinks for your friends as you want to.
You may chance your luck at the lottery.
You may lose as much money as you desire at the casino.
You need not carry your marriage certificate with you.
You may stare at the pretty señoritas, because staring in Cuba is considered a
compliment- not a crime. (Woon cited in Perrottet and Biondi 1996, 35).
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The guidebook also contained a section named “Naughty-Naughty Nights,” essential
reading for those seeking Havana’s burgeoning pockets of vice and prostitution
(Ibid.). This presents clear evidence that Cuba’s reputation as a center of illicit
pleasures was established long before the 1950s. Of course, Cuba’s wealth of pristine
beaches and its tropical climate were additional magnets for pleasure-seeking tourists.
Beginning in 1919, Cuban tourism promoters were anxious to establish a
marketing plan to attract visitors to the island. Schwartz notes that Cuba initially
lacked a well-defined image since in many ways it was typical of both the Caribbean
and the Spanish colonial realm although it lacked the “authentic” Indian ruins that
drew tourists to Mexico, Central America and South American countries (Schwartz
1997, 76). Between 1924 and 1931, a period of sustained growth in tourism numbers,
Cuba’s marketing strategy evolved from one designed to attract up-scale clients with
refined and luxurious tastes, to a plan that wooed a decidedly middle class clientele.
This shift in emphasis put both Cuba and the Caribbean region in general on the
tourism circuit and middle class vacationers and excursionists (defined as those who
traveled to the island from Florida for a brief day or overnight stay) were the key to
the region’s tourism success.
The arrival of significant numbers of tourists led to new constructions and
productions of space on the island. Schwartz offers the example of what she terms
“manufactured traditions” that were developed in order to attract greater numbers of
visitors (Schwartz 1997, 74-87). One of these “traditions” involved changing the
emphasis of Cuba’s carnival season that prior to the 1920s was a distinctly Cuban
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holiday. The parades originally associated with the celebration focused on traditional
Cuban themes and were noted for their informal spontaneity and high degree of local
participation. During the 1920s, however, tourism promoters began to systematize
carnival proceedings and in the process incorporated American themes that at one
point led to the construction of a miniature Coney Island amusement park in Havana
(Schwartz 1997, 84). As Schwartz notes, “Tourists [in the late 20s and early 30s]
poured into Cuba and made Carnival their own [and the resulting spectacle] became
more of a tourist attraction than a Cuban holiday” (Schwartz 1997, 84). Indeed, the
rising popularity of carnival led to the sale of grandstand seating as part of tourist
packages deals (Schwartz 1997, 83). This example points to a shifting construction of
international tourism that signaled both its ascendancy in Cuba and its far-reaching
ability to alter Cuban culture and ultimately restrict Cuban access to evolving tourism
space.
The availability of legal alcohol along with the success of tourism promotions
translated into increasing arrivals. Villalba has demonstrated that by the end of the
1920s, Cuba was welcoming over 62,000 tourists annually, compared to a rate of
31,500 in 1924. The global depression led to a plateau of visitors (91,000 in 1934),
but by the end of the 1930s, the Cuban tourist economy had expanded again,
accommodating over 178,000 visitors in 1937 (Villalba 1993, 44, 50). From a high
point in 1937, tourism arrivals in Cuba dropped significantly in the years that
followed due to heightened hostilities that led up to World War Two. Although tourist
numbers began to increase again in 1946, it was not until 1949 that visitations to the
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island matched those of the inter-war era. In that year 180,000 people came; and thus
began the boom that occurred in the decade of the 1950s.

The Heyday of Cuban Tourism: 1946-1959

While tourist numbers began to rise at the end of World War Two, it was
during the 1950s that Cuba realized its greatest growth. The high point was in 1957
when Cuba welcomed 272,266 tourists to the island (Villalba 1993, 25). Visitors to
Cuba during this time period, however, were not only the typical sun, sea and sand
seeking tourists. A number of mobsters, including the notorious Meyer Lansky,
found a lucrative offshore profit center in Cuba (Miller and Henthorne 1997, 2-3).
Mob connections and investments played an important role in the Cuban tourism
sector until the end of the 1950s. Indeed, Cuba’s position atop the regional tourism
market was due, in part, to the generous concessions offered to tourism operators by
the Batista regime that took power for the second time in 1952.51 For example, Hotel
Law 2074 passed in 1955 provided tax exemptions for all new hotels as well as direct
financial assistance for enterprises deemed particularly lucrative. Case in point was
the Hotel Riviera, a Havana landmark that was built at a cost of $14 million and
opened in 1957. The Cuban government provided half the funding for the project and
floated bond issues to cover most of the remaining cost. According to one source,
Lansky and his investors likely paid only a small percentage of the total cost (Miller
and Henthorne 1997, 2). This situation was problematic because little of the revenue
51
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generated from the Riviera and its infamous casino found its way into government
coffers. Lansky and his associates would pay a percentage of their earnings to Batista
and top government officials in backdoor transactions that some believe accounted
for the over $3 million found in his Swiss bank accounts alone (Perrottete and Biondi
1996, 36).
Cuba had to pay a price, however, for its tourism-based relationship with the
Yankees from the north. As one observer succinctly notes,
“Havana [during the post WW II era] quickly became the prostitution capital
of the Western Hemisphere. Businessmen could choose their mulatta for the
weekend from photographs at the airport” (Perrottete and Biondi 1996, 35).
While the exploitative nature of Cuba’s tourism product was indeed problematic, the
fact remained that the industry, as implemented, exacerbated the historic uneven
development on the island. According to one source, “The glitter of Havana stood in
contrast to the backwardness of some of the most impoverished regions in Cuba,
particularly in the eastern-most province of Oriente” (Díaz-Briquets 1988, 47). Since
tourism remained concentrated in Havana and a few choice beach resorts such as
Varadero, Cuba exhibited a distinctly urban/rural divide wherein urban areas, led by
Havana (a typical primate city), were much better off economically than povertystricken rural zones (see Pérez-Stable 1999, 14-35 for discussion). This stark
urban/rural division created a situation where impoverished rural Cubans followed the
“bright lights” of the tourist hotels in search of work and opportunity. Many rural
women (along with girls and boys), who were drawn (and were often times forced to
migrate) to Havana and Varadero, wound up working in the sex trade in places like
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the notorious Casa Marina where tourists were offered 13-year-old “virgins”
(Perrottet and Biondi 1996, 35).
One must also consider that despite the strength of Cuba’s tourism economy,
the island continued to depend on the production and exportation of sugar. Most rural
dwellers relied on seasonal employment in the sugar industry and this seasonality led
to high levels of underemployment in rural Cuba. In 1956-57, over 18 percent of
rural dwellers and 11 percent of urban dwellers were characterized as
“underemployed” (Pérez-Stable 1999, 30). Indeed, only 64 percent of rural dwellers
were considered to have full-time employment during the 1950s whereby 71 percent
of urbanites were fully employed (Pérez-Stable 1999, 28).
In the final analysis, tourism during the 1950s was exemplified by stark
contrasts between the spaces open to tourists and those accessible to average Cuban
citizens. Furthermore, a strong division of labor forced women and darker skinned
Cubans into less desirable and less lucrative jobs. According to Caute, middle and
lower class Cubans were routinely barred from many tourism establishments and
beaches (1974, 36). Women were frequently regarded as “hospitality specialists,” a
loose term that encompassed beautiful smiling tour guides and waitresses, exotic
dancers and sex workers. Many of the sex workers came to Havana and Varadero
from the poorer provinces and found employment in brothels where they suffered
discrimination at the hands of unscrupulous owners (Paternostro 2000). Blacks
mainly played the role of the entertainer (most were musicians) and were barred from
the higher class hotels and beaches patronized by American tourists and wealthy
Cubans except when they were hired to play in the off-limits establishments
137

(Paternostro 2000). One source summed up the racial, economic and spatial division
thusly, his disgust of the situation barely concealed:
“A musician’s life in Havana was poor: Cuban musicians were paid ten
dollars a night, with cleaning charges for uniforms. Black skins and mulattos
in one door, white musicians in another. No drinks on the house, no overtime.
The big money went to American jazz bands and front-liners” (Hijuelos
quoted in Perrottet and Biondi 1996, 36).
As will be discussed below, many of these patterns have re-emerged with the reintroduction of large-scale tourism into Cuba.

Tourism from 1959-1989: The Soviet Era

When Castro took control of Cuba in 1959, he immediately began to address
issues of under and uneven development. As part of this process, the Castro regime
moved quickly to establish laws that “returned” Cuba’s tourism spaces to the Cuban
people. For example, Law 100 was passed in February 1959 that created the
Department of Beaches for the People in an effort to provide for national tourism
(Villalba 1993, 124). Through Law 851 that was passed in November 1959, the
regime nationalized many of the top-rated hotels in Havana, including the Hilton,
Nacional, Riveria and others (Miller and Henthorne 1997, 6). Finally, Law 636 that
was passed in November 1959 established the National Tourism Institute (INIT) that
was established in order to focus on national tourism for Cubans rather than the
international variety (Villalba 1993, 125). The eventual downturn in tourism
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numbers in the early 1960s allowed Castro to convert many tourist hotels into
residential space for Cuban residents (Ibid.).
The establishment of INIT occurred concurrently with strained relations
between Cuba and the United States and spurred an era of increasing national tourism
coupled with a swift decline in international visitors. By 1968, the island hosted a
mere 3,000 tourists most of whom hailed from Soviet bloc countries or were
“western” visitors sympathetic to the Castro regime (Mesa-Lago 1981, 74). Many
visitors traveled to Cuba to participate in “revolutionary” activities such as assisting
with sugar cane harvests and attending cultural courses at Cuban schools and
universities. The initial years of the “Soviet” period of tourism were mainly focused
on providing recreational and travel opportunities for Cuban citizens.
After declining numbers of foreign visitors throughout the 1960s and early
1970s, the Castro regime once again decided to develop international tourism and
began new hotel construction in 1974, a year Cuba attracted 15,000 visitors. Five
years later in 1979, the island attracted 130,000 tourists, 40 percent of which were
from Canada (Miller and Henthorne 1997, 8; Villalba 1993, 194). While this
represented only about one-third of the yearly number of visitors who frequented
Cuba in the late 1950s, it was clearly a turning point for Cuban tourism. Ten years
later on the eve of the Special Period, the island welcomed 300,000 visitors, an
indication that the island was once again on its way to becoming a major tourism
power in the Caribbean (Miller and Henthorne 1997, 8).
It is useful to consider the role of tourism in the Soviet period from the
perspective of the average Cuban citizen. To begin, the Castro regime accommodated
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Cuban tourists by providing them access to the island’s tourism infrastructure until
the end of the 1970s. Significantly, the Cuban government insisted that new hotel
construction begun in the mid-1970s in an effort to attract international visitors was
consistent with an emphasis on national tourism. The government maintained that the
high season for Cuban tourists, which was and remains in the summer months,
complemented the Caribbean’s winter peak for foreign tourists (Miller and Henthorne
1997, 7-8). Therefore, in the mid-1970s when Cuba re-emphasized international
tourism, Cuban tourists were allowed to share space with foreign visitors but at
different times of the year. According to Mesa-Lago, however, this arrangement was
short lived due to the rapid success of Cuba’s foreign tourism promotion efforts. The
brief lifting of U.S. restrictions on travel to the island led to an increase in CubanAmerican visitors and prompted Castro to plan for a record numbers of tourists by the
mid-1980s (Mesa-Lago 1981, 74-75).52 In order to accommodate an increasing
number of international tourists, Castro shifted investment from the domestic to the
international sector. Furthermore, he warned the Cuban people that in the case of
need, preference would be given to international tourists adding that domestic
vacation plans were subject to cut backs in order to accommodate international
arrivals. He argued that the shift in emphasis from domestic to international tourism
was necessary so the island could earn the hard currency it needed:
Based on our economic situation we should give precedence to investments in
international tourism rather than national tourism. We have to continue
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Beginning in 1977, Cuban exiles were allowed by the Carter administration to return to the island for
short visits. The returning exiles contributed $100 million to the island’s economy in 1979 alone
(Mesa Lago 1981, 74). Heightened tensions between the U.S. and Cuba coupled with the election of
Ronald Reagan, who adopted a hard-line anti-Castro stance, led to the re-implementation of travel
restrictions for American tourists in 1981 (Rudolph 1987, 57-58).
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thinking about what the socialist solution to the vacation problem is as
this becomes a right and a possibility of all the people because if we
continue with the previous criterion that one can go to the beach only in
July and August--and all workers and all families want to go to the beach
only in July and August because it also coincides with vacation time--it
will be impossible to ever resolve the the vacation issue. We have to take
advantage of the installations on hand all year round (Castro 1978).
From a spatial perspective, Castro’s pronouncement effectively spelled the
end of policies that favored Cuban tourists and set the stage for the Special Period
policy of exclusionary enclave tourism. Cubans had enjoyed equal access to the
island’s tourism infrastructure from 1961-1979, but the arrival of greater numbers of
tourists meant that the government was either unable, or unwilling, to allow dual
national and international use of its facilities. As will be discussed below, Castro
attempted to compensate for the loss in prime tourism space by creating the
campismo popularcamping infrastructure for the exclusive use of the Cuban
population. This idea was met with a lukewarm response and most Cubans do not
regard it as an acceptable substitute for the loss of tourism space to foreign visitors.
There is evidence to suggest that prostitution remained a component of Cuban
tourism during the Soviet tourism era. One source notes that while the Castro regime
closed the infamous 1950s-era sex shows and began an effort to “rehabilitate” Cuban
sex workers, prostitution reappeared already by the early 1960s (Baker 2000, 98).
The implementation of a rationing system for food and other material goods in the
1960s and 1970s also attracted women to work as jineteras in order to improve their
economic standing (Baker 2000, 98). According to the Cuban author Guillermo
Cabrera Infante, the state has always made “mulattas” (sic) available to foreign
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dignitaries (Cabrera cited in Baker 2000, 98). The presence of sex workers in the
early years of the Special Period was not, therefore, a new and novel response to the
conditions of the Special Period.
In sum, the early Soviet era of Cuban tourism was characterized first by the
increasing availability of space given over to national tourism. When international
tourism began to take off in the late 1970s, Cuban tourists were once again deprived
of equal status with international visitors and their access to prime tourism space
became limited. In response, in 1981 the Castro regime began allocating resources to
the development of the campismo popular, a nation-wide network of camps for
Cuban tourists and educational groups.
While international tourism in the 1960s and early 1970s played a muchreduced role both economically and socially in Cuba, evidence suggests that Soviet
visitors continued to view Cuba as a source of women (often euphemistically referred
to as mulattas) who were available for their sexual gratification (Baker 2000, 98).
Indeed, it is worth emphasizing that the term jinete has been in use throughout the
revolutionary period in Cuba, although it has become more common and more
widespread during the Special Period austerity program. Despite exhortations to the
contrary, Castro was never able to fully eradicate prostitution in Cuba. Indeed,
evidence suggests the regime was an active participant in the provision of sexual
services to visitors to the country (Cabrera cited in Baker 2000, 98).
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The Tourism Industry During the Special Period
The solution to Cuba’s economic problems during the Special Period was a
multi-faceted approach with tourism as the centerpiece. Following the demise of the
Soviet Union, Cuba began actively soliciting investors in the tourism, mining,
tobacco and infrastructural sectors such as telecommunications. A constitutional
amendment was passed in 1992 to allow foreign partners up to forty-nine percent
ownership in concerns, total exemptions on taxes, unrestricted repatriation of profits
and the freedom to hire and fire their Cuban staff (Jatar-Hausmann 1999, 49-50).
This effectively expanded the parameters of Law Decree 50, a law dating to 1982 that
allowed for the formation of joint ventures. In 1995, with Law Decree 77, the Cuban
government further expanded the rights of investors to establish corporations with
100 percent foreign ownership in some cases, though as Miller and Henthorne note,
the government clearly prefers to promote joint ventures (1997, 123). Additionally,
the law allowed for foreign investment in real estate to provide for “non-permanent
residents in Cuba” as well as construction for use in tourism (Jatar-Hausmann 1999,
123).53
In July 2002, Vice Minister of Foreign Investment stated that Cuba
maintained 412 active joint ventures with foreign concerns (Spadoni 2002, 161).
However, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Investment and Economic Collaboration
(MINVEC) reports that 72 joint ventures are in the process of dissolution (Spadoni
2002, 161). According to data from the Ministry of Foreign Investment (MINVEC),
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As of April 2003, Law 77 is on hold because Cuban-Americans could theoretically qualify for the
new housing (Scarpaci, personal communication, April 2003).
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83 joint ventures are involved in basic industry (mining, old exploration, etc.) while
75 are involved in tourism. Spain is the leader in joint ventures with 104, followed by
Canada (70), Italy (57) and France (18) (MINVEC 2002). From 1988 to 2001, Cuba
attracted $5.4 billion in foreign direct investment commitments via joint ventures, but
only $1.9 billion had been delivered (Spadoni 2002, 164).
In an effort to streamline Cuba’s tourism infrastructure and help satisfy
investor needs, the Castro regime re-organized the administrative apparatus for
tourism by transforming the National Tourism Institute (INTUR) into the Ministry of
Tourism (MINTUR) in 1993. The main goal of the government was to focus on a
more efficient means to provide services, particularly in marketing the tourism
product, and to create distinctive hotel and tourism “groups” that would each assume
responsibility for unique market niches under the larger umbrella of MINTUR. These
groups include: Gran Caribe, which deals with the administration of “luxury” services
such as several four and five star hotels as well as several well-known restaurants (La
Bodequita del Medio in Havana, for one); Horizontes group which focuses on mainly
three-star accommodations as well as particular “specialty” niches such as the
maintenance of ecotourism resorts and provision of specialty tours; Cubanacán,
which was given international tourism facilities to manage in an effort to earn the
proceeds needed to upgrade domestic tourism needs; and Gaviota, an arm of the
military that also focuses on specialty tourism in the former retreats of the Cuban elite
such as Topes de Collantes located near the colonial city of Trinidad (Horizontes
2002; Miller and Henthorne 1997, 143-162; Avella and Mills 1996, 58-60).
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The Cuban government has marshaled various educational resources in its
effort to develop tourism. The country currently maintains regional tourism schools
that exist to prepare students to work in all facets of the tourism sector, from front
desk operators to assistant managers. The Castro regime has even allowed foreign
business professors to teach classes ranging from management to marketing on the
“western” model (Fletcher 2000). Additionally, the government supports universitylevel curriculum designed to prepare students for a wide range of opportunities in
tourism as well as to assist in locational analysis of potential tourism sites. The
Department of Geography at the University of Havana is the only department in the
country to offer a degree in tourism studies (Dean Garcia, personal communication,
1996). Some students in the program have been charged with performing
environmental impact studies on areas of interest for potential tourism development.
One of my long-term interview participants was a University of Havana geography
student who was in the midst of preparing an impact study on Cayo Coco in the
northern keys through an association with a UNESCO-funded program.
On paper, tourism has proven a successful strategy for Cuba from many
different perspectives. The industry surpassed sugar in 1997 as the most important
source of export revenue for the island. (By convention, tourism is considered an
export industry, even though “consumption” occurs within the country in question.)
According to one source, the industry generated $2 billion in 2000, compared with
$900 million earned from sugar exports (San Martin 2001). Another important
source of income for Cuba is remittances sent from Cubans living abroad, and this
influx of cash totaled anywhere from an estimated $800 million to over $1 billion in
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2000, the majority arriving from Cuban-Americans in the United States (San Martin
2001; Urizarri 2001). Remittances are now the second most important source of
income for the Cuban economy (Urizarri 2001).
At least for the near future, tourism will continue to grow both in the size of
the industry, as well as in its importance to the Cuban economy.54 Forecasts by
experts point to the possibility of attracting 10 million people by the year 2010.
According to Castro, however, this goal can only be realized when the “economic
war” with the United States ends and Americans are once again allowed to travel
freely to the island. Castro reported the findings of an undisclosed poll that was
allegedly carried out in the United States that stated 64 percent of Americans would
visit Cuba in the event restrictions to travel to Cuba are lifted by Washington (Acosta
1998,1).
While this figure may seem out of reach based on current figures, Cuba has
witnessed steady growth in the tourism sector and has become a legitimate rival to
other Caribbean tourism juggernauts such as Jamaica (World Tourism 2001). The
World Tourism Organization (WTO) placed arrivals in Cuba at roughly 1.7 million
people in 2000 and tourism receipts at $1.76 billion (World Tourism 2001). In a
recent speech, Fidel Castro noted that Cuba attracted 1.6 million people who brought
over $2 billion in revenue to the country in 2002 (Castro 2003a). In 2000, Cuba
ranked third behind Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic in tourism arrivals,
tourism receipts and overall market share (Castro 2003a). Between 1995 and 1999,
Cuba ranked first in overall growth rate with an increase of 20.1 percent of arrivals.
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United States. See discussion in Chapter Seven.
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In order to place these figures in context, between 1985 and 1996 Cuba rose from a
rank of 24th to 12th place in tourist arrivals among Latin American countries. During
this same period, Cuba’s tourist arrivals increased 34.6 percent, the highest growth in
the region (Acosta 1998,1).
Interestingly, despite Cuba’s heavy investment in the tourism sector, the reorganization of the industry has actually led to a loss of jobs for many former tourism
workers. Some job slashings have occurred as a result of foreign managers taking
control of joint venture hotels and restaurants. Incoming bosses complained that
bloated payrolls significantly effected profitability and many resorted to deep cuts in
personnel. In one example, Iberostar SA hotel group of Spain remodeled the Triton
hotel in Havana and re-opened with only 180 of the 750 previous workers, a cut of
over 75 percent (Avella and Mills 1996, 58). A source I interviewed in 1997 stated
that she and other members of her family were laid off from work when the Bellamar,
a Varadero hotel, closed for renovations. She considered herself lucky to find work
in another hotel since her previous job was to be terminated when the Bellamar reopened (Carla, personal communication, 1997). Another interviewee stated that his
employer, the Havana Libre, trimmed the majority of its workforce after foreign
management assumed control of the Havana landmark (Humberto, personal
communication, 1996).
Despite the above examples of job losses in individual establishments, the
expansion of Cuba’s tourism infrastructure will surely translate into further
employment opportunities for Cuban citizens. Indeed, according to one source Cuba
employs over 40,000 workers in tourism and over 50 percent of those are younger
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than 35 years of age (Regalado 1999). Yet, as will be discussed below, Cubans are
justifiably worried about a rising propensity by the Cuban government to favor
“enclave” tourism development. As has occurred in other developing countries, this
strategy may be aimed at restricting contact between Cubans and tourists so as to
limit the ability of Cubans not employed in the tourism sector to legally acquire hard
currency through direct contacts with dollar-toting tourists.

The Structural Components of Cuba’s Tourism Industry
The Ascendancy of Enclave Tourism
“The protagonists of the (enclave tourism) industry…have contended that the
road to success lies in the incarceration of the tourist in spectacular multistoried buildings…within whose walls the tourist is encouraged to drink
himself (sic) silly while remaining oblivious to the country beyond his hotel
window. This school of thought seems to rest, at least in part, on the
assumption that the rest of the country is an object of shame which the tourist
could not possibly enjoy” (Michael Manley as quoted in Britton 1980, 47)
Tourism as practiced and implemented in Cuba today conforms in many
regards to what is widely accepted as “enclave tourism” and Varadero and the
Northern Keys (cayos) in particular exhibit distinct enclaves. Under the enclave
model, hotels, restaurants and entertainment facilities are built for the sole use of nonlocal (usually international) visitors. Many enclaves are physically separated from
the wider community by walled structures and limited access entryways. Several
resorts in Varadero retain beach and grounds patrols that check visitor identification
cards and that have the power to remove anyone from the general vicinity. Indeed,
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the Varadero city police are often seen patrolling tourist beaches and checking the
identification cards of residents.
In Cuba as in many developing countries, the infrastructure of enclave tourism
is not intended to directly benefit the resident population, although entry-level jobs
may become available to locals. According to Jenkins (cited in Pearce 1989, 95),
spill over effects, such as the creation of new entrepreneurial activities for locals, are
not intentional. Non-sanctioned activities such as the selling of trinkets and other
souvenirs to tourists are in some cases suppressed by tourism operators and local
officials who are worried about un-due competition and who harbor perceptions that
visitors are subject to harassment by local vendors and “hustlers.” Jenkins also notes
that because site location is physically separate from existing communities, few
trading links are allowed to develop between the local community and the tourism
resorts (Jenkins cited in Pearce 1989, 95). The result of this separation is that a
significant proportion of inputs ranging from food to hotel linens are imported from
other regions in the country or from abroad as one source has documented (Orrio
2002).
Direct financial benefits go to both partners of joint tourism ventures, namely
the Cuban government and foreign investors who under the 1982 law that authorized
joint ventures, can legally repatriate any profits realized. The Castro regime prefers
to rely on the peso-driven economy to meet the needs, albeit incompletely, of the
local population. It attempts to keep tourism profits under its control, and hence,
private initiative in the tourism industry is curtailed through a variety of means
including limiting employment to those ostensibly loyal to the regime and through
149

direct repression of jineteras. All legal aspects of the tourism infrastructure, from
accommodations to restaurant offerings and souvenir vending, are strictly controlled
by the Castro regime. However, there are distinct geographic patterns to this state of
affairs. Since the 1996 crackdown, Varadero has become a tightly controlled enclave
where illegal entrepreneurialism is difficult to pursue. In contrast, my field data
indicate that Havana is home to a sizeable community of paladares (privately run
family restaurants), many of which depend on tourist traffic to earn a living (see
Scarpaci, Segre and Coyula 2002, 245, and Henken 2002, 344-350 for discussion of
Cuban paladares).
The fact that tourism provides access to dollar-generating jobs is often
portrayed as an unfortunate side effect of the development strategy, and the Cuban
government has repeatedly demonstrated the willingness to regulate and police the
workforce. In 1998, the government began to require that new workers in the tourism
industry obtain an “employment card” which entails a security check (Regalado
1999). The government claims that the new policy was adopted to combat “negative
conduct” that ranged from bribery to “piracy.” One source cited as an example
“unscrupulous” hotel workers who engaged in such activities as “offering to change
money for male guests [an illegal activity] and asking sexual favors of female
visitors” (Regalado 1999).
This move can also be interpreted as a way to weed out “counterrevolutionary” elements in the tourism industry. For example, according to Regalado,
over 50 percent of Cuba’s reported 40,569 tourism workers are under the age of 35
(1999). She explicitly states that many younger workers are not prepared to “provide
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excellent service,” inferring that they have had limited exposure to the demands of a
modern service economy. The article also asserts that tourism workers need to be
carefully chosen and monitored because some believe that younger workers are
considered “more prone” to illegal activities within the tourism sector.
In order to gain a greater perspective on the views of Cuban supporters of the
Revolution, I interviewed Humberto, an older, white, self-described revolutionary
who had fought in Angola. When I asked him how he felt about tourism’s rise during
the Special Period, Humberto became visibly agitated and criticized a nephew who
worked in the tourism industry: “I am frustrated with many of today’s young people.
They were given the fruits of the revolution, whereas we [older revolutionaries] had
to fight for it. “Too many young people are prone to counter-revolutionary activities,
including my nephew who thinks materialism is fine” (Humberto, personal
communication, June 1997).
Not surprisingly, jobs in the tourism sector are highly sought-after by the
nation’s old and young alike. And while many anti-Castro observers appear to revel
in the fact that one can find former doctors and engineers among the ranks of Cuba’s
taxi cab drivers and bartenders, (which in their minds offers a clear indictment against
Cuba’s socialist system), the fact remains that the government claims to award
tourism jobs based on revolutionary merit. The following vignette examines this
notion from the viewpoint of young tourism workers and aspirants.
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Personal Profile: Cuban Youth and the Tourism Industry

One evening in Vedado, Carlos W. hosted a domino game for several of his
friends. Carlos is a chef in a tourist hotel in Havana. Among those present were his
friend Juan, a hotel clerk, and Inés who had recently re-applied for acceptance into a
“tourism school.” All three friends were under thirty years of age. Carlos and Juan
were from Havana and Inés was originally from Sancti Spiritus, but had moved to
Havana to live with relatives in the capital to seek employment. At one point in the
evening, Inés wondered if she would be able to get into tourism school on her second
try. She was originally unsuccessful, she believed, “because I did not stress enough
my love of the revolution.” Carlos laughed and agreed that while strong
revolutionary credentials were necessary, almost every applicant he knew
exaggerated their devotion to the revolution. He also believed that a connection to a
party official was needed to expedite the process, an obstacle he overcame by calling
on a relative to vouch for him. In response to Carlos, Inés noted with a hint of
sarcasm “I will try to be more like Che if I’m given the opportunity for another
interview,” a reference to a popular propaganda campaign that accompanied the RP in
the mid-1980s when Castro emphasized the non-material rewards and incentives
advocated by Che Guevara (see Eckstein 1994, 62-63).
As the evening wore on, Carlos and Juan discussed the problem of petty theft
at the hotel where they both worked. Carlos admitted, “I sometimes smuggle food
out of the hotel kitchen to help my family and to sell on the black market.” All three
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opined that they thought it necessary to siphon food and other supplies from the
tourism sector to help alleviate shortages in the peso-driven economy. Inés declared
that once one obtains a job in tourism, a person often assumes the role of the primary
provider for the family, whether the worker is male or female, younger or older.
“Without access to guanikiki [Cuban slang for dollars], you cannot survive in Cuba
today,” said Carlos. “Everyone wants a tourism job or a relative who lives abroad.”
(Based on my conversations with Carlos and friends, July 1997.)

Tourism officials and planners also promote tourism enclaves to limit contact
between residents and tourists and to reduce the ‘social and cultural’ pollution
associated with in-coming visitors (Pearce 1989, 95). This desire to circumvent the
perceived dangers of the so-called “demonstration effect” has been widely cited by
observers as one goal of Cuba’s tourism strategy, namely the limiting of contact
between the Cuban people and tourists.55 The construction of tourism enclaves in
Cuba has revealed a high degree of spatial differentiation. For example, true tourism
enclaves are found in locations that have been made strictly off limits to the average
Cuban citizen. These include the famous tourism destination of Varadero in
Matanzas province along with the northern caye resorts located on Cayo Coco and
Cayo Romano in Camaguey province. Access to these resort areas is strictly
controlled via checkpoints that allow only authorized Cubans and, of course, tourists
to pass. In the case of Varadero, the only non-tourism oriented vehicles that may pass
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are those registered in Matanzas province and/or those who can prove they have
official business in Varadero. Cayos Coco and Romano are connected to the
mainland by raised berm roads. Entrance to the berm roads (pedeplenares) is strictly
controlled and only tourism workers are allowed onto the cayes themselves. As
discussed in the next section, the end result is the maintenance of “apartheid tourism”
whereby Cuban citizens are not granted the same opportunities and advantages
available to the international tourist.

Apartheid Tourism in Cuba

To most people, apartheid is a term imbued with images of a segregated South
Africa, a symbol of a by-gone era. Apartheid is an Afrikans term meaning “the state
of being separate” (New World Dictionary of American English, 1988 ed.). Of
course, apartheid as it was practiced in South Africa implied much more than simply
a spatial separation of the races into four distinct categories: Blacks, Whites,
Coloureds and Asians. Rather, it provided the basis for a multi-layered, statesponsored policy of discrimination. According to Smith, apartheid, as originally
implemented, operated at three spatial scales: personal, within residential space in
towns and cities, and at the national level (Smith 2000, 28). At the personal level,
discrimination took the form of denied entrance into certain public facilities such as
parks, theaters and transportation and lavatories. At the residential level, apartheid
insured the segregation of the races in cities through the Group Areas Act, which
allocated exclusive use of a defined region in the city to one race. Finally, apartheid at
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the national level led to segregation in the form of 10 “homelands” assigned to the
major African tribal groups (Smith 2000, 28).
The South African government originally claimed that the designation of
homelands would allow for the rise of separate, but somehow equal societies within a
larger pluralistic country. However, apartheid was a thinly disguised policy of
discrimination along racial lines, the hallmark of which was the control of black labor
by the white minority. The dismantling of the apartheid regime, while theoretically
turning power over to a democratically elected plurality, has become de-facto “classbased apartheid” in that societal divisions revolve increasingly around the issue of
class rather than simply race. According to one source, “whites, along with better-off
members of other race groups, have been able to protect some of their privileges” at
the neighborhood level (Smith 2000, 29). The presence of gated communities in the
country is reported to be greatly increasing (Rector, personal communication, 1998).
Tourism as practiced in many developing countries is an industry that exhibits
social patterns not unlike those discussed in South Africa. Apartheid tourism is a
form of enclave tourism and can be designated as a side effect of true enclavism.
While apartheid is a term that underscores racial division and inequality, apartheid
tourism as practiced in Cuba is primarily, though not exclusively, economic in
character. However, as established in the previous chapter, changing economic
patterns associated with access to dollars (or lack thereof) are giving rise to a de facto
class hierarchy that exhibits visible racial overtones. It is important to establish that
discrimination on the basis of race and gender is expressly prohibited, according to
official policy. Indeed, the Cuban constitution bars discrimination based on “race,
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skin color, sex, national origin, religious creeds, and any other type [of
discrimination] offending human dignity” (Human Rights Watch 1999).
Despite laws to the contrary, many observers and Cuban scholars have noted
the increasing incidence of apartheid tourism in the country (Moses 2000; Miller and
Henthorne 1997; Schwartz 1997, et al). The treatment of apartheid in the literature
mainly revolves around a strongly enforced governmental policy to restrict Cubans
from having direct access to tourists. As will be discussed in the remainder of this
section, apartheid tourism in Cuba, like the South African prototype, is a multilayered policy that involves the issues of class, race and gender.
Several Cubans I interviewed noted the irony of the economic and racial
divisions exposed by Cuba’s tourism practices. Cuba’s involvement in Angola’s Civil
War is thought to have played a role in the eventual downfall of South Africa’s whiteonly rule, because the Afro-Caribbean Cubans won several victories against white
South African foes. The war in Angola garnered support for Castro among the nonaligned countries. Eckstein further argues that the moral basis for Cuba’s
international efforts was tied to “pan-continental” racial solidarity (1994, 186-187).
While some Cubans like to point out that the Cuban forces were dominated by AfroCubans (a form of poetic justice, they say), the fact remains that the Angolan
experience continues to play a role in the Cuban collective identity and is viewed with
equal importance by Afro-Cuban, mulatto and white participants. Indeed, one
interview source expressed bitterness in recalling his role in “ending apartheid in
South Africa” only to experience de-facto apartheid during the Special Period in Cuba
(Humberto, personal communication, 1997).
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It must be stressed that apartheid tourism is directly attributable to the social
construction and social production of tourism by the Cuban government and their
foreign investors. Up until recently, the Cuban government has followed an official
policy that prohibits Cubans from staying in hotels or eating in restaurants designed
for international tourists, regardless of their ability to pay in dollars. The government
maintains that the policy is designed to maintain a system of equality in the country
whereby one citizen is not supposed to have privileges that another cannot enjoy.
Tourism Minister Ibrahim Ferradaz explains, “Cubans who have dollars cannot go to
the hotels because not all Cubans can go. We defend equality” (Ferradaz quoted in
Cuban Tourism Minister, 2000). At face value, the policy upholds the precepts of the
revolution that are framed around issues of equality. These precepts run counter to
both Cuban law and popular “policy” widely proclaimed by Castro at the beginning
of the revolution. Cuban nationals are routinely barred from enjoying amenities open
to foreigners; the best hotels, resorts, beaches, and restaurants are off limits to most
Cubans (Human Rights Watch 1999). According to Scarpaci, many of Cuba’s finest
hotels will allow Cubans to enter their lobbies if they state they are going to the dollar
stores. He notes that this policy requires security guards to maintain greater vigilance
(Scarpaci, personal communication, April 2003).
Despite official policy, Cubans have found ways to gain access to hotels,
tourism restaurants and other establishments using both legal and illegal means.
Legally, the government grants about 170 Cubans a week the privilege to stay in
lower end hotels at state-subsidized prices in an effort to reward loyal workers.
Honeymooners are also provided with three nights of room and board at tourism
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hotels that are largely off limits to locals (Horizontes hoteles official, personal
communication, June 1996; also see Bauza 2002). However, Cubans also gain access
to off-limits locales in illegal ways, as well. As will be discussed below, Cubans are
adept at side-stepping official policy where possible and I encountered several
instances where official policy was flaunted.
Apartheid tourism in Cuba is not simply a matter of denying average Cubans
access to tourism installations. Rather, discriminatory practices occur at many
different levels and impinge on access to certain spaces as well as personal
associations. At a personal level, many visitors to Cuba are dismayed at their
inability to invite Cuban friends or relatives to their hotel room or a particular
restaurant. I encountered this situation several times during my stay in Cuba. At the
local and national level, Cubans are restricted from select public beaches and even
from whole areas of the country such as the northern cayes and the beach resort of
Varadero regardless of their ability to pay in hard currency, suggesting that “price
enclavism” (the exclusion of native peoples from tourist installations due to their
inability to pay tourist prices) is no longer an effective control because a sizeable
segment of Cuban society has access to dollars.
To place the discussion of tourism into perspective, one observer has noted
the significance of the shift from sugar production to tourism in the Caribbean. He
writes,
“Where sugar is succeeded by Princess Tourism, the fragility of the industry,
and the industry itself has introduced new social relations. Where sugar
brought people together, working together on large estates, tourism brings
people together in hotels, without it seems, the same social bonding.
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Everyone is on his [sic] own. More and more tourism alienates. Especially
when tourism is in foreign hands” (Hector quoted in Pattullo 1996, 85).
While most Cubans continue to be restricted from tourism work, the long-term effects
of the tourism industry might be towards a greater level of individualism. This
potential eventuality runs counter to Castro’s idea of collective socialism and could
lead to a greater erosion of Castroist policies.
Nonetheless, evidence suggests that Cuba is moving towards the greater
implementation of tourism enclaves in the country (Miller and Henthorne 1997, 1314). As noted above, reducing the ability of Cubans to contact tourists directly in
legal fashion effectively restricts the ability of average Cubans to realize any tangible
benefit of tourism. As will be developed in greater detail below, residents of
Varadero and Havana have noted an increase in incidences of tourist apartheid, and
they claim that this diminishes both their quality of life and their ability to earn a legal
living in the tourism industry.

The Social Production of Tourism Space in Cuba during the Special
Period

The aim of this section is to situate and explore the dominant discourses
advanced by the Cuban government regarding the production of tourism space during
the Special Period. On the one hand, the government continues to develop (some
would say over-develop) resorts such as Varadero that increasingly correspond to the
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all-inclusive enclave model. Within this context, Varadero serves as an exclusive
space that favors international dollar-toting tourists while excluding Cubans involved
in private enterprise as well as Cuban tourists and excursionists (day trippers).
Varadero is part of larger tourism spaces jointly produced by the Cuban government
and international investors in an effort to provide for the exclusive needs of foreign
tourists. Cuban citizens are involved only in building and maintaining the
infrastructure and in serving foreign guests in government-controlled jobs. Indeed as
one source notes, “Nowhere else [but Varadero] is the island’s “tourism apartheid”
more obvious” (Perrottet and Biondi 1996, 175).
On the other hand, the government has increased spending on Cuba’s national
tourism infrastructure known as the campismo popular. The chief patrons of the
campismo popular facilities are Cuban tourists and young people who use the camps
for education-related activities. Providing Cubans access to tourism facilities (albeit
of rustic and often inferior quality) allows the government to point to tangible
benefits that have accrued as a result of international tourism. It also underscores a
continuing discourse on socialism for the Cuban people that is decidedly at odds with
that associated with the dollar-driven tourism economy.
The government insists that Cubans benefit from international tourism via a
centralized, state controlled system whereby revenue finds its way to social programs
such as health care, education, food provision and recreation. While tourism money
does indeed benefit the Cuban people at a certain level through wages to a few and
through revenue that is invested in the campismo popular infrastructure, most of the
profits that remain in Cuba go to maintaining the international tourism infrastructure.
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Some revenue leaves the country via the repatriation of profits realized by joint
venture investors. More importantly, the significant multiplier effects of international
tourism that could benefit the broader Cuban populace are lost since the government
refuses to allow for a rise in local private enterprise to supply commodities and a
range of tourism services. Cuba relies instead on an inefficient state-directed system
that is ill equipped to satisfy the demands of the developed world tourist. As a result,
the government is required to import much of the food and material needed for the
tourist sector. For example, in August 2002 Cuba was forced to quickly import fresh
vegetables including two tons of tomatoes from Mexico when Cuban producers could
not supply tourist restaurants (Orrio 2002).
Although the Cuban government dabbles in capitalism itself, it maintains a
decidedly pro-socialist discourse for the Cuban population as a whole, and the public
appears to accept and participate in the efforts to reinforce socialism. In the summer
of 2002, the country resoundingly voted to declare socialism “irrevocable.”
Nonetheless, critics have pointed to the coercive nature of the Cuban election system
that leads to questionable election outcomes (Pérez-Stable 2002). In reaction to such
activities, Castro has encouraged citizen loyalty pledge drives and has moved to
increase membership in vigilance brigades following the public disclosure of the
Varela Project, an indigenous effort that amassed over 11,000 signatures in favor of
democratic reforms in the country. Varela Project organizers asked the government to
hold a referendum on a broad array of civil and political rights, including competitive
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elections, freedom of the press, and a general amnesty for political prisoners (Human
Rights Watch 2002).56
As part of this government-sponsored retrenchment, the regime has increased
crackdowns, albeit unevenly, on illegal capitalist ventures by Cubans, particularly
those that occur in tourism spaces that compete directly with government operations.
While the government is acquiring land and producing space for tourism and
international capital investment, the regime is at the same time calling for the Cuban
population to re-affirm socialism and to denounce and avoid “dangerous” internal and
external influences.
Health tourism as practiced in Cuba illustrates the “collision” of two
discourses and has led to the formation of landscapes of “mixed or dual discourses.”
The Cuban government is well justified in showcasing its successful health care
system that is provided largely free of charge to the Cuban people, a point that serves
to underscore the dominant discourse of Castroism, namely a concerted effort of
investment in medical science and the utilization of medical knowledge for both
country-wide and internationalist ends. The backbone of this program is the
maintenance of health clinics spread throughout the island to provide more-or-less
equal access to health care for all Cubans. However, with the rise of tourism in the
country, many of the more prominent facilities, especially those in tourism magnets
like Havana and Varadero, now treat exclusively foreign, dollar-paying tourists at the
long-term expense of Cuban citizens.
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Some believe that the Varela Project was supported by U.S. interests. Varela Project sponsors deny
this.
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The effect on the social landscape has been the loss of what many consider
critical space as ample evidence suggests a deterioration of health care opportunities
for average Cubans and the rise of exclusionary health tourism facilities that includes
recently renovated spas and health “retreats” for foreign patrons (Horizontes 2002).
Independent Cuban journalists document the difference in the quality of care between
the tourist or dollar denominated health facilities and the public facilities. A diabetic
in Havana confirmed assertions of recent declines in service by explaining that she
sometimes lacked insulin as well as special foods prescribed by doctors to alleviate
her condition. She was forced to rely on a U.S.-supported Catholic mission clinic for
her daily insulin (Zelda, personal communication, 1997). Arroyo (2001) described
how deteriorating health care options, linked to the hijacking of clinics and personnel
to serve tourists, have been a significant factor in recent hepatitis outbreaks in rural
Cuba. In another report, Cosano Alén documented the siphoning of equipment from
national health care facilities to those established for international tourists (2001).
In the next section, I critically analyze the two distinct and dominant
discourses through an examination of the symbolism and constructions of space
surrounding both national and international tourism in Cuba. Given the need for hard
currency in Cuba today, it is necessary to consider the ways Cubans negotiate and
indeed profit from these new spatial productions. I will first examine the discourse
and historical development of the campismo popular indigenous camping
infrastructure in an effort to provide insight into the production of socialist space.
This will be contrasted with the emerging international tourism enclave of Varadero.
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An analysis of how Cubans negotiate the new tourist spaces will emphasize the socioeconomic movement known as jineterismo.

The Campismo popular: Nature-Oriented Tourism Facilities for
Cubans

The campismo popular is synonymous with Castro’s desire to provide natureoriented tourism facilities for Cubans. Indeed, part of Castro’s discourse represents
both the attempt to show examples of government investment on the behalf of the
Cuban people, as well as an effort to downplay growing rates of inequality on the
island. In order to illustrate how this discourse translates into spatial access, I will
document the changing role of the campismo popular infrastructure vis-à-vis the
Cuban tourist during the Special Period.
As part of an effort to provide for the perceived needs of “nature-oriented”
international tourists, the Castro regime has renovated several facilities associated
with the campismo popular system that formerly served a clientele of only Cuban
tourists and excursionists in mostly rustic, unadorned rural facilities. The sites were
determined by the government to be national and ecological points of interest.
Tourism officials justify the usurpation of these spaces by arguing that the average
Cuban tourist has benefited from the development of international tourism in that
proceeds have provided the necessary capital to improve and upgrade many other
campismo popular facilities for both domestic and international tourism, (albeit on a
limited basis). Cuban citizens however, question the persistence of the appeal and
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viability of Cuba’s domestic camping infrastructure during the Special Period. Others
praise the campismo popular system as an important recreational outlet for Cubans.
The establishment of a viable domestic tourism sector could aid in combating
perceived instances of apartheid tourism and compensate for situations where Cubans
are denied entry into international tourism installations and other dollar-only
designated areas.
One must keep in mind that the Castro regime prefers to retain profits from
international tourism and to use these profits to maintain government-directed social
programs rather than allow for the rise of a private sector to fulfill Cuba’s myriad
service needs (Peters and Scarpaci 1998, 5). Therefore, a cost/benefit assessment
must focus on the degree to which tourism revenue is utilized for the public good.
That is to say, benefits to Cubans will not be in the form of profits earned by
entrepreneurs, rather profits will go to government maintenance of larger social
services that include adequate food rations, health care, transportation (mostly in the
public sector) and even access to recreational opportunities. With this point in mind,
the question becomes, to what extent is international tourism paying for recreational
outlets for Cuban citizens.
During the 1960s, when Cuba was in the process of building a socialist
infrastructure, the idea of constructing low cost camping facilities for Cuban citizens
was first discussed. In part, the idea stemmed from a new regime policy to promote
island-wide and especially rural development. Under a banner of “a minimum of
urbanism and a maximum of ruralism,” Castro sought to consolidate popular support
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for his revolution by leveling living standards among the urban and rural “classes”
(see Scarpaci 2000 for more discussion on this point). This leveling was to rectify
historical problems of substantial un-even development and income disparities
(Pérez-Stable 1993, 27-31). The completion of a six-lane highway along the spine of
the country quickly integrated the country, at least from an economic standpoint, and
greatly expanded travel possibilities within Cuba, allowing Cubans the opportunity to
more fully appreciate the cultural and environmental diversity of their country
(Núñez-Jiménez 1985, 7).
In 1981, Castro founded the Campismo Popular agency to oversee
construction of a nationwide network of camps that initially provided simple facilities
for tent campers. These were later replaced by a system of huts and bungalows and
by 1986 the campismo network included 106 facilities throughout the country, some
of which boasted amenities such as cafeterias and game rooms (Spokesperson for
Cubamar, personal communication, 1997). As can be noted in Table 4, the system is
reported to have attracted over 1.3 million visitors in 1986, meaning that the facilities
were used by over 1/10th of Cuba’s population in that year.Castro viewed the
campismo popular as the best means to offer recreational outlets for Cuban citizens,
since despite generous terms of trade with the Soviet Union the island lacked the
necessary monies (and indeed the desire) to develop a comparatively expensive
tourism infrastructure. One author believes this to be an early attempt at ecotourism
development, since it involved efforts at conservation as well as an opportunity to
educate Cuban young people about the natural environment (Aitermoser 1995, 59-
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Table 4: Visitor Data for the Campismo popular Infrastructure: 1981-2001
Year

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
2001

Number of Facilites National Visitors Accumulated Total

6
31
70
95
100
106
103
101
99
100
101
101
101
93
89
89
82

34,455
256,014
535,136
776,167
1,128,012
1,364,233
1,112,007
1,460,684
1,342,482
1,307,706
1,460,684
908,089
1,061,769
1,040,563
748,815
825,000*
925,000*

34,455
290,469
825,605
1,601,772
2,729,784
4,094,017
5,206024
6,408,165
7,750,647
9,058,353
10,519,037
11,427,126
12,488,895
13,529,458
14,278,273
15,103,273*
19,000,000*

Sources: Cubamar, 1996; Granma diario, Jan. 31, 2002.
*Denotes estimated visitors

62). Furthermore, local materials were used in the construction of these facilities, and
food was (and continues to be, in some cases) locally grown or grown on-site for use
by the visitors (Spokesperson for Cubamar, personal communication, July, 1997).
Castro himself stated, in reference to the campismo system, “we were the first
country in the world to truly establish ecotourism and on a large scale” (Castro
discusses, 1996). Indeed, the campismo popular in many ways exemplified Castro’s
goal of institutionalizing the revolution by promoting a deeper indigenous attachment
to the island’s environmental assets. Furthermore, it relieved pressure at traditional
beach tourism resorts such as Varadero and Havana’s Playas del Este where,
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following Castro’s victory in 1959, many tourist hotels had been converted for use as
worker apartments (Castro discusses, 1996).
With the advent of the Special Period and the growth of international tourism
in Cuba, the government established the tourism agency known as Cubamar that was
given the directive to commercialize various campismo popular facilities by
renovating them for use by international tourists. As with other state-run agencies
and industries in the Special Period, Cubamar was directed to function selfsufficiently and hence to rely little on the state for funding. For this reason, the
agency assumed control of a percentage of the profits from their international
installations. These monies were to be used to maintain the agency and the campismo
popular system. Cubamar renovated existing campismo sites to develop three
distinct types of low-cost installations designed for use by international visitors.
Included were villas, nautical bases (camps on the coast with access to water and
boating activities), and “mixed” facilities for use by both international and domestic
tourists (Aitermoser 1995, 38-39, Spokesperson for Cubamar, personal
communication, 1997). As shown in Figure 2, Cubamar currently manages three
villas including Aguas Claras and El Abra in Pinar del Rio, and Guajimico near
Cienfuegos, and maintains two nautical bases in Puerto Escondido and Rio Canimar,
and four “mixed” facilities that include Dos Hermanas in Pinar del Rio province,
Sierrita in Granma, Silla de Gibara in Holguin, and Rio La Mula in Santiago de Cuba.
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Figure 2: Map of International Ecotourism Installations (Cubamar)

The “mixed” facilities are referred to by Cubamar as tourist “bungalows” and
serve as basic accommodation for “nature” tourists. They lack comforts such as air
conditioning and private bathrooms with running water. As in many North American
and European campgrounds, tourists share common bathing facilities. An important
feature is that the “mixed” facilities are also available to Cuban vacationers who pay
for their stay in national currency (the peso) as opposed to the parallel currency (the
U.S. dollar) used by tourists. It is important to realize that while dollars became legal
for Cuban citizens to hold and use in 1993, possession of dollars does not grant
Cubans automatic access to tourist-oriented hotels, restaurants and shops, although as
noted earlier, Cubans are increasingly allowed into hotels in order to shop in dollar
stores (Scarpaci, personal communication, April 2003). In 1996, international
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vacationers had access to a nearby restaurant and gift shop that charged in dollars;
Cuban vacationers at that time were not allowed to enter those facilities regardless of
their ability to pay in the requisite currency. Cubans who entered establishments for
international tourists were usually asked to leave by tourism personnel or security
agents. Flagrant violations are subject to fines and even imprisonment.
While officials at Cubamar advertise the “mixed” facilities as a means for
international tourists to meet and interact with Cuban tourists, it appears that few
travelers have heeded the call despite their low cost. Oscar González, director of the
Campismo Popular agency, noted that the internationalized campismo sites were only
able to attract 3,000 foreign tourists in the first quarter of 1999 (González 1999).57 In
the summer of 1999, prices for international tourists at the mixed facilities ranged
from $9.00 for a single to $18.00 for a triple. Touristic “villas” and nautical bases cost
$14.00 for a single up to $30.00 for a triple (all prices quoted in U.S. dollars)
(Cubamar 1999).
I conducted interviews with representatives at Cubamar in 1996. Ana
Eugenia, the assistant director, revealed that the agency had a two-fold directive: to
enhance offerings for international tourists and to use a percentage of those receipts to
breathe new life into the campismo popular infrastructure for use by Cubans. In
1999, Oscar González of the Campismo Popular agency noted that Cubamar had
invested 10 million pesos (equivalent to roughly $475,000 in 1999) to remodel and
expand the campismo infrastructure. He declared that fifty percent of the investment
came from the agency’s earnings in the international tourism market with matching
57

According to Cubamar, occupancy data for individual installations were unavailable.
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funds supplied by the Ministry of Tourism (González 1999). This investment
includes improvements to installations for both international and Cuban tourists. As
of summer 2001, 82 of the original 106 camping facilities remained open to Cuban
visitors; the others had either been closed permanently or had been renovated for use
only by international tourists (Más 2001). Despite an overall reduction in facilities,
Cubamar welcomed a reported 925,000 Cuban tourists to the campismo popular in
2001 (Más 2001). González cited improvements in the quality of services as a main
reason for the increased use by Cubans, including renovated installations and
improved offerings at restaurants and cafeterias (González 1999).
Tourism officials such as González argue that the Cuban tourist has begun to
receive benefits from receipts earned through international tourism. My interview
data disputes González’ assertion, however. In 1996, I conducted a poll in Havana
and Varadero involving fifteen Cuban citizens of varying ages, races and genders. I
drew participants from those who had visited a campismo site at least once and I
asked them each informally to offer their opinion of the campismo popular
infrastructure. Ten stated that they did not enjoy “camping out” and would rarely or
“never again” utilize the infrastructure. Two adults believed the program was best
suited to children and young adults and had not visited an installation during their
adult years. In addition, all but two noted that the overall lack of reliable
transportation (a concern duly noted by Cubamar officials) made visiting the sites
unappealing at best and impossible at worst. A female respondent in her late 40s
stated, “most Cubans are not interested in camping vacations, rather we prefer time at
the beach or access to nightlife activities.” (Carmela, personal communication, June,
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1996). She believed the government had made little effort to provide the citizens
with quality accommodation and tourism options and was critical of governmental
policy that prohibited entry into international tourism establishments and areas.
Three interviewees in Varadero, however, spoke in favor of the campismo
installation located on the eastern tip of their peninsula referred to as Ríncon Frances.
All three respondents were white males in their early 20s. Two lived in Varadero and
the other lived in Cardenas. They stated that they felt more comfortable away from
the international tourist hotels from which they were restricted or otherwise made to
feel unwelcome. Furthermore, one respondent believed the international installations
to be de-humanizing and charm-less; he preferred the “easy-going” pace and
ambience of the campismo facility. Other reasons stated in favor of the campismo
sites included the lack of a police presence coupled with the chance to meet
international tourists interested in socializing with “regular” Cuban citizens (as
opposed to tourism workers). Unfortunately for these respondents, the Varadero
campismo facility has been torn down in order to construct a new hotel for
international visitors (Cubamar representative, personal communication, 2000).
According to the source, there exist no plans to build a new campismo site in
Varadero for Cuban visitors. Rincon Frances is not the only Cuban space to be given
over to international tourism. According to a published report, “Jóse Martí Pioneer
City,” a multi-million dollar camp east of Havana that could accommodate up to
20,000 children, was recently converted into hotel space for international tourists
(Allen 1999).
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In addressing the government claim that the benefits of developing an
infrastructure for international tourism will ultimately enhance tourism facilities for
Cuban people, several participants argued that the problems they face in day-to-day
life in the Special Period overshadow any benefits they might receive as tourists in
their own country. Indeed, the fact that Cubamar was allowed to pursue mixed
tourism is notable in that the Castro regime has increasingly discouraged contact
between tourists and Cuban citizens as was noted in Chapter Two. Indeed, Cuban
access to an improved campismo infrastructure must be weighed against the loss of
prime local tourism space in many locations throughout the country. Cases in point
include Varadero and Cayo Coco which are now accessible only to international
tourists and the Cubans who have been cleared to work there, primarily construction
and tourism workers; the average Cuban is denied entry into the area.
Some have complained that this prohibition runs counter to measures enacted
after the Revolution such as Law 437 of July 7, 1959 which called for: “the creation
of a Department of Beaches for the Cuban people, the fostering of tourism beaches
and the guarantee to allocate reasonable tourist attractions (for Cubans).” At that time,
the government also passed laws that “recuperated” former international tourist space
for the use by the Cuban people including Resolution 1077 of December 16, 1959
that “returned” the Hilton hotel to the hands of the Cuban people (Villalba 1993, 124125). As previously discussed, recent shifts in policy have effectively overturned
these laws leading many to question the position of the Cuban people in the new
geographical realities of international tourism. Indeed, the presence of apartheid
tourism has become a serious point of contention among some Cuban people. As one
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observer has stated, “in defiance of socialist ideals, this enclave system is as divisive
as the former Berlin Wall. Hotels are like country clubs that no Cubans can join”
(Perrottet and Biondi 1995, 72).
Another contention over the use of Cuban space cited by several officials and
Cuban people involves charges that environmentally destructive tourism projects are
carried out with the full knowledge and approval of the Cuban government. While
the Castro regime has employed experts to study areas where tourism is deemed an
appropriate strategy, expert recommendations are often ignored in the final
implementation of many tourism projects. A tourism official interviewed for this
study was dismayed that the recommendations outlined in his impact study at the
Guajimico campismo site were seemingly dismissed, a situation he believed was
driven by the desire for rapid construction of the facility. Specifically, he noted an
example where workers clear cut trees along with the neighboring vegetation in a
mangrove swamp to make way for an imported white sand beach for tourists. Citing
this and other examples, he openly questioned the government’s commitment to
conservation efforts.58
At the present time, it appears that revenue from international tourism is
slowly making its way into the campismo popular infrastructure for the benefit of
Cuban tourists. Despite the misgivings of many Cubans, if greater investment causes
the campismo popular to grow in popularity with both between Cuban and
international visitors (as Oscar González, director of the Campismo Popular agency
has predicted) then the infrastructure could serve as an important vacation option for
58

See Perez-Lopez 2000, 261-266 for more discussion on conservation.
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Cubans. Many observers have noted that in some areas where apartheid tourism is
present, pressures also exist to provide locals access to some facilities at reduced
prices. In Kenya and Ecuador, solutions such as differential fee structures and other
price breaks have been tried. Locals are allowed access to areas such as national
parks that recoup operating fees from international tourists, who are charged at a
higher rate (Wallace 1993, 76). In Jamaica, holidays for workers have been
organized at tourist resorts in an effort to combat the twin problems of psychological
and price exclusion of locals (Pattullo 1996, 204-205). As mentioned, in the “mixed”
campismo facilities, international tourists are charged dollars whereas their Cuban
counterparts pay in pesos to use the same facilities. However, it appears that many
Cubans would rather have access to hotels now reserved for international tourists, an
option currently available only to honeymooners and “exemplary” workers who can
earn a short vacation usually in a two or three star tourist hotel. As stated above, the
rest of the population is forbidden from staying in hotels managed for international
tourists. I develop the counterpoint to the campismo popular (socialist) discourse in
the following section.

The Discourse of Tourism in the Special Period: The Case of
Varadero

“Varadero: seemingly endless, clean, powdery, white beaches; a broad, shallow,
sandy slope far out into the sea, with coral reefs beyond; three yachting marinas;
water colors you always assumed were airbrushed into the travel magazines and
brochures” (Miller and Henthorne 1997, 23).
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Varadero, as a socially constructed and produced space, is subject to analysis
from several points of view. First of all, it represents a symbol of the revival of
tourism and all the attendant aspects of that industry during the Special Period. This
includes the return of substantial foreign investment to the country and the role of the
state in promoting the area. Varadero is Cuba’s leading beach tourism destination and
in many ways represents a typical enclave tourism resort. Located on the Hicacos
Peninsula roughly 90 miles east of Havana, it is home to over 19,000 permanent
residents and at any given time entertains Cuba’s second largest community of
international tourists after the capital city. Some locals complain that the town is
developing too quickly and believe that if continued unabated, Varadero will soon
resemble its overdeveloped rivals in the Caribbean region. Varadero boasts over
8,000 of Cuba’s roughly 50,000 available hotel rooms and one source believes that
25,000 might eventually be available on the peninsula thereby placing Varadero in
the same league with Cancun (Miller and Henthorne 1997, 26). Many locals
interviewed for this study, including some not directly employed in the industry,
worried about the (seemingly temporary) effects of the 1996 crackdown that they
believed led to a dip in tourism numbers to the peninsula. Varadero residents view
tourism as important to their personal economic well-being as well as to the health of
their town.
As is the case with some critics of the campismo popular system, several
Cuban officials, including those at the Cuban Institute of Physical Planning, have
expressed concern about the environmental ramifications of tourism development on
the Varadero peninsula (Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-Lopez 2000, 262). A geography
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professor at the University of Havana believes that tourism-related buildings are
being constructed too close to the shore line which could eventually lead to profound
beach erosion (Dean Garcia, personal communication, 1996). Other officials point to
Varadero as a model for development in other regions such as Cayo Coco where
building continues apace and features both sea and air connections with Varadero. It
should be noted that the development of Cayo Coco has been roundly criticized since
access has been provided by a berm (referred to as a pedraplene in Cuba) that
connects the island to the mainland. Ecologists believe the construction to be
environmentally unsound since it blocks the flow of water in the intra-coastal waters
leading to increasing contamination and adverse effects on local flora and fauna
(Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-Lopez 2000, 264-265).

Varadero as Symbol

Varadero represents many things to many people and serves as a symbol for
tourists, Cuban officials and average citizens alike. Over the course of the
revolutionary period and especially during the Special Period, Varadero has served as
a key indicator of the dominant thinking and concerns of the revolution. Compared to
its multi-faceted and much larger tourism rival Havana, Varadero is a relatively small,
self-contained enclave that is easily controlled since there exists only one road onto
the peninsula. Its physical setting is a textbook example of a Caribbean paradise that
tempts tourists with its warm, shallow waters, pleasant climate and fine-grained white
sand beaches. Cuban officials project Varadero as a model of the form of tourism
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that they wish to produce and maintain: enclave, all-inclusive tourism packages that
allow greater control of revenue as well as a means to limit contact between visitors
and Cuban citizens. As proof of this latter assertion, the government issued a severe
crackdown in 1996 on both legal and illegal economic activities on the peninsula
(discussed below).
Varadero also serves as a symbol for Cuban citizens. Varaderans are proud of
their town’s heritage as is evident from the capital invested in the restoration of many
of the wooden balloon-framed houses dating from the late 1800s. During interviews,
many seemed pained by Varadero’s new exclusionary practices that recall the Batistaera whereby many Cubans were effectively second-class citizens in the most
attractive parts of their country. Furthermore, many Cubans, who lived in former
hotels that had been renovated into citizen apartments early in the Castro era and had
once again been adapted for the use of foreign tourists during the Special Period, are
disappointed that they have had to relocate into generic apartment blocks in nearby
Cardenas.
While tourism was, and remains, Varadero’s economic mainstay, the
peninsula was first known for the production of salt. In fact, the first recorded history
of the area begins in the year 1587 when Don Pedro Camacho began engaging in salt
extraction. Salt mined from the area amounted to 250,000 sacks (size not indicated)
per year, which was enough to satisfy the needs of Cuba and the Spanish fleet that
anchored in Havana en route to Spain (Nuñez-Jimenez 1990, 8). By 1928, the
peninsula reportedly produced over 22,500 fanegas of the commodity annually; salt
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production in Varadero was terminated in only 1961 (Condensed History 1988, 5758).
The future tourist resort boasted long stretches of fine-grained white sand
beach that now prove a major draw for tourists. The town was first “put on the map”
by the Havana elite who built leisure houses and developed the beginnings of a
tourism infrastructure on the peninsula in the late 1800s. According to the Condensed
History of Varadero (1988) published by the Museum of Varadero (Museo de
Varadero), the Varadero Sport Club was established in 1889 to promote aquatic
sports, but it also served as a social venue for meetings, dances and dinners. Also in
that year, Varadero’s first theater and casino were built for vacationers (Condensed
History 1988, 57).
Despite the early attempts at development by wealthy patrons, the town grew
slowly due to “unhygienic” conditions created by physical features of the peninsula.
While the first major hotel, the “Varadero,” was built in 1915, it was not until the mid
to late 1920s that a sustained effort to build tourism establishments was undertaken.
The peninsula suffered from both limited access to clean drinking water, as well as
swampy conditions on the southern edge of the peninsula that favored the breeding of
malaria-carrying mosquitoes. Indeed, these conditions were cited as the main reason
that Varadero, which was long considered a location of incomparable natural beauty,
developed slowly and even lost population from 1899 (1,029 people) to 1919 (668
people) (Condensed History 1988, Appendix One). It was not until the late 1920s
that the twin problems of water impurity and malarial swamps were satisfactorily
addressed and tourism began to expand at an accelerated rate. The growing popularity
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of Cuba as an excursion destination for American visitors, and the “discovery” of
Varadero as a locus of villas for wealthy American businessmen fueled this growth.
Irénee Dupont, the French born chemicals magnate, purchased 512 hectares of land in
the center of the peninsula in 1926 through his real estate company, Peñas Hicacos.
Dupont eventually constructed a series of retreats, the centerpiece of which was a
vacation mansion he named “Xanadu,” including an 18-hole golf course (Perrottet
and Biondi 1996, 175).
Despite this investment in the 1920s, Varadero drew a limited number of
visitors until the tourism boom of the 1950s. After its beginnings in the 1920s as a
playground for the wealthy, by the 1950s Varadero began to attract tourists of all
classes and became a key cog in Cuba’s tourism infrastructure, helping to underscore
the popular moniker for Cuba: the playground of the Caribbean. Development in
Varadero exploded in the 1950s with private investment spiraling from $245,000 in
1951 to $3.5 million in 1957 (Schwartz 1997, 128). When Fidel Castro came to
power in 1959, he portrayed Varadero as a symbol of what he perceived were the
pathologies of the previous regime. Varadero, he stated, was home to the decadent
ills associated with capitalism including vice, prostitution and entrenched inequality
(Perrottet and Biondi 1996, 70). By opening up the beaches to the entire Cuban
population and renovating many hotels into apartments for Cuban citizens, he
effectively re-christened the town and claimed it as a symbol of socialism and
equality. Indeed, the passage of Law 437 and Resolution 1077 that nationalized
tourism beaches and hotels encouraged people to think of resort towns such as
Varadero as their own personal space. Cubans were actively encouraged to visit the
180

former domains of the foreign visitors and they were accommodated by many of the
same hotels and restaurants that were built from the 1920s to the 1950s, including the
centerpiece of the peninsula, the Hotel Internacional built in 1957.

Personal Profile: A Changed Varadero

It was in the summer of 1995 that I first traveled to Cuba where I established a
research base in Havana. Over the course of two months, I traveled to Varadero on
three separate occasions with groups of American students and Cuban friends from
Havana. At that time, Cubans were allowed to enter Varadero and on every visit we
found the town and the beach bustling with a mixture of Cuban day trippers and
foreign tourists. While Cubans at that time were restricted from several “private”
beaches, there were ample stretches of sand where Cubans and international tourists
intermingled. One vivid memory I have of Varadero was watching the sex workers
ply their trade along the beach. The women (and some men, a.k.a., beach boys)
would proposition tourists on the beach and would either leave with their dates
(presumably to hotel rooms) or they would conduct their business in the ocean.
Offers for cigars, rum and drugs were also frequently posed and hawkers of tourism
trinkets were found on every street corner.
Two years later on a return visit to Varadero, I noticed that the illegal hawkers
and sex workers were mostly gone from the scene. The tourism officials had been
successful in “sanitizing” the town, Prosecutor Juan Escalona’s euphemism for
removing the sex workers and other unwanted “pests” from the beaches and from
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public view (see Tamayo 1996, 1). Also gone were the Cuban excursionists who
were no longer allowed to visit their island’s most famous, and some would say most
attractive, stretch of beach. In Varadero, a few stretches of public beach remained
open for residents of the town and immediate vicinity,59 but I noted an increasing
number of private beaches that fronted the new enclave resorts that had sprouted in
the intervening period. Varadero was much quieter and appeared from my
perspective to be a completely different place in the summer of 1997 than it was in
1995.

With the return of international tourism in the Special Period, Varadero once
again became the centerpiece of the regime’s economic strategies that are in many
ways at odds with the socialist discourse. Thus, over the past ten years Varadero has
reverted to an exclusive space where Cubans as tourists are no longer welcome.
Indeed, its importance to international tourism was underlined in 1996 when the
Castro regime restricted non-authorized Cubans from entry onto the peninsula and
issued a crackdown on illegal activities in the area. The regime erected the first toll
booths of the revolution on the road from Matanzas to Varadero in the same year.
Private cars are charged $2 US and tourist buses pay $4 US. Residents claim the toll
booths were mainly constructed to keep prostitutes out of Varadero and to limit traffic
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Only Cubans who can demonstrate their residency in Matanzas province are allowed to enter
Varadero. Exceptions are made for those on official business or who have clearance to visit the area.
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by other Cubans who have no legitimate business in the area (Scarpaci, Segre and
Coyula 2002, 302).
The following vignette discusses ways that some Cubans have found to
navigate the new realities of the tourist economy following the crackdowns of 1996.

Personal Profile: Varadero’s Shifting Geography and Lived Spaces

Carlos (20 years old) is a lifelong resident of the Varadero region. He and his
sister, Ana (18 years old), were born in the town and currently live in the nearby city
of Cardenas, not by choice, but due to government action. They grew up in a former
hotel that had been renovated to accommodate Cuban families during the early years
of the Castro regime. However, in 1994, due to increasing demand for tourism space
on the peninsula, they were forced to move into a newly constructed apartment block
on the north end of Cardenas. Both Carlos and Ana disliked the idea of leaving
Varadero for Cardenas. Even though their new residence is only eight miles away,
transportation into and out of Varadero can be difficult, especially in the evenings.
This is because most available buses have been allocated to the tourism industry and
most currently transport tourism workers between Cardenas, Matanzas and Varadero.
Carlos and Ana’s father was a taxi driver in Varadero even before the Special
Period. He was able to work for the first few years of the Special Period and Carlos
remembers this time fondly as his father was able to bring home dollars from the tips
he generated. Unfortunately, the father became ill and passed away in 1995 and
Carlos and Ana’s mother, Clara, was forced to seek employment to support the
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children. Clara found work in the Hotel Bellamar in Varadero but was laid off when
the hotel was closed one year later for renovation. She currently draws
unemployment from the state and says she has been promised a job in Varadero
“soon”, but insists that the pay will be insufficient for her family’s needs.
To help with family expenses, Carlos has been seeking work in the tourism
industry. When we met, he was working as the camp manager of Rincon Frances, the
erstwhile campismo popular installation located on the eastern tip of the peninsula.
Carlos’ duties included managing the small discotheque and food rations as well as
checking in and supervising visitors. While Carlos earned his wages in pesos, he was
able to supplement his income by selling lobster on the black market. An excellent
swimmer, Carlos would swim a great distance past the reefs to elude beach patrols.
He would sell his successful catch for cash or trade to a friend who he called a “small
time jinetero.” Carlos spent some of his money on entertainment and gave the rest to
his mother.
In the summer of 1997, Carlos met an English woman who was on vacation in
Varadero for several weeks. They began dating and Carlos “moved in” to her cabana
near the Hotel Internacional. Interestingly, Carlos was allowed to stay despite the full
knowledge of the management that he was there. Indeed, based on my experience in
Varadero, it appeared unproblematic for a white Cuban male to accompany foreign
females into hotels, restaurants and shops. During my stay in Varadero, I was aware
of several other Cuban men besides Carlos who were staying in hotels with the
foreign girlfriends they had recently met. Ana, Carlos’ sister, believed that she would
have a much more difficult time “moving in” and spending several days in the hotel
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room of a foreign man following the 1996 crackdowns. She believes that Cuban
officials make a distinction between the relationships between Cuban males and
females and their foreign partners. The situation of a male dating a foreign woman is
not necessarily construed as a union based on a financial agreement; rather: “it is seen
as a conquest by the Cuban male.” By contrast, Ana believes, a Cuban woman dating
a foreign man is always looked upon with suspicion and is considered an act of
jineterismo. A double standard based on access to tourists was confirmed by
interview data, as Cubans generally believed that men enjoyed greater access to
foreign women (and hence to spaces reserved for foreign visitors) than Cuban women
enjoyed with foreign men. The informants believed darker skinned Cubans had the
greatest difficulties in negotiating these spaces.

Varadero and the Crackdowns of 1996

The headlines of Juventud Rebelde (the Young Communist League’s official
organ) stated, “In Varadero, they’ve broken the chain.” The date was April 4, 1996
and the Cuban authorities had begun a systematic attack on “prostitution”
(jineterismo) throughout the country, but focused their efforts on Varadero, Cuba’s
second-most important tourism space. According to the newspaper article and several
authorities I have subsequently interviewed, Varadero had become the site of growing
networks of prostitution and vice where pimps (proxenetas) were said to control
whole systems of sex workers, illegal private taxi drivers and illegal private
restaurants along with black market sales of counterfeit cigars, drugs and rum
185

(Schwartz, 1997: 211).60 The crackdowns were said to be “long overdue” and were
consistent with a desire to promote a brand of tourism that Cuban officials labeled
“family-oriented” (Elizade and Pulido 1996). The government claims that it keeps
the throngs of hustlers at bay in order to project a safer image in places like Havana
and Varadero (San Martin 2001). According to one observer, “The war against the
jineteras was on. But it is a war the Cuban government cannot afford to lose and
cannot afford to win” (Paternostro 2000). Indeed, as will be noted in this section,
Castro alternately depends on Cuba’s sex workers and hustlers while at the same time
he fears their potentially destabilizing influence or power.
While the crackdown effectively squelched illegal activities in Varadero, the
Castro regime mounted a concurrent effort to increase control of many officially legal
forms of self-employment. This was accomplished through the implementation of
harsh tax laws that forced many self-employed Cubans out of business in a variety of
occupations, including the operators of small private restaurants known as paladares
that had proven an increasing draw for tourists (Perrottet and Biondi 1996, 62). One
reason for the multi-level crackdown was the fear on the part of the Cuban leadership
that the forces of capitalism were slowly moving beyond the direct control of the
government. The situation in Varadero was a case in point. Castro was also afraid of
the growing popularity of enterprises that competed directly with state-run facilities
such as restaurants and hotels and that were capable of draining money away from
60

Beginning in January of 2003, Cuban authorities instituted a series of crackdowns similar to those of
1996. They targeted legal and illegal operators in the informal economy and in the process reportedly
confiscated “tons” of products and equipment (Rodríguez Valdés 2003). The government has also
reportedly carried out raids on medical dispensaries operated by civil organizations that draw support
from international agencies. In a March 24th raid, the government is said to have confiscated 90
pounds of donated medicines from a Havana dispensary (Armenteros 2003).
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government coffers. As Fusco has noted, the government often changes rhetoric in
order to rein in activities where they believe direct control is waning (1998, 161).
The subsequent crackdown on paladares, illegal taxi drivers and individuals who
rented private rooms to tourists was widely seen as an attempt to limit the degree to
which “unauthorized” Cubans could benefit directly from the burgeoning tourist
dollars entering the country. As established in Chapter Three, these unauthorized
(illegal) workers are collectively referred to as jineteros.

Personal Profile: Jineterismo in Varadero
Pedro is a truck driver by trade who lives just south of the main thoroughfare
(1st Avenue) in Varadero and is representative of many part-time jineteros. He rents a
room in his house to tourists whenever he gets the opportunity, although he has to be
careful, because the police increasingly keep tabs on private rentals following the
1996 crackdowns. When a foreign tourist asks if she will get into trouble with the
authorities if she agrees to stay in his house, Pedro tells her that the government
recently made it legal to rent private rooms in Cuba. What he neglected to tell her
was that Cubans who wish to rent out rooms must register with the authorities and are
subject to a tax system that charges them a flat rate regardless of whether they have
rented their space or not. While Pedro rents his room illegally, he always checks with
the local CDR representative when “friends” (his euphemism for foreigners) and
family stay at his house to reaffirm that they are not staying permanently. He hopes
this arrangement will deflect the attention of the local police. Pedro charged tourists
10 dollars a night to stay in his house and he included one meal that was prepared by
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his wife, Laura, who stayed at home with the children while Pedro was at work.
According to Scarpaci, most private rentals cost at least 20 dollars in 2003 (Scarpaci,
personal communication, April 2003). (Based on my conversation with Pedro, June
1997)

The above profile illustrates that jineterismo includes many more activities
than sex work. Cubans often perform such acts in ad hoc fashion to take advantage of
opportunity as O’Connell has demonstrated (1996, 40). For example, Pedro illegally
rents out a room in his house whenever he is able and he depends on word of mouth
to attract tourists. It was unclear from our discussion whether the CDR official he
notifies receives compensation for his cooperation with Pedro’s scheme. Judging
from Pedro’s ability to avoid harassment by the police during a period of heightened
enforcement of anti-jineterismo legislation, I suspect he has made some arrangement
(financial or otherwise) with his neighbor.
Despite the fact that jineterismo is an umbrella term for any act deemed by the
government as an illegal form of capitalism, sex work remains the activity most
frequently attached to the term. It is useful, therefore, to consider how the discourse
surrounding Cuban sex work compares to that practiced in other countries and
particularly in other tourism resorts. Prostitution, both as an act and a distinct
economic sector, has no universal definition. As Truong has noted, many continue to
define prostitution through the lens of normative assumptions regarding the primacy
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of intercourse and other sexual acts as acceptable only within the confines of socially
sanctioned unions (1990, 9). Furthermore, the term “prostitute” continues to carry a
stigma in most societies and this has led to instances of women being labeled
prostitutes for engaging in acts that challenge the societal norms (Truong 1990, 10).
As Hubbard has noted, “Prostitution is a form of work imbricated with the same sort
of complex and contradictory power dynamics which face all people in their jobs;
simultaneously empowering and exploitative, sex work can be a life-line for some, a
life sentence for others” (1999, 8). As a result of economic realities present during
the Special Period, the definition of the word prostitute in Cuba has taken on an
expanded Marxist interpretation. The Spanish word for a female sex worker is
prostituta, but is rarely used by Cubans in that context. Rather, sex workers are
simply called (like others engaged in illegal activities) jineteros.
It must be noted that I adopt the term “sex worker” to follow the lead of
feminists and even the World Health Organization who identify the selling of sex as a
legitimate form of commerce. The women and men involved in the provision of
sexual services view their activities as labor and believe they should be granted the
same provisions as other workers including such issues as workplace safety. Sex
work as it is practiced in Cuba falls within this category in many Cuban minds, and as
such, presents a challenge for feminists and other observers, because the act of selling
one’s body in exchange for sexual favors is often condoned and even encouraged by
the families of young Cuban women.
One reason sex work is popularly condoned by the Cuban public is that it is
regarded by the government first and foremost as an act of illegal capitalism or
189

jineterismo. Therefore, the act, in general, fails to illicit the response of shame
associated with moral turpitude that it does in most other regions in the world. Fusco
aptly demonstrated this point during an interview with two jineteras. When asked
what the men in the neighborhood think about their profession, the women reply,
“They see the (client) coming in with a girl, and they don’t see him. They see a
chicken, beans, rice-a full fridge” (Fusco 1998, 157). On the other end of the
spectrum, in Belize, Ragsdale and Anders’ work on sex workers notes the degree to
which women in many Latin American societies are stigmatized by their form of
employment. They write that women (in Central America) “share a constant fear of
being discovered, which creates very stressful situations when they run into an
acquaintance or a family member near or in their place of work” (1999, 222).
For these and other reasons, today’s sex worker differs from Cuban prostitutes
of the 1950s in that she (and he, in some cases) is generally much better educated and
would often be considered middle class. Many observers have noted that Cuban
prostitutes often engage in their work in a rather ad hoc fashion, seizing opportunity
when it is presented to them (see Rundle 2001 and O’Connell 1996, 40-41). Cuban
sex workers are also distinct in that they are rarely subject to contractual obligations
to third parties (i.e., procurers: pimps), despite government rhetoric that overstates the
presence of organized crime rings. Rather, sex workers are relatively autonomous
opportunists who take advantage of local conditions (O’Connell 1996, 40-41).
Furthermore, evidence suggests that sex workers are often supported in their
decision to perform this work by family members who encourage them to seek out
tourists in an effort to earn hard currency (Paternostro 2000). In some cases, they are
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instructed to seek a marriage proposal from a foreigner in an effort to leave the
country. Once this occurs, the woman who has left the country is expected to send
remittances back to the family and/or attempt to arrange immigration for family
members left in Cuba. It is ironic to note that the construction of sex workers as
simple working women by some family members can lead to an exploitative
relationship wherein the worker becomes, literally, a work horse who supports the
family.
The crackdown on jineterismo of all types dating from 1996 but including
sporadic crackdowns through 2003, must be viewed in the context of government
concern surrounding growing income inequalities. As Locay noted, Cubans with the
least access to dollars, either gained through jineterismo or via remittances from
abroad, are also thought to be the regime’s strongest supporters. Therefore, as the
government cracks down it is likely to be directly punishing its largest cohort of
support by making it yet harder for them to make a living (Locay 1998, 86-87).
Fusco believes that Cuban women see foreign men as replacement providers during a
period when the government has a reduced capacity to provide for them or their
families. She writes,
“From the salsa singers, the cab driver’s quips and the bawdy folk art
renderings of jineteras I encountered around Havana, I got the sense that on
the street these women are perceived as heroic providers whose mythical
sexual power is showing up the failures of an ailing macho regime” (Fusco
1998, 154).
In an effort to combat perceived criminal activity, the Cuban government
amended the penal code to facilitate the prosecution of “profiteers” (translated as
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pimps: proxenetas) who are believed to have enriched themselves unduly through
dealings with international tourists (Pérez-Lopez 1998, 72-74). Since that time, the
regime has frequently cited this law in dealing with suspected jineteros in all lines of
work. Indeed, the 1996 sweep of Varadero was carried out under the auspices of
enforcing the penal code. However, the evidence suggests that the enforcement of the
code is both selective and geographically uneven. For example, while anti-jinetero
crackdowns have occurred in Havana as well as Varadero, there remain pockets of
“vice” in Havana (typically in dollar-denominated discos and nightclubs) whereas
Varadero remained a virtual “police state” in the late 1990s in terms of opportunities
available to the average jinetero. For example, during the summer of 1997, while in
Havana, I frequently utilized (cheaper) private and national “for Cubans only” taxis
rather than the more expensive tourist (turist) taxis even though this practice was
technically against the law for the operators. However, in Varadero it was impossible
to procure anything but a turist taxi; neither national taxi drivers nor private
automobile drivers would even consider picking up tourist fares.

Sex Workers and the Castro Regime in the Special Period

Colin Hall, in his study of sex work in Southeast Asia, noted that authoritarian
governments are often in control during periods when sex tourism is promoted by the
state. He writes, “it is possible that the denial of individual rights by authoritarian
regimes may encourage the perspective that individuals are sexual commodities to be
utilized for advancing the national economic good” (Hall 1995, 68-69). In
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accordance with Hall’s theory, in the early 1990s the Castro regime touted Cuban sex
workers as educated, clean and healthy assets to the country; four years later,
however, the regime had changed its discourse. Since the 1996 crackdowns, the
government has seemingly embraced two discourses at odds with one another. Maria
de los Angeles, an expert on Cuban affairs noted, “What bothers the government now
is not that women are selling themselves. It’s that the business is out of their hands.
The State has been directly involved in promoting sex tourism for years” (de los
Angeles quoted in Fusco 1998, 162). Her point is echoed by Paternostro who writes,
“Castro’s campaign against prostitution is not mainly about higher moral standards; it
is mainly about state control” (Paternostro 2000). In 1996, almost overnight, officials
labeled sex workers (along with other jineteros) as morally deficient exploiters who
engaged in their activities in an effort to feed their consumer desires. About the
increasing demand for sex workers by foreigners, the regime was mute when in fact
the government was promoting sex tourism to foreigners.
It is important to clarify that the Castro regime views sex work through a
different lens than it does other forms of jineterismo. For example, the government
does not view sex workers as potential competitors with the State since the regime
does not maintain brothels or directly arrange sex tours. However, the government
does view other capitalist enterprises such as paladares (both legal and illegal) and
illegal taxis as direct competitors with state-operated restaurants and tourist taxi
services. Indeed, one scholar has studied jineteros in Havana and believes that the
Cuban government and jineteros maintain a symbiotic relationship at one level,
despite overt actions designed to stamp out their activities. She writes,
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“It is difficult to argue that jineterismo currently represents a fully formed and
coherent “resistance culture” capable of challenging the established system,
(since) jineteros are more interested in economic survival than in political
resistance. By directing tourists to hard currency stores and dance clubs, their
behavior is more aptly characterized as collaboration” (Elinson, 1998: 8).
In other words, while jineteros can in some instances compete directly with the
government and their activities in and of themselves go against the grain of socialism
(such as in the illegal rental of rooms to tourists), jineteros can also complement the
government’s efforts to encourage tourist spending in selected establishments. For
example, some jineteros (both sex workers and illegal guides) aid the government by
steering tourists to establishments such as nightclubs, tourist-only dollar stores and
restaurants whose profits go directly into government coffers. This is undoubtedly
one reason why they are tolerated and even seemingly encouraged to operate in some
tourist locations that are out of sight of the average Cuban. Many have suspected that
the government deliberately allowed sex work in touristic zones to prosper as a means
to stimulate growth in tourism (Paternostro 2000; Pope, personal communication,
2000).
From a public relations standpoint, however, the government has taken a hard
line stance against sex workers and other jineteros. In an effort to discredit
jineterismo, the government turned to the (captive) press and the writings and
speeches of Fidel Castro himself. In addition to printing articles critical of sex
workers, the government enlisted commentators to write on the topic. The following
was printed by the Cuba Press in 2000:
“To look at her, crossing the street with her baby in a brand-new pram, you
would think she is lucky, that she has family abroad who can supply enough
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dollars for her to be a “pretty woman” with a “nice baby.” But you would be
wrong. Because Marieta, at 24, had the baby with an old Italian who was a
grandfather when she met him, but who went gaga when the beautiful Cuban
mulatta told him over the phone that she was pregnant. ‘I’m not sure the boy
is his, because at around that time I was also hanging out with a Canadian, a
Spaniard and a German.’ No matter what the kid looked like, she could debit
any one of the four” (Quintero 2000).
The tone of the piece is critical of Marieta’s lifestyle and portrays her as a
promiscuous gold digger who attempts to extract money from a client without proof
of paternity. Reading between the lines, the commentator is also critical of her access
to money that allows her to buy a new pram and dress as a “pretty woman.”
Independent Cuban journalist Hector Peraza penned a poem called the
Romance of the Sad Jinetera (Romance de la Jinetera Triste) in 1996. The following
passage is an excerpt:
Televisor a color
Le regalo a su mama
La grabadora, a su hermano
Un pantalón, al papa
A la abuela, le envió una copa
de crystal de Baccarat

A color television
a gift to her mother
A tape player, for her brother
A pair of pants, for her father
To her grandmother, she sends a crystal
Baccarat goblet

Su familia está contenta
¡Que inteligente es la niña!
piensen todos en la casa
Un giro siempre les llega

Her family is happy
How intelligent she is!
everyone thinks
She always brings them money

“No trabajes tanto, hija,”
le dijo la madre un dia
Ellos creen que labora
en turismo, como guia

“Don’t work so hard,”
Her mother tells her one day
They think she works
in tourism, as a guide

Viente años cumple’ hoy
algo le falta, imagino
a la Linda jovenzuela
Que sera’ lo que no tiene
si de encajes esta llena
si el hambre ya la sacio

She turns twenty years old today
something is missing
thinks the pretty young woman
What could be the matter,
if she is covered in lace,
if her hunger is finally satisfied,
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si muy pronto en un avion
a otras tierras viajara
casada con un señor
que le triplica la edad

if very soon she’ll travel in a plane,
to another land,
married to a man,
three times her age

Peraza illustrates several themes that Cubans often associate with sex workers.
On the one hand, sex workers are believed by critics to engage in their labor to pursue
purely consumerist ends. However, she is also portrayed as a significant monetary
contributor to the family, although in this case she buys them non-essential material
items, just the sort of activity the government frowns upon. Finally, the jinetera
imagines herself married to an aged foreigner and moving to another country in an
effort to satisfy her material needs. Presumably, this ultimately leads to an unhappy
existence.
Fidel Castro has also spoken out on the problems he associates with jineteras
and their lifestyles. Reversing his stance of 1992 when he spoke out in praise of
Cuban sex workers, Castro, “sounding like a hurt father,” proclaimed in 1999,
“A pair of high heels, a luxurious little shoe, a seductive perfume, a new dress
cannot be the price of honor and the sustenance of a nation. It hurts too much
that a country that has done so much to dignify women, that a foreigner can
come to trick her, fill her with vices…to corrupt her” (Castro quoted in
Paternostro 2000).
In the passage quoted above, Castro has shifted the blame from the jinetera to the
foreigner who “tricks” and corrupts her using material rewards as a lure. Vilma Espín
of the FMC called for a battle against prostitution “not only for the dignity of women,
but for the dignity of Cuba” (Espín quoted in Tamayo 1996).
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The Spatial Patterns of Sex Work in Cuba

“A week in Havana, and no jineteras in sight…the women are almost
impossible to find. They’ve abandoned Quinta Avenida, they are gone from
the cobbled streets of Havana Vieja, they’ve vanished from the Malecón and
the Hotel Riviera, which housed their favorite nightclub. Incredibly,
prostitution seems to have disappeared from Cuba” (Paternostro 2000).
When considering the social production of space in post-revolutionary Cuba,
it is important to establish the limited role assumed by private (meaning nongovernment sponsored) “producers” of space in that country. Despite efforts by
average Cubans to carve out private (mainly economic) space in the country in the
form of paladares, snack bars, etc., the overwhelming majority of spatial production
is directed by the strictly maintained policies of the central government. Furthermore,
despite the advent of tourism development in the country that has privileged the role
of foreign investors, the state maintains a strong presence in directing the construction
of the tourism infrastructure. Indeed, while it is theoretically possible for hotels and
other tourism buildings to be 100 percent owned by foreign entities, the government
clearly prefers to enter into 50/50 joint venture agreements as a means to exert control
over spatial production. This policy echoes Hayden’s assertion that “One of the
consistent ways to limit the economic and political rights of groups [in this case the
Cuban populace as a whole] has been to constrain social reproduction by limiting
access to space” (1995, 22). In Cuba, this has been done by reducing the legal
avenues available to earn hard currency through transactions with foreign tourists.
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Ordinary Cubans, however, have attempted to establish what Lefebvre (1991)
referred to as “counterspace,” or private spaces that function either as contested
economic or political space. For example, early in the Special Period, Havana and
Varadero in particular were magnets for sex workers and other jineteros interested in
economic contacts with tourists. In the early 1990s, sex workers were openly visible
in hotel lobbies, nightclubs and restaurants. Some of the more brazen would
proposition customers on the beaches (sometimes in front of wives and girlfriends)
and in the water (Elizade and Pulido 1996). In fact, many trysts occurred in the
ocean. The first wave of crackdowns in 1996 effectively ended this state of affairs.
The expulsion of prostitutes from prominent areas in Varadero occurred almost
overnight, according to sources. In 1996, a local hotel employee stated, “There are
very few jineteras around. The bars and beaches are almost empty” (Tamayo 1996).
According to the opening quote by Paternostro, jineteras were suddenly also difficult
to find in Havana.
While jineteros once again plied their trade in Havana, by 1996 they were then
forced to operate in a much more inconspicuous manner (Elinson 1999). While it has
never been legal for sex workers to accompany tourists into their hotel rooms during
the Special Period, lax enforcement and corruption made it possible for sex workers
to circumvent this policy.61 The regime also does not allow brothels (sanctioned or
non-sanctioned) to operate in the country. The result is that the government has
limited the space available for Cuban sex workers to operate and to conduct their
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Some sex workers are able to circumvent these prohibitions since managers and security staff at
Cuban hotels are believed to take bribes to allow Cubans into the hotel rooms of foreign visitors (Ana,
personal communication, 1997).
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business. As was noted above, some acts of jineterismo, including solicitation by sex
workers, are increasingly performed in semi-public spaces such as discos, nightclubs,
and beaches. These tourism spaces are considered semi-public in that they are not
considered “Cuban space,” because they are off-limits to the average Cuban. The
spaces are maintained in an effort to earn hard currency from tourists. The fact that
many jineteros are able to gain entrance into such establishments suggests that the
government has allowed some activity to continue, and in some spaces and at some
times actually facilitated it.
The effort of the Castro regime to isolate sex workers in discos and nightclubs
meant for foreign tourists appears to be a means to remove them as visual reminders
of income inequality to the Cuban population at large while allowing these same
practices with the potential to alleviate inequality to continue. Pope interviewed
police officers in December 1999 who verified that a new policy was then established
in Havana to arrest sex workers who operated out in the open. The officer noted that
the policy ran concurrently with efforts to move nightclubs popular with tourists to
the Havana suburbs in order to “officially” curtail prostitution in the major tourist
zones in Old Havana and along the Malecón waterfront (Pope, personal
communication, 2000). This allows the regime to criticize the practice in public
while allowing sex workers and other jineteros to have out-of-the-way spaces in
which to operate, although the practice is still technically illegal. Indeed, according
to one source, the state is an active participant in the provision of sex work and has
co-opted the role of tout in that a form of “steering” now occurs that entices
foreigners to spend money in Cuba’s clubs thereby creating “an underworld of
199

consumption in a society that demands socialism or death” (Paternostro 2000). In this
fashion, sex work has moved from the overtly public spaces of beaches and street
corners to the semi-private spaces in Cuba where only tourists are legally allowed to
venture.
Part and parcel of Castro’s sex work spatial plan was to relocate back to their
rural villages girls who were assumed to be sex workers because they were operating
in public but could not prove they were originally from Havana or Varadero. Repeat
offenders were subject to rehabilitation camps such as a center that opened in 1998 in
Valle Grande near Havana (Rice 1999). According to Rice, a processing center for
sex workers in Havana dealt with 6,714 women in 1998 alone. Fifty-nine percent of
those processed were from the provinces and were forced to return home (Rice 1999).
However, as Paternosto (2000) notes, most find their way back to the capital since
only limited opportunities exist in their home regions. It is worth noting that on April
22, 1997, Castro signed Decree Law 217 that created internal migration regulations
for Havana out of an espoused interest in public health and public order concerns. By
late April, the government announced that 1,600 people had been returned to their
home provinces “using persuasive methods” (Decree 1999).

Some Final Thoughts on Sex Work in Cuba

From the previous discussion, I have attempted to show how sex work in
Cuba today is in many ways different from that of the pre-revolutionary period. As
one source notes, “There is a big difference in the prostitutes [of the 1950s] and the
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prostitutes now. They are different in their quality. Women are called jineteras,
because it is she [sic] who dominates the animal” (FMC official quoted in Paternostro
2000). What this official meant is that sex workers during the Special Period are
often highly educated and healthy and often choose to engage in activities with
tourists in ad hoc fashion (Paternostro 2000). Furthermore, pimp-run brothels do not
exist in Castro’s Cuba and for that reason sex workers of today are more autonomous
than sex workers of the 1950s.
In choosing to compare sex work during these two distinct periods, I am in no
way suggesting that prostitution was completely eradicated between 1959 and the
onset of the Special Period. In fact, as discussed earlier, during the 1970s and 80s,
sex workers were reportedly available to foreign tourists (mainly from the Soviet bloc
countries but also Western Europe, Latin America and Canada) and were well-placed
near major hotels. According to one source, many sex workers operated with the
expressed consent of the government and were reportedly employed by the Ministry
of the Interior (MININT) to inform on the movements and activities of their clients.
Furthermore, Cuban men (particularly those in the Party elite) were said, as well, to
have access to sex workers (Fusco 1998, 153).
An interesting aspect of jineterismo throughout the Special Period is that
tourism space has proved an area where mulattas and Afro-Cuban women have often
been more successful than their white counterparts. This is because North American
and European sex tourists deliberately seek them out as the exotic Caribbean “Other.”
Sex tourism, then, represents an arena where race and gender intersect. Fernández
(1999) has noted the entanglement of race and gender within the popular perceptions
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of sex work in Cuba. While some observers believe that Afro-Cuban women
predominate as sex workers in the country, Fernández correctly notes the degree to
which race is socially constructed in Cuban (and, indeed, Caribbean) society. She
writes, “Black, mulatto and white are not self-evident categories as much as they are
negotiable and malleable identities constructed in social interaction” (1999, 87). For
this reason, she believes that while the possession of money can in some regards
“whiten” one in Cuban society, socially questionable activities such as sex work can
conversely “darken” (Fernandez 1999, 87). Fusco supports this assertion by noting,
“To engage in sex work practically means to assume mulatta identity by association”
(1998, 155).
The earning potential for mulatta and Afro-Cuban sex workers has, in some
situations, mitigated disparities in income between the white and black populations.
Given that sex workers are able to earn in one night what the highest paid Cuban
professionals earn in one month, they have often been expected to support extended
families. In many ways, they represent the Cuban equivalent of the Philippines “New
Heroes,” women who work in the sex industry and in the “maid trade” with the
implicit support of both their families and the regime. Indeed, some Cubans actively
encourage their daughters to engage in sex work, a point noted by Herrera of the
Afro-Cuban women’s organization known as MAGIN. She mentioned the case of a
mother who was a member of the party who encouraged her daughter to bring back
money so they could go to the dollar stores (Herrera 2000, 124). In fact, Herrera
notes that she has older friends who say that if they were twenty years younger and
attractive, they too would go out to the streets. However, she expresses a cautionary
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note, “For a young, intelligent woman to go out and give her body to bring food home
for her family and for herself, she has to have very high self-esteem, she has to be
very sure of what her values are and what she’s going after” (Herrera 2000, 124).
Evidence shows, however, that police target mulattas and Afro-Cuban
jineteros at a higher rate than their white counterparts. For example, I, myself,
observed an unusual number of darker-skinned Cubans being questioned by the
police in Varadero in 1997 while white Cubans were allowed to pass by without
incident. Elinson found that white jineteros find it easier to approach tourists and
have fewer problems with the police than their darker skinned counterparts (1999, 2).
Fusco notes that when Cuban men or women who are considered part of the elite
engage in jineterismo, “everyone looks the other way.” However,
“The fact that black and mulatta jineteras are succeeding in marrying
Europeans at an unusually high rate also makes these women the objects of
envy (in the country). The more affluent, and mostly white sectors of the
female population often resort to moralizing rhetoric as a mask for their
resentment” (Fusco 1998, 160).
Jineterismo has changed not only the geographic spaces and discourse of the Special
Period, but those spaces associated with race and gender, as well. Unfortunately, my
research indicates that this unequal access to space has sexist and racist overtones.
The following chapter continues on this theme and examines representations of
women and Afro-Cubans in the tourist literature.

203

CHAPTER SIX
Representations of Race and Gender: The Social Construction of
Tourism Space through Brochures and Guidebooks

This section draws from the previous chapter but shifts the focus to the
dominant government discourse as it relates to representations of race and gender
associated with the tourism industry. After placing the research in its theoretical
context, I explain the results of a survey on tourism literature and the representations
of race and gender highlighted from that analysis. In an effort to more fully examine
representations of race and gender, I conducted a quantitative and qualitative analysis
of tourism literature produced both in Cuba and in North America for an audience of
international tourists. I surveyed three categories of publications, including
brochures, guides and magazines.
The purpose of this section is to focus critically on the use of images in the
marketing of Cuba as a tourist locale by highlighting the discourses of gender and
race promoted by the literature and to examine how Cuba’s tourist gaze is influenced
by the production of tourism space during the Castro period. The inclusion of
literature on Cuba from both Cuban and foreign sources highlights several issues
regarding representation. First of all, representation of gender and race is a key
component within the ideas of social constructionism and cultural hegemony and
raises the question as to who has the “socio-spatial” power to represent? (Pulsipher
1997, 285). Secondly, Castro has embraced an international tourism model that
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embodies ideas anti-thetical to revolutionary precepts. Therefore, Cuba embraces not
only the tourism model developed in, and diffused from, capitalist countries, but
publishes and distributes materials with image themes that mirror those in the foreignproduced media. I discuss the findings of my analysis after I first establish the
theoretical basis and explain the importance of the image as a tool for academic
research.

“Representation” in the Tourism Literature

According to Dave Cooper, who did his work in Southeast Asia, tourism
images “are not just reflections of the world as it appears, but [are] socially
constructed and meaningful representations…they act as metaphors, symbols or
devices that refer to meanings and understandings outside the frame” (1994, 145).
This point is echoed by Morgan and Pritchard who write, “Images are the currency of
cultures, reflecting and thereby reinforcing particular shared meanings and beliefs and
particular value systems” (1998, 3). Pictorial images can carry multiple meanings
and their interpretation necessarily involves not only aesthetic but political judgments
on the part of the observer (see Jackson 1992, 89 and Cooper 1994, 145). Images are
imbued with relationships of power that can at times be hidden from the casual
observer, just as power relationships can remain opaque in other forms of
representation. Jackson (1992) writes, “For any claim by one group to ‘represent’
another is itself a form of power, exercised over subordinate groups by those more
powerful than themselves” (1992, 89). He cites as an example Said’s promulgation
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of Orientalism (1978) that demonstrates the degree to which representations of other
cultures more accurately reflect “domestic concerns” rather than a clear portrait of
those they claim to represent. Said presents the European take on Asian people and
suggests that a discourse developed out of the practices of colonialism that positioned
the ‘Orient,’ and former colonies more generally, as culturally, economically and
politically subordinate and inferior to Europe (Jackson 1989, 89). The result is the
predominant viewpoint that the developed West is superior to backward and therefore
dependent non-Western cultures. This is accomplished, in part, by the imposition of
Western science and Western classifications on other places, in essence, the West
defines the East, turning it into an object to be dissected by both Western science and
academic research in general (Said as paraphrased in Coffay 2001).
Urry (2002) introduced the concept of “tourist gaze” to refer to a socially
organized and systemized production that enables the tourist to “gaze upon or view a
set of different scenes, or landscapes and townscapes that are out of the ordinary”
(2002, 1). The gaze as described by Urry is one-way, with an active subject, and a
passive object that allows the observer to define and thereby “contain” the object.
This attempt at containment has found voice in popular culture, which has served to
both “museumize” cultures deemed inferior to the West, as well as to reinforce
colonial attitudes of race and gender. For example, as Lutz and Collins (1993) have
noted, National Geographic articles and exhibits tend to concentrate the Western gaze
on more “primitive” cultures and this tendency has, in effect, “served to naturalize
and legitimate racial and gender hierarchies” (Quoted in Coffay 2001).
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Part and parcel of this colonial discourse is the development of a form of
“academic” gaze, or the employment of ascendant voyeuristic methods to observe and
study the Other (read here to mean the colonized, women, and those of races different
from that of the observer) in the guise of scientific discovery (Crang 1997, 362). The
underlying message or “gaze” influenced by today’s travel literature has not changed
substantially from colonial-era representations of “exotic” locales. Derek Gregory
examined tourism in Egypt during the 19th century and in so doing underscored Said’s
contention that travel writing in particular stressed the cultural superiority of Europe.
He notes that travel writers “construct Egypt as a transparent space, exposed to the
gaze of the observer who had the power – and the duty – to sweep aside the mask or,
in a visible sexualized project of ‘dis-covery,’ to remove the veil” (Gregory 1999,
115).

Duncan and Gregory continue in this vein and note that travel writing serves

as “an act of translation that constantly works to produce a tense ‘space in-between’”
(1999, 4). Therefore, travel writers “’translate’ one place into another” and can in the
process lose and even transform symbolic meaning (Ibid.). Indeed, travel guides
often serve as a ‘cognitive map’ for tourists, telling them not only what to see, but
how to interpret things they actually do see (Coffay 2001).
Studies by Dean MacCannell (1992) and Mike Crang (1997) dispute the idea
that the tourist gaze necessarily flows from the tourist’s position of advantage to the
detriment of objectified subjects or Others. Rather, they note that the gaze can flow
in both directions thereby allowing the tourist subjects space to develop or control
their own power of representation. MacCannell provides the example of groups of
Native Americans in the western United States who, upon the arrival of a car full of
207

tourists, routinely interrupt their own lively conversation and laughter to play act the
role of the downtrodden, drunk or depressed “Indian,” only to resume their laughter
and conversation once the tourists depart (1999, 141). Crang writes, “The idea of a
single touristic gaze becomes disaggregated through the embedding of picturing
practices in social relations” (1997, 367). He notes that many former subjects such as
the Kayapo in Brazil have adopted video cameras in an effort to control their own
representational power (1997, 369). One of the notable by-products, he observes, is
that the images produced by the group have been used by the western media to
represent the Brazilian rainforest (1997, 369).
It must be noted, however, that the Kayapo example represents an exception
in the literature. Most researchers highlight the one-way aspect of the tourist gaze.
Indeed, Crick, in his analysis of representations of international tourism, has
assembled a wide array of studies by academics and other observers that confirm the
gaze as flowing from the tourist to the object. He noted that tourism commentators,
from Mark Twain to Claude Levi-Strauss, frequently utilized terms such as “barbaric”
and “blasphemous” to describe modern middle class travelers (Crick 1989, 307-308).
In short, the tourist “gazer” has been generally criticized by observers for myriad
perceived shortcomings. Many have focused on the role of the tourism literature in
proliferating and reinforcing the tourist gaze.
Like travel writing, images developed to sell tourism and aid tourists over the
course of their travels perform the function of reinforcing the power relations that
underpin the gaze. The gaze reflected in these images frequently conforms to the
desires and world-views of tourists and potential tourists (through the “brokerage” of
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tourism providers and marketers), most of whom (in the case of Cuba and most other
Caribbean destinations) hail from Europe and North America. Therefore, what is
portrayed for the consumption of these developed world guests is often refracted
through the lens of lingering colonial mindsets and indeed serves to reinforce many
misconceptions of developing world tourism regions through the typical imaging of a
“romantic” or idyllic tropical paradise. The end result is often the portrayal of
women and darker skinned citizens in ways that run the gamut from simple
misrepresentation to patently false, fantastical illusion.

The Image as a Tool for Scholarship

While scholarly attention to tourism literature was rather limited in the past,
recent critical tourism scholarship substantiates the significance of tourism writings
and images as research tools. One of the first studies to explore and critique the
tourist image in-depth was Boorstin’s aptly titled article, The Image (1962, 77-117).
The author was critical of what he believed was the “replacement” of the “genuine art
of travel” with prepackaged spectacles and pseudo-events (Boorstin 1962, 106;
Sternberg 1997, 954). Boorstin believed that representations by tourism marketers
were partially to blame for (falsely) developing expectations of “authentic” tourist
experiences in foreign locations. For example, through sustained tourism marketing,
visitors to Hawaii have been instructed that the hula dance presented by natives is an
authentic slice of native Hawaiian culture. Over time, the hula dance has become a
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pseudo symbol or signifier of Hawaiian culture and therefore a crucial (but erroneous)
element of the typical tourist’s impression of indigenous life in the islands.
Britton (1979) built on Boorstin’s work with his study that was concerned
with the content and implications of images in the developing world (Third World in
his parlance.) He was mainly interested in how and for what purpose tourist locations
in the developing world were portrayed (represented) by the tourism industry. He
cites architect Clare Gunn who contended that images of tourist locations evolve in
two ways: organic and induced (Britton 1979, 320). Organic images are those
stemming from non-tourism communications such as news reports, television or
cinematic representations or word-of-mouth accounts from acquaintances. Induced
images, by contrast, are those that derive from a deliberate effort of promotion,
advertising and publicity (Britton 1979, 320). Britton believes that in the promotion
of developing world countries, induced images tend to be more prominent given the
under-representation of the developing world in the Western media and because
organic information might continue to exhibit tinges of the place during its particular
colonial period (Britton 1979, 320).
While this study certainly considers the role of organic images, the following
section will concentrate on induced tourism images. Namely, aside from particular
news events such as the widely reported Elian González custody case of 2000 or other
news detailing political tensions, Cuba receives very little positive promotion (or,
indeed exposure) in the developed world media, particularly in the United States. In
light of this fact, Cuba has established a multi-pronged infrastructure to concentrate
on promoting Cuba’s tourism product through producing induced images (this point
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was developed in Chapter Five). Additionally, the island depends on promotion by
agents in the tourist’s country of origin, hence inclusion in this study of Canadian
examples. Some observers have noted a disparity between how Cuba promotes itself
as a tourist destination and how the country is promoted by European agents. For
example, Fusco has noted that Cuba is often promoted in Europe, by European
agencies as a prominent sex tourism destination, an implication largely missing from
the Cuban produced tourism literature examined in this study (1998, 152).
Britton also identified several predominant themes found in the tourism
literature that described developing-world locations (1979, 321-322). One nearly
ubiquitous theme is that poor countries are not represented as “real places”; rather,
representations amplify the exotic nature of the destination. In order to accomplish
this feat, advertisers favor pastoral images over industrial and urban images.
Additionally, they often include text that focuses on the pre-modern conditions
present in the destination, conditions that correspond to a supposed by-gone era free
from stress and the bothersome by-products of the industrial revolution.
Paradoxically, tourism copy also highlights modern conveniences in an effort to
assure travelers that they will be safe and comfortable. In a perhaps ironic note, when
the exotic is perceived as perhaps too uncomfortable, foreignness can be minimized
through creative representation. Britton offers this example to illustrate the point:
“Government of India ads are headlined, ‘India: The most foreign country you can
visit…speaks your language’” (1979, 322). Other examples of tourism copy that
underline this point include: “To allay fears about service” Thai International Airlines
cabin crews are portrayed with distinct Caucasian-featured faces by advertisement
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artists who soften the Asian features of the personnel portrayed in tourism
advertisements. A German-owned hotel in St. Lucia declares “To maintain our
impeccable credentials, we have thoroughly trained the local staff…and brought in
our top personnel from Europe to assume key positions in the hotel.” (Britton 1979,
322).
The minimization of foreignness is also upheld via selective omission,
whereby references to the “real” or “authentic” place where tourism takes place are
missing. Advertisements often include images of casinos, hotels, cocktails and
“beautiful people” (both tourists and exotic locals), but very rarely show the real
features of the place where tourism happens or occurs (Britton 1979, 322). Not
surprisingly, many observers have highlighted the prevalence of sexual themes in
travel advertising (see Britton 1979; Morgan & Pritchard 1999, 187-205). Advertisers
and guides often portray locals as exotic and submissive “Others” rather than ordinary
people with everyday lives.
The images produced during the 1990s in Cuba, as well as the preRevolutionary themes, affirm many of the above assertions. For my analysis, I
focused on the Special Period and therefore I did not include images from before
1990. I did, however, peruse samples from guides and magazines that were produced
during the 1960s and 1970s (by both Cuban and foreign sources). The literature from
the pre-Special Period is a decided departure from current publications since it is
focused more intently on the socialist nature of the country and includes ample text
and photographs detailing the industrial and agricultural accomplishments of the
Revolution. This is particularly evident in material produced by Soviet bloc
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publishers that include several travelogues (see for example Burchard 1967) and the
black and white photos used in Russian and Polish guides. A few Western European
examples such as Cloës colorful French language guide for Cuba (1968) also depict
social features. The literature from the 1960s and 70s also devotes more space to
documenting Castro’s preeminence in Cuba and particularly focuses on his formative
years prior to the 1959 victory, themes mostly absent from the literature produced
during the Special Period.
It must also be noted here, however, that one study designed from a feminist
perspective by Marshment, a practitioner of cultural studies, contradicts Britton’s
(and other’s) assumptions that tourist images of women are necessarily sexual in
nature. She writes,
“There is no shortage of images of women in this material, nor of swimsuits,
but the regimes of representation within which they appear are structured to
produce a range of meanings around gender and holidays that are not
necessarily sexual, nor which articulate the sexuality of women to other
discourses” (Marshment 1997, 16).
In an important distinction, Marshment establishes that the ubiquitous “woman in a
swimsuit” functions as a signifier of a beach holiday rather than a part of the holiday
package (1997, 20). In her view, the woman of the image is not promising sex, per
se, but rather is suggestive of a leisured lifestyle or luxurious idleness. In this way,
she functions in much the same way as an image of a beach, a palm tree or other
tropical representation; objectified, but not necessarily sexualized. This point will be
explored in greater detail vis-à-vis Cuban images in the discussion section below.
As Britton also noted, another key characteristic of tourist brochures and
guides is the promotion of the region as “safe” for tourist traffic. The destination may
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advertise the country as exotic and out-of-the-ordinary, but it must convey the idea
that no harm will come to the tourist participant (Britton 1979, 321). Images are a
convenient means to promote safety through the use of familiar “signs” (such as
inviting sand beaches and palm trees) along with non-threatening locals who are
portrayed as rather more eager to serve than to harm tourists. The Caucasoid features
of Asian flight crews are an added example of a means to promote a mixed message
highlighting the exotic and the safe in a single image. While Cuban images also
focus on white tourists and Cuban tourism workers alike, Cuban-produced literature
additionally highlights the island’s self-proclaimed low violent crime rates as a point
of safety. In this context, Cuba’s tradition of strong social controls (for which it is
often severely criticized) is portrayed in a positive light.
Since Britton’s study of 1979, several recent works, including many by
geographers, have focused on the tourist image as a valuable research tool. Dave
Cooper drew from tourism brochures and postcards to study their differing roles
within the tourism industry. While brochures are developed to sell a location to a
prospective tourist, postcards, “confirm the tourist’s attendance in the presence of the
Other by certifying the validity of the experience” (1994, 144). He continues, “the
different stages of the tourism path are marked by images that manipulate, codify and
confirm prior expectations of the travel experience” (Britton 1994, 144). Further,
travel photographs are not just reflections of the world as it appears, but are socially
constructed and meaningful representations that when read “metonymically” are
perceived as signs, recording the traces of concrete phenomena and presenting them
as an objective representation (1994, 145). Cooper drew from two methodologies in
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his interpretation and analysis of photographic imagery. First, he sought to interpret
what he referred to as the “concrete phenomena” of the picture’s content. This would
include an analysis that would deal with, for example, the number of people pictured,
their age and gender, mode of dress, type of activity performed and whether their
activities were staged or “natural.” The second form of interpretation, however, deals
with the image as a whole in relation to the accompanying written narrative (1994,
145). He argues that the use of both categories of interpretation allows the researcher
a greater opportunity to contextualize and decipher the embedded codes within the
image and text.
Laffey produced a Master’s thesis that focused on predominant images and
themes of tourism literature as it applied to the Caribbean island of Montserrat. She
notes the suitability of using tourist images as a research tool thusly:
“As telling as…verbal references may be, visual representations most clearly
reveal tourism literature’s construction of (race) relations. With greater
subtlety than words, pictures can, with a deceiving sense of transparency,
represent the roles, characteristics, and power relations that Euro-Americans
associate with people of different races” (1995, 41).
Her analysis revealed the ways in which “touristic representations of Montserrat
reflect Euro-American class distinctions, understandings of racial and ethnic
difference, and desires for ‘authentic’ or unmediated experiences” (1995, 2). Laffey
based her study on fifty-six pieces of tourism literature that included a mix of
brochures, magazine articles, tour guides and maps. She found that tourist literature
produced for the Montserratian industry was “forged out of the cultural
understandings and desires of Euro-American tourists” (1995, 64). Furthermore, she
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found that tourism literature reflected and indeed propagated Euro-American
constructions of social inequality vis-à-vis their dealings with former colonies (Laffey
1995, 64).
According to Laffey, a key aspect of the production of the tourist brochure in
Montserrat is the idea of “racism by omission.” In other words, she found that the
island’s black populace was missing as a key element in the ethnicity on the island.
Instead, blacks were often referred to as the “Black Irish,” an apparent attempt to
construct them as descendents of the island’s Irish past who somehow maintain Irish
traditions (Laffey 1995, 35-37).62 Outside of the Black Irish representations, Laffey
noted a dearth of information regarding the black population on the island. (As will
be discussed shortly, my findings of Afro-Cuban representations in Cuba also point to
a policy of obscuring the role of blacks in Cuban society). Furthermore, she writes,
“picturing Montserratians performing ‘traditional’ activities, while failing to depict
them in the ‘modern’ activities that occupy most of their lives, clearly reveals tourism
literature’s interest in constructing the island’s black population as ‘simple’ and
‘backward’”(1995, 44).
Pattullo found that images worked in tandem with encounters tourists had
with locals such as beach boys, waiters and even female sex workers. Since there are
no representations of “ordinary” people in the tourism literature, tourists arrive and
come away with a truncated view of the local society. As Pattullo writes, “Tourists
only meet beach boys, therefore the idea of a Barbadian man is restricted to that
image” (1996, 87). Morgan and Pritchard echoed Pattullo’s findings and noted the
62

Scholars have found little evidence to conclusively show that Irish culture survives on Montserrat
(Lydia Pulsipher, personal communication, 2003).
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strong element of stereotyping that occurs in the production of tourist images. As
they suggest, most images are the result of what amount to cliches that correspond to
the commonsense, everyday articulations of the dominant ideology (1998, 176).
Canadian geographer Robert Dilley conducted a study using content analysis
of twenty-one tourist brochures designed for Canadian tourists that detailed
international destinations. Dilley’s findings underline the importance of considering
the audience of a particular item of tourism literature. For example, he notes that in
his samples relatively few of the brochures contained scenes of coastal locations in
Europe, since his past research indicates that Europeans (and the British in particular)
tend to favor vacations in coastal areas. He believes that the North Americans, the
particular audience for the brochures he examined, are less concerned with the coastal
attractions in Europe since they have access to Caribbean and Pacific beaches (1986,
62). This point is important to consider because this study will review literature
produced both in Cuba by Cuban authorities as well as in Canada by Canadian tour
operators.
Graham Dann, a British sociologist, developed his work on tourist brochures
to advance study on “semiotic ethnography” of tourist literature. Dann drew from
several previous studies including Albers and James (1988), and was interested in
how tourists and locals were portrayed in British produced tourist brochures for
eleven popular overseas destinations. He noted that the distinct advantage to
research of tourism literature was that it was unobtrusive and did not modify the
behavior of respondents (1996, 62). Operationally, Dann developed a method that
mixed both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Drawing from images depicted in
217

5,172 tourism photographs, he constructed a matrix that compared the frequency that
tourists and locals were depicted in tourist images (as opposed to scenes devoid of
people). He found that 24.3 percent of the photographs depicted no people whereas
60.1 percent portrayed tourists only, 6.7 percent depicted locals only, and 8.9 percent
showed tourists and locals. Dann then conducted a qualitative analysis in an attempt
to contextualize and explain his findings. He concluded that most indigenous people
were featured as ancillary hotel staff, vendors or entertainers. He writes,
“understanding the people of tourism is thus, above all else, an analysis of images”
(1996, 79).

Framing the Analysis

My analysis of tourism literature includes samples produced in Cuba, North
America and Europe that were designed for the gaze of international tourists. My data
set stretches from 1990 (the beginning of the Special Period) to 2000 and includes
samples of tourism brochures, magazines and guidebooks produced during Cuba’s
ten-year tourism explosion. I sampled 1220 photographs in which people are
depicted (see Appendix 1 for a complete list of tourism literature). Cuban companies
employ images produced in the country, although there are two cases where Cuban
produced-literature was edited in Cuba, but published in abroad: Viajeros Cuba
magazine published in Spain, and Cubanacan 94-95 brochure published in Canada.
Despite the origin of the publications, there is a remarkable similarity in overall
content and the material portrayed was typical of the average Caribbean tourist
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destination, although the overall presentation was of decidedly lower quality in most
of the Cuban-produced literature. The Canadian brochures exhibited higher quality
production standards, but the themes were largely similar in terms of how the editors
represent race and gender. I will address this issue in more detail in the discussion
section below.
Lutz and Collins, in their analysis of photographs in National Geographic
magazines, noted that it might appear counterproductive to “reduce the rich material”
of a photograph into categories that are quantified in a coded matrix (1993, 89).
However, this process allows the researcher to uncover patterns that may not appear
evident from a casual observation of the images. Furthermore, the establishment of
distinct categories of analysis beforehand protects the researcher from a subconscious
search for only those photographs that confirm one’s initial sense of what the images
portray (Lutz and Collins 1993, 89). The examination and coding of every
photograph in a particular publication further guards against the tendency to “Cherry
pick” only photographs that confirm the research hypothesis. I chose to focus on
brochures, magazines and guides in an effort to achieve the greatest breadth of
analysis since these publications typically employ a significant number of
photographs. Each of these materials performs a different function within the overall
tourism scheme. The tourism industry employs brochures in a direct attempt to sell
their “product” to consumers, most of whom possess a limited knowledge of the
prospective destinations. Carefully constructed brochures using “representative”
photographs of the location in question are thought by many observers to be one of
the most significant factors in “reaching” or enticing potential tourists (Cooper
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1994,144; Dann 1996, 62). In this study, I examined 24 brochures produced in Cuba
for international travelers and six produced by Canadian travel agencies for a
distinctly Canadian audience.
In contrast to brochures, the tourism magazines examined in this study are
produced in Cuba for tourists already present in the country, with the exception of
Viajeros Cuba, which is edited in Cuba but published and distributed in Spain. While
using many of the same collection of photographs for promotion (they are oftentimes
identical) that are found in Cuban-produced brochures, magazines also produce
feature stories that highlight Cuban citizens, most of whom are employed in the
tourist sector. Prisma, one of the Cuban tourist magazines used in this study, focuses
mainly on tourism managers, Chefs and bartenders who serve to promote Cuban
specialties that “define” the tourism experience in the country. For example, a feature
found in all Prismas sampled called “Nuestro Chef” (Our Chef) spotlights a different
Chef each month who prepares such Cuban “specialties” as “Pollo al Aljibe” (Aljibe
Chicken), that according to the featured Chef is made from secret ingredients.
It must be noted that the government could have produced an alternative
discourse that focused on “real” Cubans, such as Afro-Cuban doctors and female
engineers, and thus highlight the successes of the Revolution. But such a depiction
would have required and potentially led to greater contact between tourists and
Cubans. The government did not choose this course of action because the control of
tourism was deemed more important than showcasing Cuba’s successes. The end
result is that most Cuban people do not benefit directly from tourism, a state of affairs
that allows the government to maintain its hegemonic control.
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Tourism guidebooks occupy a different niche from brochures and magazines.
Indeed, half of the guidebooks I sampled were published in the United States and
were prepared for an American audience. Insight Guide: Cuba is published in the
U.K., but is widely available in U.S. bookstores. Both the Guia de Varadero,
published in Spanish by an Italian company, and Varadero: Guia Turistica, a multilingual guide published in Cuba, are widely available in tourism shops throughout the
country. Overall, the guidebooks offer a more in-depth look at Cuba and include
discussion on a wider range of issues than the brochures and magazines. Guidebook
photos, therefore, more closely mirror the material and include attempts to portray
significant themes in the wider culture deemed of interest to tourists. Further, as
Bhattacharyya notes, the guidebook plays a distinctive role in the tourist experience
because it serves to mediate the relationship between the tourist and the host by
providing a cognitive framework for interpreting what one perceives in a new
location (1997, 372).63 In other words, it helps to inform (or reinforce) the tourist
gaze.
My purpose in this section is to draw from Bhattacharyya’s (1997), and
Dann’s (1996) methodologies in particular as a point of departure in my examination
of Cuban tourist brochures and other literature. Both authors developed matrices to
conduct content analyses of select tourism literature. Bhattacharyya analyzed the
guidebook, Lonely Planet: India, which she regards as the most popular guidebook
for that country, in an effort to discern ways in which the indigenous population is
portrayed. Her matrix was constructed to focus on portrayals of native Indians as
63

Brochures and tourist maps also mediate but perhaps less immediately and less accurately.
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they relate to tourists. She found that “Indians are present in the text either as
middlemen providing tourism services or as objects of tourist sightseeing interest”
(1997, 371). The guidebook, therefore, was an important instrument for reinforcing
images of India and privileging tourist desires in their relationships with indigenous
inhabitants (Ibid.).

Establishing the Matrix

In an effort to focus on ways in which Cubans are portrayed in the tourism
literature I developed a coded matrix that concentrated on Cuban actors rather than
the foreign tourists portrayed. The actions of tourists were not considered because
they were not the objects of analysis; however, tourists were included in the count
data to see how many times they were portrayed in comparison with Cubans. I also
wanted to see how the results from the Cuban literature would compare to
Bhattacharyya’s and Dann’s findings that locals are most often portrayed in activities
that place them in subservient positions in relation to foreign tourists and as objects of
the tourist gaze. The y-axis of the matrix included categories that depicted the actions
performed by the actors in the photos only if they were considered to be “locals” (i.e.,
Cubans posing as international tourists) or Cubans. I was not concerned about the
actions of foreign tourists and therefore I simply counted them in that singular
category. I counted (foreign) tourists and local Cubans pictured together as “locals
and tourists” only in instances when the Cuban actors could not be counted in any
category listed in the y-axis. Cubans were keyed into categories based on two general
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criteria: my interpretation of the principle action performed (such as entertainer or
tourism worker), or the symbolic quality (such as exotic or sexualized) I perceived the
image was attempting to portray (see Table 5 below).
Because my study is concerned with representations of race and gender in
Cuban tourism literature, the categories on the x-axis were keyed to those
constructions. The categories I utilized included: 1) black or mulatto male, 2) black
or mulatta female, 3) white male, 4) white female, 5) racially mixed males, 6) racially
mixed females, 7) gender mix, racially black or mulatto, 8) gender mix, racially
white, and 9) racially mixed males and females.

Table 5: Master Matrix
Master Matrix
Tourists
Locals and Tourists
Children
Exotic (sexualized)
Entertainer
Heroes
Idlers/Posed
Laborer (common)
Miscellany
Private Enterprise
Rafters
Revolutionary
Shoppers
Sports
Transportation
Tourism Worker
Locals as Tourists
Totals

B/M
male
1
0
7
4
25
0
6
5
7
2
0
0
1
4
3
5
0
70

Race
B/M White White mix
female male female male
0
0
0
22
11
0
5
0
3
0
0
1
2
1
2
3
0
50

32
0
3
4
19
19
7
23
18
7
2
1
4
14
21
83
14
271

22
0
7
49
14
0
3
3
7
3
0
0
4
1
1
42
18
174

Race
Gender Gender Race
mix
mix
mix
mix
female White B/M
M/F
0
2
1
0
6
0
3
6
4
0
1
4
0
3
2
2
0
34

1
0
2
3
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
9

168
13
5
6
13
0
1
0
19
1
0
0
1
2
10
10
235
484

1
0
0
10
5
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
20

Totals
1
9
16
4
12
0
3
1
13
0
0
4
2
2
8
7
26
108

226
24
41
102
107
19
30
38
71
13
3
10
14
27
48
152
295
1220
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Predictably, the vast majority of people portrayed in the literature were either
depicted in typical “tourist” scenes that covered the wide range of conceivable leisure
activities to be experienced in Cuba, or were engaged in activities that reflected,
presumably, editorial judgements of what interested the typical tourist. In instances
where the action portrayed, or the actors involved, could have easily represented more
than one category, I chose the category that I believed was the central focus of the
photograph. Often, I deferred to the accompanying text in making decisions on how
to categorize the photographs. In an effort to maintain consistency throughout the
analysis, each photo was only tallied once in the matrix, despite the potential for
multiple categorization and interpretation. For example, a photo that included a
Cuban tourism worker dispensing information to a group of tourists was counted
under the category “tourism worker,” rather than “tourists.” Only those photographs
that depicted tourists at leisure without accompanying Cuban actors were counted in
the matrix as “tourists.” This policy was pursued in an effort to focus on the
representations of Cubans in the tourism industry, rather than give overemphasis to
the role of tourists in photographs.
While a few of the categories on the y-axis of the Master list in Table 5 are
self-explanatory, several require more detailed explanation. To begin, I used the code
“Exotic (sexualized)” when actors were portrayed in situations that focused on their
construction as an attractive or “available” Other. This would include people in
colorful “native” dress, people suggestively dressed or posed, or people engaged in
activities outside the norm of the average tourist (such as those portraying
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santeríarituals). I used the category “Entertainers” to refer to those who were
specifically engaged in a performance for a tourist audience. Most of the entertainers
were musicians and several were dancers. In instances where I believed the image
was produced to focus on the exotic or sexualized nature of musicians or dancers, I
tallied the results under the exotic category. I pursued this policy out of an interest in
consistency: for example, santería practitioners are often employed as tourist
entertainment, but they are usually portrayed in a manner that suggests and accents
their Otherness. Interestingly, the number of times Cubans were portrayed as exotic
and sexualized was similar among the three media: 8.6 percent of images in
guidebooks, 6.6 percent in brochures and 9.7 percent in magazines. However, those
portrayed as entertainers were more evident in the magazines (20 percent) as opposed
to the guidebooks (7.1 percent) and the brochures (5.9 percent). One reason for the
skewed results of the entertainer category is that several of the magazine articles dealt
specifically with selected Cuban artists.
I faced another challenge when I attempted to develop categories that best
portray those at work or at rest. I enlisted Lutz and Collins for guidance in
developing this part of the matrix. They noted that photographs in National
Geographic magazine often reflect western assumptions of the typical forms of labor
performed in developing countries versus labor believed synonymous with more
developed countries. They noted that people at work are depicted in two-thirds of the
photographs they sampled from National Geographic (1993, 106). Darker skinned
peoples were more often depicted in manual labor whereas lighter skinned subjects
were portrayed conducting more highly technical labor. Furthermore, whites were
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depicted as idlers or people at rest more often than darker skinned peoples (Lutz and
Collins 1993, 106). In an effort to better document the portrayal of work and rest, I
included four categories related to those topics: Idlers/Posed (those at rest or not
portrayed as performing work), Common Laborers, Private enterprise workers and
Tourism workers.
Idlers are people who are engaged in no discernible activity. They are
sometimes posed to convey a sense of tranquility or restfulness or to better focus on
the physical characteristics of the subject. The deliberate posing of subjects in idle
positions also reflects a more artistic interpretation in the tradition of portraiture.
Idlers were found in over 10 percent of the guidebook images but in less that one
percent of the brochure and magazine images. One possible explanation for this
finding is that Cubans in the brochures and magazines are deliberately portrayed
engaging in some sort of activity on the behalf of the tourist, who is seeking idle-ness
herself. The tourism literature reinforces the idea that tourists are provided
opportunities to be idle. Tourists and potential tourists generally turn to brochures
and magazines to get a better sense of the services provided with the tourist product.
Therefore, these media will be more apt to portray Cubans working rather than in idle
positions.
As noted above, I established three categories for people engaged in some
type of work activity. Common laborers are engaged in non-tourism related statedirected activities that range from agricultural work to tobacco rolling. Common
laborers are portrayed at a higher rate in tourist guides (8.2 percent) than in brochures
(1.3 percent) or magazines (2.4 percent). I developed the category Private Enterprise
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to indicate those engaged in self-employment such as running private restaurants and
repairing bicycle tires. I often deferred to the accompanying text to separate those
tallied under Private Enterprise from those categorized as Common Laborers. Those
engaged in private enterprise made up 2.1 percent of the images in guides and less
than one percent in both brochures and magazines. One reason for this difference
could be that the brochures and magazines are developed to showcase Cuba’s state
tourism offerings and therefore they omit information on competing services (i.e.,
those provided by jineteros) such as private restaurants and private room rentals.
Cuban tourism workers, in contrast to the other categories of workers, were
coded in activities ranging from bartending to hotel reception. Images in this
category occurred more greatly in magazines (32 percent) and tourism brochures
(11.1 percent). Guidebooks portrayed tourism workers in only 1.8 percent of their
images. Indeed, as mentioned above, the tourism magazine Prisma runs several
articles per issue that concentrate on tourism workers in Cuba. It was sometimes
necessary to defer to the printed text to properly code workers, since the nature of the
work performed was not always clear. For example, someone working in a private
paladar was coded as private enterprise while a worker in a tourist restaurant was
counted as a tourism worker.
I included two categories that highlight the construction of Cuba as a socialist
country: heroes and revolutionaries. Photos coded under the category of Heroes are
portrayals of Cuba’s pantheon of revolutionaries who had been granted meritorious
status by the Castro regime. The two most popular were Che Guevara and Jóse
Martí. The Revolutionary category included portrayals of those engaged in activities
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with an overt theme of nationalism. For example, Cubans participating in popular
rallies and waving Cuban flags would be coded under this category. Interestingly,
heroes and Revolutionaries were both more evident in tourism guidebooks
(collectively portrayed in 8.6 percent of the images) than in brochures (0.1 percent) or
magazines (2.0 percent). For this reason, this particular category more greatly
reflects outsiders constructions of Cuba. One reason for the greater emphasis on
revolutionary heroes in U.S. produced guides, I believe, is to emphasize the Otherness
of Cuba and to accent themes of interest to a general audience. Also, guidebooks
concentrate more heavily on Cuban history and the political system; brochures and
magazines tend to focus more on the services offered by the industry. Furthermore,
the Castro regime likely wishes to de-emphasize many of the revolutionary tenets that
largely run counter to a tourism industry focused on consumption.
The remaining categories require explanation, as well. “Rafters” are images
of Cubans attempting to sail to the United States in homemade vessels, an activity
that increased with the economic difficulties of the Special Period. I included this
category in response to high profile media reports that attempted to portray the rafters
as symbolic of a failing socialist system. However, only three photographs depicted
this activity, all of which were in guidebooks. In the same vein, western media reports
of the paucity of materials available in the peso economy coupled with the rise in the
importance of dollar stores in the Special Period led to widespread interest in the
shopping habits of Cubans. As a consequence, depictions of Cubans as shoppers are
found in fourteen photographs, five of which were in the guidebooks.
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Sports is another theme that is frequently reported in both the Cuban and
western media, most often in relation to baseball. Cubans engaged in sporting
activities are found in 27 photographs, 14 of which were found in brochures and ten
that were found in guidebooks. Finally, I tallied children in a separate category
regardless of the activities performed in the image. Children were only coded when
they were pictured without adults present. I pursued this coding method to
concentrate on the actions performed by Cuban adults. Guidebooks portrayed
children in 6.5 percent of their images while brochures (2.8 percent) and magazines
(0.7 percent) lagged behind them. The miscellany category served as a default for
actions that could not be coded in other categories. Seventy-one photographs were
counted under the miscellany category.
I must point out an interesting feature of several of the Cuban brochures,
particularly those produced by Horizontes Hotels. It is quite obvious to even the
casual observer that the “tourists” portrayed in the brochures are in actuality Cuban
models. For this reason, I added the category “locals as tourists” not to reflect
portrayals of Cubans as tourists in their own country, but rather Cubans thinly
disguised as foreign tourists (see Plate 9). The majority of images in this category
were found in brochures due to the fact that Horizontes in particular developed an
entire series built around Cuban models. Indeed, over 38 percent of the images in
brochures were labeled as locals as tourists. By contrast, this category was
represented in less than three percent of magazine and guidebook images.
I included the additional “locals as tourists” category because I believe it
raises some interesting questions regarding representations of Cubans. With the
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exception of one pair of models, the Cuban “tourists” are not only white but
additionally very fair skinned people who frequently sport blond hair. While their
clothing and other markers reveal their Cubanness to Cuban and outside observers,
their presence in tourism photographs reveals, evidently, the “types” (read phenotype)
of tourists sought by Cuban officials. Indeed, in one photograph, the ostensibly
European couple descend the stairs from a French airliner with the caption, “First
Impressions: 100% clear skies. The Cubatur guide was there and welcomed us in our
own language” (Havana with Cubatur 1997).
It must be noted that the matrix I chose and the coding of each photograph
might be critiqued on several scores. To begin, any reading of an image is
susceptible to multiple interpretations depending on the “position” of the viewer
(Cooper 1994, 145). This includes the potential for some to question the ability of the
researcher to properly categorize the images. The researcher must be careful to
categorize the portrayed information in such as way as to refrain from under or overstating a particular phenomenon. I have attempted to address this point by coding
only one category per image rather than attempting to code all portrayed activity
present in every image.
Another level of critique deals with the accuracy of racial coding. As
established in Chapter Five, racial divisions in Cuba are more fluid than in the United
States thereby confounding easy categorization based on racial features. As Carrion
has noted,
“The issue of race in Cuba is a complex one; some say that there are as many
opinions about race as there are Cubans. Cuba is a racially mixed society, with
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more flexible and ambiguous racial identities and definitions - unlike the
United States, where one drop of black blood has historically defined a person
as being Black” (Carrion, 2000).
I am comfortable that my personal assessment of the photos in question (regarding
my ability to differentiate between the racial groupings) is valid in that I am a
member of the general audience (North Americans and Western Europeans) that the
literature is geared towards. I am well aware that many dark-skinned Cubans
differentiate themselves using a wider spectrum and largely reject the
black/brown/white divide. However, as my sampling indicates, marketers prefer to
portray the Cuban citizenry as predominately white either in regards to service
workers, or the population as a whole.

Discussion of Findings

In the previous section, I established the rationale of the matrix and I
discussed the results of each category on the y-axis in terms of the frequency of
images presented in each of the three media. At this point, I turn to a discussion of
the portrayal of images on the basis of race and gender. I will present the results of
the analysis at two levels: first, I will explain the race and gender patterns that
emerged from the overall matrix, and second, I will contextualize the social and
geographic ramifications of my findings as they relate to the constructions of race and
gender in Cuba.
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Based on frequency of appearance, black and mulatto Cubans are
underrepresented in photographs detailing the tourism industry, although they are
perhaps better represented in tourism guides that present an overview of the country
as a whole. Recall that mulattos and blacks make up an estimated 62 percent of the
Cuban population whereas whites account for 37 percent of the population, according
to the CIA World Factbook (2002). The cohort of blacks and mulattos is found in
only 20 percent of all photos that include representations of people. In the
guidebooks, blacks and mulattos are represented in 25 percent of the images while
that figure drops to 11.1 percent of the images in magazines and 10.8 percent of
brochures. Photographs that depict exclusively black and mulatto men account for
only 5.7 percent of the total. Of those, 35 percent depict Afro-Cubans as
“entertainers” who are generally playing in music groups for tourists (See Figure 3).
By contrast, only seven percent of the photos depicting exclusively black and mulatto
men portray them as tourism workers.
Black and mulatta women are also underrepresented as a whole (See Figure
4). They are found exclusively in only four percent of the photographs. Of those
portrayals, two-thirds of the photos depict them as either “entertainers” or
“exotic/sexualized.” Like the black and mulatto males, they are rarely portrayed as
tourism workers (only six percent of black and mulatta representations fall under this
category.) Both sexes of blacks and mulattos are also more highly represented as
“idlers/posed” than their white counterparts. Black and mulatto males and females
are counted in this category in nine percent of the photos, whereas whites are depicted
as idlers/posed in two percent of the photos where they are exclusively pictured.
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Figure 3: Black/Mulatto Male Depictions by Category

1. Tourists
2. Locals and Tourists
3. Children
4. Exotic (sexualized)
5. Entertainer
6. Heroes
7. Idlers/Posed
8. Laborer (common)
9. Miscellany
10. Private Enterprise
11. Rafters
12. Revolutionary
13. Shoppers
14. Sports
15. Transportation
16. Tourism Worker
17. Locals as Tourists
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Figure 4: Black/Mulatta Female Depictions by Category

1. Tourists
2. Locals and Tourists
3. Children
4. Exotic (sexualized)
5. Entertainer
6. Heroes
7. Idlers/Posed
8. Laborer (common)
9. Miscellany
10. Private Enterprise
11. Rafters
12. Revolutionary
13. Shoppers
14. Sports
15. Transportation
16. Tourism Worker
17. Locals as Tourists
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I believe this can be explained by the propensity to portray darker-skinned Cubans as
signifiers of the Caribbean region in general. White Europeans and North Americans
expect to see images of darker-skinned natives in this region. Overall, however, given
that Afro-Cubans and mulattos are generally considered to make up a majority of the
population in Cuba by most observers, darker-skinned Cubans are generally underrepresented in most categories of the tourism literature.
White females, while outnumbered by white males in the analysis, are
portrayed in greater numbers in three main categories: exotic (sexualized) where they
make up more than 50 percent of those portrayed, tourism worker (they are portrayed
in 27.6 percent of the images in this category), and locals as tourists (See Figure 5).
This last category is skewed based on a large number of photos (over 200) published
by Horizontes that detailed a complete vacation by an ostensibly French couple
through the course of an entire brochure. Pictures of this brochure were borrowed for
publication in others, thereby exaggerating the presence of this couple in the sample.
While white females have a larger number of images characterized as “exoticsexualized” as compared to Afro-Cuban and mulatta women, they account for a lower
number of images proportional to their overall total. Proportionally, Afro-Cuban and
mulatta women were more often portrayed as exotic-sexualized subjects in the
sample. By contrast, men overall were deemed exotic-sexualized in less than eight
percent of the images in that category.
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Figure 5: White Female Depictions by Category
1. Tourists
2. Locals and Tourists
3. Children
4. Exotic (sexualized)
5. Entertainer
6. Heroes
7. Idlers/Posed
8. Laborer (common)
9. Miscellany
10. Private Enterprise
11. Rafters
12. Revolutionary
13. Shoppers
14. Sports
15. Transportation
16. Tourism Worker
17. Locals as Tourists
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White males, in contrast to the other cohorts, were more commonly portrayed as
tourism workers. In images where white males were photographed exclusively and
with white females, they accounted for over 61 percent of the total number of tourism
workers. White males were also presented more frequently in all three media and
were present in almost two-thirds of all images where people were depicted (See
Figure 6).
The dearth of Afro-Cuban and mulatto representation in the tourist literature is
consistent with their overall low level of representation in tourism-related
employment. These findings closely correspond to those reported by de la Fuente
who noted that hotel administrators have expressed their preference for whites or
light-skinned mulattos because those groups have a reported “buen aparencia” (good
looks) that they believed tourists desired and expected (de la Fuente in Howell 2001).
In terms of racial representation in the tourist literature, my findings mirror those of
Marshment who found “an average of one [photo of black holiday goers] per
brochure massively under-represents the proportion of young black people in the
population” (1997, 21). The portrayal of Afro-Cubans and mulattos as primarily
“entertainers” and as “exotic” practitioners of santería in many ways confirms
stereotypes held by Cuba’s most sought-after tourists. This state of affairs parallels
the findings of Jackson who studied Afro-Cubans in the U.K. He writes,
“(The) West Indians’ alleged propensities for sports and
entertainment…serve(s) a restrictive and exclusionary function, confining
black people to certain occupations and reflecting an inequality in the power
of definition which is not afforded reciprocally to those who are thus defined.”
(Jackson, 1989:148)
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Figure 6: White Male Depictions by Category

1. Tourists
2. Locals and Tourists
3. Children
4. Exotic (sexualized)
5. Entertainer
6. Heroes
7. Idlers/Posed
8. Laborer (common)
9. Miscellany
10. Private Enterprise
11. Rafters
12. Revolutionary
13. Shoppers
14. Sports
15. Transportation
16. Tourism Worker
17. Locals as Tourists
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He believes that representations of race in the popular media (and, in this case, the
tourism literature) often reflect the cultural discourse of racism that has become
institutionalized as the dominant ideology in countries such as the U.K. Because the
developed-world countries exhibit institutionalized racism often based on and
reinforced by powerful stereotypes, representations of race found in the tourist
literature mirror or reflect the prevailing discourse found in wider society.
As further proof, take the image of the mulatta performer, pervasive in both
tourism brochures and tourism guidebooks. Cuban tourism officials believe that
visitors come to see these exotic dancers who were also a powerful symbol of Cuban
tourism in the 1950s. According to Kutzinski (1993), the “iconic mulatta is a
symbolic container for all the tricky questions about how race, gender, and sexuality
inflect the power relations that obtain in colonial and postcolonial Cuba” (1993, 7).
According to Figure 4, Afro-Cuban women and mulattas are overwhelmingly
portrayed as exotic figures or entertainers (or both); they are categorized as such in
two-thirds of the photographs where they are exclusively depicted. Coffay’s study of
the representation of mulattas in the Cuban tourism literature also points to the
predominant portrayal of the so-called “hot mulatta,” a woman best identified by her
sex appeal (and supposed sexual appetite) (Coffay 2001).
One reason for the portrayal of blacks as “entertainers” is that santería has
been popularized in recent years, in part to take advantage of a perceived tourist
demand for santería-themed entertainment (see Cubaweb 2002). For this reason, a
potential tourist to Cuba who had little knowledge of the island beforehand, upon
perusing the tourist literature would be forgiven for assuming that santería was a form
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of popular entertainment. Santería practitioners, many with explicit blessing by the
government, offer an “insiders” view of the religion by “performing” specific rites for
the consumption of foreign tourists.
Many tourism observers have lamented that this commodification of
“traditional” rites of some societies leads to an overall “cheapening” and degeneration
of local ritual and artistic endeavors in the process of their morphing into tourist-only
shows (see MacCannell 1999, Taylor 1993, and Urry 1990, et al). However, Harrison
has shown in the case of Alarde, a ritual common in Fuenterrabia in Northern Spain,
that focus on the ritual “held considerable political significance for the townspeople”
(Harrison 1995, 21). He notes, “that the ritual became a tourist attraction, and was
used as a source of income, undergoing changes in the process, is not at issue; that it
lost meaning for the local people is highly debatable” (Harrison 1995, 21). Other
scholars noted by Harrison have found that tourism can actually strengthen local
support for traditional arts, crafts and tradition, particularly in the case of Bali in
Indonesia.
One of the promises of travel to developing world destinations is a sense of
moving back in time, to observe a more primitive or “authentic” lifestyle of the
advertised Other (Cooper 1994, 159). Despite the marketing of Cuba that highlights
its Caribbean-ness, tourism promoters are careful to represent a hint of Cuba’s
political uniqueness, though in a non-threatening way. Signs of Cuba’s past,
including the predominance of 1950s American automobiles lends the country a
particular timeless and quaint charm. Pictures documenting the typical “Tropicana”
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style show draw on the same “nostalgic” idea of Cuba as it was in the 1950s, yet
without the decadence of gambling and overt prostitution.
In sum, with a few exceptions, Cubans are represented in similar ways by both
Cuban and international editors of tourism literature. This suggests that the
representations of Cubans in the tourism literature are largely based on existent
models that favor images of inequality. As mentioned previously, the government
has chosen this course of action rather than focus on Cuba’s revolutionary successes.
While tourism brochures, magazines and guides perform different functions within
the spectrum of tourism literature, they all include representations that privilege the
white (read European or Western) tourist gaze.
I believe the portrayal of women and darker-skinned Cubans in the tourism
literature illustrates the concept of “discursive violence” as discussed by Jones, Nast
and Roberts. Discursive violence involves “practices to script groups or persons in
places and in ways that counter how they would define themselves” (1997, 393-94).
In the process, the socio-spatial relations counter how the groups or persons would
define themselves. The end effect is that they are relegated to “subaltern” or
essentially minority positions in society (Jones, Nast and Roberts 1997, 394).
As I have previously documented, racism in Cuba remains a powerful issue
that is hidden beneath official proclamations of racial equality. However,
representations found in the tourism literature suggest that Afro-Cubans and mulattos
are not equally represented in the tourism industry. Indeed, the representations of
darker-skinned Cubans in the tourism literature (or lack thereof) are consistent with
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the overall hierarchical status of differently hued Cubans on the island itself. In short,
the hidden becomes overt and concrete in the Cuban-produced tourism literature.

242

CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusions

The purpose of this research was to investigate the intersection of race, gender
and tourism during Cuba’s Special Period. I hypothesized that Cuba’s focus on
tourism betrays revolutionary principles by privileging practices that are
discriminatory and unequal. At the beginning of the study, I posed several questions
built around the query, “development for whom? I address this question below by
examining Cuba’s track record during the Special Period. Secondly, I tested
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, a Marxist model based on the assumption that
hegemonic power is rooted in the Western European capitalist model. My goal was
to test this theory by deciphering how hegemonic power is wielded in Castro’s Cuba,
a self-proclaimed socialist society. The socialist government argues that many of its
maladies are products of the island’s attempt to participate in the global marketplace
under its own terms, while maintaining a modicum of basic services in the areas of
health care, education, housing, and food provision. However, as this dissertation
asserts, the Castro regime has deliberately attempted to exclude the average Cuban
citizen from full participation in new tourism economy and in the process has allowed
for an overall decline in standards of living and reduced access to a formerly wellfunctioning, but Soviet subsidized social safety net; in short, the government has
failed to live up to revolutionary promises of equality and nationalist rhetoric that
favors Cuban citizens.
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The evidence from the research suggests the Castro regime has betrayed the
Revolution at many different levels. First of all, Cuba maintains a growing disparity
between those with access to dollars (and hence enhanced purchasing powers) and
those who must survive largely in the peso economy. I conclude that this divide is
not merely economic, but also has wide-ranging social, racial and gender implications
and leads to other, sometimes less obvious, divisions. Indeed, the divide frequently
falls along lines of race: the evidence shows that lighter skinned Cubans tend to have
greater access to dollars than their darker hued compatriots due to a combination of
demographic patterns and state-supported economic and political practices. On the
one hand, Afro-Cubans and mulattos tend to have fewer family members living
abroad who have the wherewithal to send remittances. Additionally, white Cubans
have used the informal “socio” network to tap friends and relatives for lucrative jobs
in tourism although evidence suggests that race-based hiring practices of some
foreign managers may also play a role in limiting Afro-Cuban involvement in the
tourism sector. If the data from my analysis of the tourism literature are
representative of actual employment patterns, white Cuban males would hold the
greatest number of jobs. Race-linked economic patterns are consistent with
government attempts to stifle real debate about race and racism on the island, a point I
developed in Chapter Four.
At another level, Cuba’s tourism product during the Special Period is eerily
similar to that of the 1950s: apartheid tourism has been reconstituted, albeit in
different forms, and inequality and racial/gender divisions of labor (that never
completely disappeared) remain in force. Early in the Special Period, the average
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Cuban citizen was denied access to most tourism installations regardless of their
ability to pay in the requisite dollars although evidence suggests that Cubans are now
able to enter dollar shops in the poshest hotels (Scarpaci, personal communication,
April 2003). However, Cubans are continually denied access to many of Cuba’s
finest beaches and are limited in their ability to enjoy the fruits of tourism themselves.
Cubans are also denied access to self-employment opportunities and while the
island’s tourism infrastructure continues to grow, the government has severely
restricted the development of private industry to meet the needs of the tourism
industry. Therefore, rather than evolving in organic fashion, tourism remains a
centrally planned and produced industry built on external capital investment coupled
with restrictions on the development of private spill-over industries. Recent reports
suggest that the government is attempting to increase its hegemonic control by
restricting private sector activities both in the legal and illegal realms (Rodriguez
2003). To cite one example, government control of the tourism supply network is
evident in the maintenance of state-operated “art factories” in Havana and Varadero
that produce tourist trinkets and souvenirs for international tourists. The average
Cuban citizen currently has no legal option to open a private souvenir production
business.
I conclude that, in direct contrast to Marxist and Gramscian theory that links
the rise and maintenance of hegemonic power exclusively with capitalist regimes,
Castro’s Cuba functions as a de-facto hegemony at several different levels. First of
all, the regime stifles debate and dissent with the blanket response that anything not
for the revolution is aligned against the revolution (i.e., counter-revolutionary) (see
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Dalton 1993, 14-15). Indeed, the Castro regime remains the ultimate arbiter in
determining whether practices are acceptable or counter-revolutionary. Thus, when
Castro proclaims that the conditions for racial and gender inequality have been erased
by the Revolution and racism and sexism will cease to exist in socialist Cuba, there
are no avenues open for real debate. Secondly, Castro maintains a discourse that all
are equal in a Revolution where the State is the designated provider. At one level,
Cuba’s enviable health statistics indicate that the regime has been successful in
providing basic care to its citizenry, although there appear to be increasing holes in
the system. Further, the data show that Cubans receive adequate caloric intake, in
spite of an overall reduction of the amount of food available through the libreta, or
state-run ration system (see Scarpaci, Segre and Coyula 2002, 249-254). At the same
time, Castro has frequently cracked down on private enterprise and vocal opposition
groups in an effort to maintain his grip on power. Opposition groups, in particular,
have been subject to harsh jail sentences as counterrevolutionaries (Human Rights
1999; 2002). While the regime embraces capitalism, Cuban citizens are instructed to
stay the socialist course or pay a severe penalty. In this way, the segregation of
tourists and Cubans is an indication that the regime has failed to uphold revolutionary
precepts.
As Jackson (1989) and Lefebvre (1991) noted, a plurality of cultures exists in
every society, and each attempts to resist the dominant hegemon. During the Special
Period, Cubans have resisted Castro’s hold on power in many ways. In a less direct
manner, people engage in black market activities and acts of jineterismo, including
sex work. Some have resisted by attempting to leave the country by various means
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including meeting and marrying foreigners to attempting to cross the Florida Straits
by raft and speedboat. In an effort to exercise its control over potential vehicles of
dissent, the government has attempted to derail opposition, in part by appropriating
aspects of culture such as santería spectacles and Afro-Cuban music ranging from son
to rap. In line with their economic goals, the government has packaged santería
ceremonies and indigenous Afro-Cuban music for sale to foreign consumers.
I maintain that acts of jineterismo pose a direct challenge to the government’s
socialist discourse, even though many acts are carried out to meet pressing needs. For
example, the evidence shows that sex work is folded into wider considerations of
jineterismo meaning that the definition of prostitution is imbued with Marxist
overtones in Cuba. This interpretation of prostitution has important gender and racial
implications. Indeed, Cuban sex workers, rather than being vilified by the general
public for perceived moral lapses, sometimes command respect by those who view
them as the ultimate entrepreneurs or survivors during the Special Period (Herrera
2000, 124; Fusco 1998, 154). Like women in other countries, Cuban sex workers are
often charged with caring for extended families through their hard-currency earning
power. Many Cubans apparently view sex work in the same vein as selling goods and
services in the black market; in other words, a means to a financial end. This is
important to realize because Cubans, unlike people in most societies, may celebrate
the female sex worker as one with the wherewithal to successfully navigate the Cuban
“New Economy,” often with the tacit support (which was more overt in the early
stages of the Special Period) of the Cuban government. Furthermore, Afro-Cuban
women and mulattas turn their “Othered” status in their own favor by attracting North
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American and European men seeking an “exotic” encounter with a darker-skinned
woman.
Nonetheless, a cautionary note on this point is in order. While the rate of
HIV/AIDS is reportedly low in Cuba, sex workers certainly expose themselves to the
danger of contracting the disease and they also open themselves up to the potential for
violence and abuse at the hands of clients. Additionally, although state or privately
owned brothels do not exist in Cuba and the widespread trafficking in women that
occurs in other tourist destinations such as Thailand does not occur in Cuba
(O’Connell Davidson 1998, 29-30). Some observers note the presence of procurers in
tourism locales who act as intermediaries between tourist and sex worker (Scarpaci,
personal communication, April 2003). Further, the possibility exists that Cuban
women (as well as boys and girls) are subject to coercion into sex work by family
members or relatives who recognize the potential to significantly increase personal or
family incomes. To my knowledge, no studies have been completed that address the
issue of coercion among sex workers in Cuba and this topic represents an important
avenue for further study.
In this study I was also concerned with the spatial considerations of sex work
and other activities characterized as jineterismo. I found that the prevalence of sex
workers in the tourism industry is not uniform, but rather demonstrates distinct spatial
patterns. Sex workers predominate in the major tourism centers, but the occurrence
of sex work varies by space and scale. The comparison between Havana and
Varadero reveals a situation where sex work remains largely available in the former
city (albeit increasingly hidden from view), but has been severely restricted in the
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latter. This state of affairs is the result of several factors including considerations of
the scale and “image” of these tourist locations. For example, Varadero, after initially
exhibiting “free-wheeling” sex for hire, has attempted to control jineterismo in an
effort to (officially) maintain a façade of “respectability” by projecting an overt image
that portrays Varadero as a “family” resort. Varadero is also much easier to police by
virtue of its relative size and the fact that only one road connection exists between the
“peninsula” (Varadero is actually an island) and the mainland and it is controlled by a
toll booth. At another level of scale, the locations where sex work is negotiated within
Havana have shifted over the course of the Special Period from public spaces
associated with tourism centers such as lobbies of tourist hotels and street corners of
popular tourist locales such as the Malecón waterfront and the squares of Old Havana,
to increasingly private clubs and discotheques that are government owned and
operated but are largely off-limits to average Cuban citizens.
Because the production of space in Cuba ultimately rests with the Castro
leadership ostensibly operating within the tenets of the Revolution, the researcher can
achieve a fairly accurate and comprehensive reading of the status of Cuba’s citizens
over the course of the revolutionary period. In other words, since no meaningful (or
even legal) opposition exists, spatial productions and representations can be
accurately assessed and compared to revolutionary pronouncements and goals. In
order to place these current representations in perspective, it is useful to recall the
situation of women and blacks in the tourism industry of 1950s era Cuba. According
to one source, women were frequently regarded as “hospitality specialists,” a loose
term that encompassed beautiful smiling tour guides and waitresses, exotic dancers
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and sex workers. Blacks were also entertainers (mainly musicians) who were barred
from the higher class hotels and beaches patronized by American tourists and wealthy
Cubans (Caute 1974, 36). According to my data, Cubans once again perform many
of these functions as the country recycles images from the perceived heyday of Cuban
tourism in the 1950s. These images are perpetuated in the tourism literature that is
produced for the consumption of international tourists. In the final analysis, Cuba’s
tourism space remains a highly gendered and racialized field controlled by a strong,
centrally focused hegemonic power.

Afterword: The Future of Tourism in Cuba

In January 2003, Fidel Castro attended the grand opening of the Hotel Playa
Pesquero, a new 944-room resort in Holguin province located on the northeast coast
of Cuba. The hotel complex cost $100 million and was completed in 22 months with
some capital and technical assistance provided by the French firm Bouygues (Castro
2003). A year before, christening a hotel on the scale of the Playa Pesquero may have
appeared ostentatious and even foolhardy. Like many countries that depend on
tourism, Cuba suffered a downturn in tourist arrivals in the aftermath of the
September 11th, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the
Pentagon in Washington, D.C. (Burns 2001). In 2002, Cuba witnessed an overall five
percent decline in arrivals from the previous year, a state of affairs that further
dampened the country’s economic outlook. According to one source, tourism was
down twenty percent in the first six months of 2002 but recovered somewhat in the
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months of November and December (Espinosa 2003). Government figures in January
2003 pointed to a 33 percent increase from the same month in 2002, leading some to
declare that the industry was in the midst of a healthy recovery (Snow 2003).
The fact that Castro and the Cuban elite showed up to the grand opening of
the Playa Pesquero in all of their finery suggests the continued importance the regime
places on the production of tourism space in Cuba and the degree to which the regime
has strayed from focusing on the well-being of Cuban citizens. Castro delivered a
speech that was broadcast throughout the country in which he touted the amenities of
the hotel. As Snow noted, the broadcast included sweeping shots of the coastline and
close-up views of the new complex, a hotel that Cubans cannot freely visit (Snow
2003). Cuba now maintains 40,000 hotel rooms throughout the country, most of
which are reserved for international visitors. Cuba and its joint venture partners have
planned a further 2,000 rooms that are slated to be completed by the end of 2003
(Castro 2003). Despite the downturn in tourism numbers in 2002, the government
added 1,500 new hotel rooms in that year alone.
Immediately before the 2002 downturn in tourists, the Cuban government
began a campaign to proclaim that the worst of the Special Period was over. (It
appears from the recent turn-about in Cuba’s tourism fortunes that in the short term,
the country can once again count on tourism revenue to serve as their motor for
development). According to the Castro regime, the tourism industry is the key source
of growth and the populace was exhorted to “stay the course” and support continued
efforts to expand Cuba’s tourism infrastructure. Billboards were plastered across the
island that read: "Revolución es Construir'' (Revolution means building). Another
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billboard pictured Cubans in hard hats with their fists raised with the caption:
"Hombres de Nuestros Tiempos'' (Men of Our Time) (San Martin May 27, 2001).
From a Gramscian point of view, these regime-sponsored promotions of
nationalism were carried out in an effort to maintain the public’s “voluntary” consent
for Castro’s policies. In other words, the Cuban population is sold the idea that the
sacrifices necessary to promote tourism serve the best interests of both the Cuban
government and the Cuban people. However, the reality is that Castro is merely
attempting to maintain his hegemonic grip on the island. Gramsci believed that
hegemonic power was the result of European-rooted capitalism and socialism
represented a means counteract the negative aspects of hegemony. Castro’s socialist
experiment in Cuba is evidence that hegemony can be achieved in any society where
a plurality of cultures is actively suppressed in favor of an agenda followed by a
dominant, unaccountable regime. To cite a recent example, the Cuban government
began a crack down on black market activities and on jineterismo in general in
January 2003, a policy that does not bode well for Cubans attempting to earn a living
during a period when the government remains steadfast on keeping austerity
measures in place (Rodríguez Valdés 2003). Castro demonstrated the lengths he is
willing to go to maintain power when in April 2003 he ordered the detention of
independent journalists and the executions of three Afro-Cubans responsible for an
attempted hijacking of a ferry boat (Kellogg 2003). While the perpetrators of the
hijacking were evidently attempting to defect to the United States, the government
labeled them terrorists and counter-revolutionaries and summarily issued the death
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penalty. Indeed, Castro’s famous assertion “everything for the Revolution, nothing
against” is a key component in the maintenance of hegemony in Cuba.
As I noted in Chapter Two, Duncan asserts that each discourse forms
attendant landscape models that are reflections of the culture within which they were
built (1991, 11). The development of Cuba’s tourism landscape underlines this point
at several levels. For example, Cuba continues to transform its prime locations into
tourist attractions designed for the exclusive use of foreign visitors, in essence to
create exclusionary “capitalist” space. Indeed, with a few execeptions, Cubans are
not allowed to freely utilize this space. In both Varadero and the northern Cayes,
Cubans are actively denied access to these areas through the use of toll booths and
checkpoints. In effort to support his socialist discourse for the Cuban populace,
Castro actively touts the campismo popular infrastructure as Cuban space. However,
my interviews with Cubans established that few have a desire to visit the poorly
appointed camping infrastructure. Indeed, it is telling that several campismo sites,
including the former Rincón Frances on Varadero peninsula, have been reallocated
for use by international tourists, a signal that the dominant capitalist discourse has
trumped the socialist discourse and that Cubans have lost access to space in the
process. In short, much of the new tourist development occurs in enclaves that serve
as physical reminders of separate, yet unequal state-constructed tourism landscapes in
Cuba today.
Fidel Castro recently reiterated his assertion that Cuba could potentially attract
an additional one million visitors to the island, thereby increasing the number of
arrivals by one-third, in the event that the U.S. government lifts travel restrictions for
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American citizens. Castro joked with attendees of the hotel grand opening by stating,
“we will practically have to move from the country, that day their constitutional right
to travel is respected” (Castro 2003, n.p). However, recent action from across the
Florida Straits suggests that Castro will have to wait for that day. In March 2003, the
Office of Foreign Assets Control decided not to renew non-student travel licenses to
Cuba. As a result, alumni groups, museums, and other non-profits (except religious
organizations) will not be able to travel to Cuba in 2004, or whenever their license
expires, leaving only church groups, scholars, students enrolled in classes, and
American journalists legally able to travel to Cuba from the states (Scarpaci, personal
communication, April 2003). This recent policy change on behalf of the U.S.
government suggests that despite greater trade connections between the two
countries, it appears that only a voluntary or forced removal of Castro from office
would precipitate normalized relations between Cuba and the United States that
would include the removal of travel restrictions.
In sum, I believe that recent efforts to re-establish central control in Cuba has
led to a latter-day Rectification Period emerging in 2003. Some of the similarities
between Cuba in 1986 and 2003 include a perception by Castro that private
entrepreneurs possess too much wealth, thereby posing a threat to the regime’s
control. In 1986, the wealth in the private sector was generated through market
openings, primarily in agriculture. Today, remittances from abroad and access to tips
fuel growing disparities of wealth in the country. In addition, as in 1986, external
economic shocks, in this case related to a world-wide downturn in tourism in late
2001 and 2002, have given the government cause for concern. It is my belief that the
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regime feels that a crackdown is necessary lest growing opposition movements
(personified in the signators of the Varela project) gain too much power for the
government to counteract. The key question remains whether tourism revenue will
lead to significant improvements in the living standards of average Cubans,
particularly women and darker-skinned people as the government says it will.
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Cuba: A Practical Guide
Cuba: Flor de Islas
Cubamar: Naturaleza
Cubamar: Turismo especializado
Cubatur: La Habana
Horizontes Hoteles: Aparthoteles y Villas
Horizontes Hoteles: Caza
Horizontes Hoteles: Cuba
Horizontes Hoteles: Cuba
Horizontes Hoteles: Ecoturismo
Horizontes Hoteles: Pesca
Horizontes Hoteles: Pinar del Rio
Islazul: Cienfuegos
Las Terrazas Tourist Complex
Rumbos: Cienfuegos
Rumbos: Palacio del Valle
Rumbos: Santiago de Cuba
Rumbos: Varadero
Havanatur: En cuerpo y alma
Havanatur: Guia de Hoteles
Havanatur: Guia de Museos
Cubanacan: 94-95
Havanatur: Informacion Tecnica
Magna Holidays: Cuba, Turn Up the Heat
Montemar: Peninsula de Zapata
Air Transat Holidays: 97-98
Alba Tours: Fall, Winter, Spring (97-98)
Hola Sun: 97-98
Sunbook Vacations: 97-98

Guides (279 photographs)
1990
Italy
1992
Cuba
1996
UK
1999
USA
2000
USA
2000
USA

Guia de Varadero
Varadero: Guia Turistica
Insight Guide: Cuba
Cuba Companion
In Focus: Cuba
Moon Handbooks: Cuba
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Year

Country Produced

Magazines (212 photographs)
1995
Cuba
1995
Cuba
1995
Cuba/Spain**
1996
Cuba

Title/Publisher
Prisma: (No. 268)
Prisma (No. 269)
Viajeros Cuba
Prisma (No. 275)

Study Literature: 40 publications
Photos Sampled: 1220
*Edited in Cuba, published and distributed in Canada
**Edited in Cuba, published and distributed in Spain
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Appendix 2: Tourism Images

Figure 7: Tourism “Signs.” Portrayed are some of the “signs” of Cuba that inform
the tourist gaze. Note the 1950s era American automobile, the exotic mulatta, the
stylized white sand beach and the colonial architecture.
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Figure 8: Diferente. Accenting the exotic and the “different” for potential cruise
customers. Note the portrayals of the Cuban and Jamaican “natives” (the exotic
mulatta, the entertainers and the cigar smoking native with accented “bemba (lips).”
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Figure 9: Tourism Icon. An example of the iconic “hot mulatta.” Examples such as
these were coded: Exotic (sexualized) in the matrix.
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Figure 10: Ché. This image was also coded Exotic (sexualized). Note the
“revolutionary” component with Ché portrayed in the background.
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Figure 11: Laborers. Images of cigar producers are found in all tourism literature
categories. Examples such as this were coded common laborers.
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Figure 12: Tourism Image Juxtaposition. These images were published side-byside in Insight Guide: Cuba. The text juxtaposed the carefree, dollar-spending
European tourist with the Cubans of “la cola,” the lines characteristic of the Special
Period where those who earn primarily pesos are forced to spend a large percentage
of their time.
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Figure 13: Female Tourism Worker. This image was coded White Female Tourism
Worker.
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Figure 14: Male Tourism Workers. These images portray scenes in Havana’s
famed Bodeguita del Medio. The image on the left was coded White Male
Entertainers and the image on the right was coded White Male Tourism Worker. In
an effort to focus on representations of Cubans in the tourism literature, the tourists in
these images were not coded in the matrix.
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Figure 15: Locals as Tourists. These models are a prominent couple in many of the
Cuban produced tourism brochures. Horizontes Hoteles developed a series of
brochures built around a storyline that focused on these models. In the brochures,
they are identified as European, but this and other photos suggest their Cuban-ness.
This image was coded White Gender Mix: Locals as Tourists.
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Figure 16: Idle/Posed Cuban Woman. Cubans as “idlers/posed” were more
prominent in tourism guidebooks than in magazines and brochures. I keyed this
woman as posed (as opposed to merely idle) because the point of interest is her mode
of dress and general countenance.
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